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ABSTRACT 
South Africa is facing a backlog with regard to service delivery in rural areas. Therefore, 
local government reform has been one of the pertinent issues which has occupied the political 
landscape since the early 1990s. Key to this transitional period to democracy was a 
realization that different communities have diverse experiences with traditional leadership 
depending on their geographical location in South Africa. But to a large extent the changes 
that took place in traditional leadership were imposed on the local structures by the national 
government. Thus, most traditional leaders and their advisers found themselves implementing 
policies which they did not necessarily support. 
This study seeks to explore developmental local government in a rural context through the use 
of the case study of 10zini Municipality. A key issue in this study is to look at the nature of 
the relationship that exists between the modem and traditional structures and the impact 
thereof on development. 
This study draws from the development literature, lengthy discussions with different experts 
in local government in conferences, seminars, and interviews with different stakeholders such 
as traditional leaders, elected councillors, community members, and municipal officials 
regarding the relationship between traditional leaders and elected councillors in the 
implementation of developmental local government. 
The findings of this study are revealing. After ten years of democracy in South Africa, there 
is still no consensus among different stakeholders on the roles and functions traditional 
leaders should play in mainstream politics in general, and in local government service 
delivery in particular. The findings show that the majority of participants felt that there is a 
need for traditional leaders and elected councillors to work together for the implementation of 
developmental local government in rural local government. Officials find themselves in a 
dilemma in rural local government as a result of what they perceive to be the silence of most 
local government policies on the roles and functions of traditional leaders. Some local 
government officials and councillors believe that the role of traditional leaders in local 
government is important. In the 10zini municipality they work with traditional leaders 
because of the mandate from the IFP political leadership but this does not mean that tensions 
do not exist. There are institutional and political implications emanating from the findings as 
analysis shows that there is a need for a closer look at the two-tier model that currently exists 
in rural local government. 
This study revealed that tensions exist between traditional leaders and elected councillors. 
This study also demonstrates that a confluence of factors and tensions affect the nature of 
relationship and the implementation of developmental local government starting from the 
national government to the communities at local level. As reflected in the study, lack of co-
operation at each level has detrimental effects on the overall implementation of 
developmental local government in the rural context. Therefore, it is clear that all 
stakeholders have a role to play in ensuring that there is proper implementation of local 
government policies in rural areas. However, the government must take a vanguard position 
because it has got all the powers and resources as compared to other stakeholders. 
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1.1 Study Context 
Poor service delivery in rural areas has been a serious problem in South Africa since 
the colonial days. The paradigm shift in governance that started in the 1990s marked 
a watershed in South Africa' s local government sphere, particularly in rural areas 
where a number of opportunities and challenges were identified by different 
stakeholders involved in development planning and implementation. The founding 
local government elections of 199511996 signalled the end of a racially based local 
government system and the beginning of an era where all South Africans had a role to 
play in development. These elections further signalled a shift in the role of traditional 
leaders in local government in rural areas. 
The apartheid legacy created a range of structural disadvantages in rural areas which 
required state intervention to promote development. In rural areas, the apartheid 
government used traditional leaders to provide services that were provided by local 
authorities in urban areas. This move capacitated and provided traditional authorities 
with uncontested powers with regard to service delivery in rural areas. 
According to Greenberg (2004: 7) under the legacy of apartheid, local government 
was imposed on the black population both in urban and rural areas. Such imposition 
intended to give the de facto role to local government to police the apartheid system, 
making sure that most of the segregation policies were implemented as required. To a 
large extent, the rural areas were further divided according to ethnic groups who were 
geographically separated. The demise of apartheid required the overhaul of local 
government system in practice during apartheid regime. There was a need to break 
down ethnic divisions and create a single system of government across rural areas. 
Traditional leaders remained an important and powerful institution in South African 
rural areas because they served as agents of colonial administrators. The apartheid 
government consolidated all the practices of the colonial government. According to 
McIntosh (1996: 239) traditional leaders served as intermediates between government 
and communities during apartheid, particularly in rural areas in the absence of local 
government. Studies confirmed that traditional authority structures were responsible 
for service delivery, development and resource management in rural areas (Munro and 
Barnes, 1996 cited in Cross et ai, 1996: 196). Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000: 271) 
concurred that ' traditional authorities tried to cooperate with provincial and central 
agencies in providing schools and health clinics in the rural areas ' . Traditional 
leadership became a very strong institution in KwaZulu Bantustan due to the support 
it received from Inkatha. 
During the transition period to democracy between 1990 and 1994, enormous debates 
took place in South Africa around the form and functions of national and provincial 
government. However, Ntsebenza (2001: 319) argued that there was a silence in the 
Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993) on the form that local 
government would take in rural areas. The Act was later amended in 1995 where a 
two level structure was recommended with the aim of moving towards equity and 
redistribution between the poor and rich areas. This did not prove to be fruitful. 
Many municipalities were surrounded by poor rural communities, were ineffectively 
administered and did not have strong revenue base. Lane and Faure (1996: 2) argued 
that the Republic of South Africa left the transition phase and entered the 
consolidation stage with several highly disturbing issues unresolved. The issue of the 
relationship between traditional authorities and councillors was the prime case which 
is manifesting itself in the current political debates. 
Furthermore, during the negotiation process for a non-racial local government, some 
stakeholders such as traditional authorities who were serving as local government in 
rural areas were left out. Cloete (1995: 4) observed that Local Government 
Negotiating Forum (LGNF) consisted of representatives of the central, provincial and 
organized local government and the non-statutory delegation. Research by Amtaika 
(1996: 4) revealed that many rural areas did not have these local authority structures 
or non-statutory bodies to represent them in negotiations. 
2 
In the process of local government I transformation, the concept of developmental 
local government2 (DLG) was conceived as a developmental tool both in urban and 
rural areas. The adoption of developmental local government was a strategic approach 
for municipalities in South Africa to address inequalities caused by colonialism and 
apartheid. The adoption of this developmental approach coincided with an undefined 
role for traditional leadership in the Constitution which opened the door for traditional 
authorities to mobilise to reassert their power. Ntsebenza (2001 : 319), for example, 
argued as follows: 
The ANC led post-apartheid government is to attempt to separate these powers 
in favour of the democratically elected structures. At the same time, the very 
same government that recognizes elected representatives in all levels of 
government, also recognizes a hereditary institution of traditional authorities 
without any clarity as to their roles, functions, and powers in developmental 
local government and land. 
This summarises the state of affairs that exists and which became the source of 
conflict and tensions in rural local government in South Africa, and which is currently 
a thorny issue in the pursuit of rural development in South Africa. Currently, rural 
communities believe that traditional authorities are the ones who assist them in 
developmental issues. Goodenough (2002: 85) argued that the contribution made by 
traditional authorities in most rural areas is acknowledged by most communities. 
Martinussen (1997: 172) argued that ' tradition need not impede development'. The 
contribution of traditional leaders in rural development may be misunderstood 
especially in cases where ' they are expected to contribute constructively to 
development programmes, yet on the other, their powers have been reduced 
substantially ' (Keulder, 1998: 302). Failure to understand and appreciate the 
challenges and a confluence of factors facing traditional leaders may lead to them 
being perceived as 'perpetrators' of underdevelopment and with no meaningful role 
to play in the development of rural areas in the current form of rural local 
government. 
) This is the third sphere of government which is closest to the people and has got a responsibility to 
frov!d~ basic services. . '" . . . 
ThiS IS local government committed to workIng With citizens and groups WithIn the community to 
find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of 
their lives (see White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 17) 
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Lahiff (1997: 28) argued that ' the introduction of a new form of local government, 
without disbanding or at least curtailing the powers of the existing structures such as 
traditional authorities, the national government effectively created two parallel 
systems of local government which are now directly competing with each instead of 
complementing each other' . Venson (1996: 279) concluded that ' the success and the 
failure of decentralization depend on the role clarification for the locally based 
statutory bodies, i.e. councillors and traditional leaders' . 
The Jozini Municipality, like the rest of the municipalities in South Africa, is 
undergoing a process of institutional change. More importantly, this municipality was 
established during the consolidation phase of local government (after the 2000 
elections). This municipality found a very serious backlog in service provision, 
including the lack of water supply, electricity, health services and poor road 
conditions. Although several attempts were made to implement development projects 
for Jozini Municipality citizens, it was evident that the majority of the population live 
in poverty. In addition, the majority of areas are under traditional authorities which 
are unequally developed and there is a lack of clarity about future plans. This 
municipality has many pensioners, children and the unemployed (Jozini IDP Review, 
2004). This backlog needs to be addressed through developmental local government 
with its strategies, such as integrated development planning (IDP), budgeting, 
community participation and performance management. Developmental local 
government could be taken as a decentralization mechanism which builds good local 
governance in areas where there has been limited governmental activities. 
There is one aspect from which the challenges of rural local government such as 
Jozini Municipality can be viewed. This thesis highlights the importance of 
dialectical modernization theory which argues that for effective service delivery both 
traditional and modern systems should work together in a desegregated fashion during 
the development process. The main objective of examining dialectical modernization 
theory is to think of possibilities of traditional institutions promoting political 
development from old practices to new ones (Martinussen, 1997: 172). This 
municipality (Jozini) is an experiment as to what people experience in the process of 
learning to work together. 
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This thesis is an attempt to study the process and observe the interactions of 
implanting modern institutions in a traditional setting. Indeed, an understanding of 
this interaction ultimately reveals the constraints and problems, and helps in showing 
which activities of development need to be handled in a complementary manner for 
development to occur in rural areas. It is worth remarking that traditional and modern 
institutions should not be viewed as separate institutions. Instead the link between the 
two is very strong because modern institutions are a product of traditional institutions. 
The White Paper on Local Government (1998: 78) in its concluding comment states: 
There is no reason why African customs and traditions should be seen to be in 
conflict with the demands of the modern governance. What is required is an 
innovative institutional arrangement, which combines the natural capacities of 
both traditional and elected government to advance the development of rural 
areas and communities. 
1.2 Rationale for the research project 
The rationale for the choice of this topic is manifold. First, 10zini Municipality is one 
among the newly established municipalities which are dominated by rural areas in 
different traditional authorities. Second, concerns of traditional authorities within 
democracy have turned out to be among the most politically sensitive issues in the 
new South Africa. Also, with the demise of apartheid, communities in the 
countryside and policy-makers seem to be divided on the matter of traditional 
leadership, and such divisions are likely to impede development. Moreover, both 
rural and urban areas are undergoing a process of restructuring and a study of 10zini 
Municipality provides a contribution of documenting this change in the context of 
difficulties of implementing developmental local government in contexts in post-
apartheid South Africa. It will be argued that actors in development in rural areas do 
not interact on an equal basis, but they exert different levels of control over activities 
promoting development. Interestingly, it is also important to experiment and to 
understand how policies enacted by the government of the ruling party are being 
implemented. The relationship between chiefs or traditional leaders and new 
democratic structures on the ground in the countryside will be evaluated. Lastly, the 
fact that the researcher grew up in one of the wards of this municipality makes the 
choice of the topic important at a personal level, and the information collected could 
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be used to influence the planning process for advocating for better basic serVIce 
delivery. 
1.3 Aim and objectives 
The aim of the study is to explore the implementation of developmental local 
government in a rural context in the Joziril Municipality. The objectives of the study 
are as follows: 
• To identify problems relating to developmental local government in rural local 
government with special reference to the Jozini Municipality. 
• To explore points of agreements and disagreements between traditional 
leaders and democratically elected councillors. 
• To explore the relevance of developmental local government in a rural context 
at Jozini Municipality 
Although the study focused on Jozini Municipality, it is also acknowledged that 
tensions are also found in other municipalities where traditional authorities exist. In 
order to address the aim and the objectives of this study, the following major and 
minor questions were raised in this thesis: 
1.4 Major research questions 
• What is the relationship between councillors and traditional leaders at the 
Jozini Municipality and how it impact on development? 
• How important is the role of traditional leaders and councillors in promoting 
or implementing developmental local government? 
1.5 Minor research questions 
• What are the key development projects at Jozini Municipality? 
• Who are the key drivers in the development of rural areas? 
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• What are constraints facing the implementation of developmental projects at 
10zini Municipality? 
• Is there a way in which the traditional authorities can improve the existing 
way of operating by moving to a new political system? 
1.6 Overview of the study 
The chapters in this study are arranged as follows: 
Chapter 1, the introductory chapter, provides the study context on how the paradigm 
shift in local governance that started in the 1990s marked a watershed in South 
Africa's local government sphere. The chapter traces how traditional leaders became 
intermediates between government and communities under the apartheid regime. 
This chapter states the aim and objectives, the rationale of the research, and concludes 
by giving an overview of the study. 
Chapter 2 provides the conceptual framework used and discusses the debates 
between modernists and traditionalists, exploring how tradition and modern systems 
change in the process which results in a hybrid theory. This chapter further reviews 
the literature on traditional leadership in different countries in Africa. Two countries 
(Uganda and Ghana) were selected to serve as case studies. 
Chapter 3 reVIews the literature on traditional leadership in South Africa, 
highlighting politics behind the incorporation and exclusion of traditional leadership 
in South Africa during the colonial, apartheid and democratic transition period. This 
chapter shows how the apartheid government consolidated colonial practices. It 
further reviews the restructuring process of local government in the democratic era. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used for the purposes of this study. It describes 
the research process, the sampling process and the research techniques. The strengths 
and limitations of the research methodologies are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the data collected in the 10zini Municipality. 
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Chapter 6 locates the 10zini Municipality within the broader context of political 
transformation in South Africa. It provides that the 10zini municipality is not immune 
to problems affecting other municipalities regarding issues such as the relationship 
between traditional leadership and elected representatives. 
Chapter 7 forms the conclusion of this study. It provides a summary of the key 
issues discussed in the preceding chapters and demonstrates the relevance of the 
present study in local government policy-making and transformation. The necessary 
recommendations are also outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1.1 Introduction 
According to Mouton (1990: 191) no meaningful scientific research can exist in 
isolation. Even if a research project is deemed groundbreaking, it draws from studies 
conducted before it. Kaarsholm (1991: 13) was guided by the same belief when he 
argued that history is important since it sets the condition for the development of 
modernity. In other words, we add on already existing body of knowledge. In the 
same vein, this study argues that to understand modern institutions better, one needs 
to know how traditional leadership institutions were organised and how they operated. 
In a nutshell, the thrust of the argument, in the conceptual framework part is that old 
and new leadership institutions complement each other. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts: the conceptual framework and literature 
review. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the relationship between 
traditional and modern institutions. Most of the debates about traditional leaders and 
democratically elected councillors emanate from the condition for the development of 
modernity. 
This chapter further reviews existing literature so as to give a historical overview of 
traditional leadership, particularly during the colonial period, demonstrating the 
nature of the relationship between traditional leadership institutions with the new 
governments (colonial governments, post-independence governments, the apartheid 
and the democratic governments in South Africa). Chazan et al (1999: 77) argued 
that there were quite a lot of changes that took place in Africa from colonial 
penetration to independence which impacted largely to the institutions of traditional 
leadership. Most scholarly analyses revealed that the institution of traditional 
leadership was abolished in different countries on the eve of independence in 
preference of democratic governance systems (Mamdani, 1996). This was premised 
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on the assumption that the institution of traditional leadership was outmoded and was 
corrupted by colonial penetration. 
The dialectical modernisation theory is more applicable in this study. This theory 
allows consideration of the way in which development in a small municipality like 
10zini dominated by traditional leaders and wide remote rural areas and modern 
structures can be achieved. Dialectical modernisation theory works as a link between 
traditional and modern structures. Through the use of dialectical modernisation 
theory the municipality could initiate the good working relationship between the two 
structures. Achieving rural development in 10zini Municipality requires clear vision, 
commitment and consensus on the side of both structures. 
The conceptual framework in this chapter starts by discussing the debates between 
modernists and traditionalists. Observers argue that modernists are convinced that the 
traditional leadership institution has no room in the African context because of its 
primitive and repressive nature. Others contended that the debates and clashes 
between modern and traditional structures need to be seen as primarily a contestation 
of social control. 
It concludes by exploring how tradition and modern systems change in the process 
which results in a hybrid theory. It demonstrates through the experience of India, as 
quite often other societies may have the desire to be modern without necessarily 
losing their own traditional outlook. 
The literature review provides the political history of traditional leadership in order to 
understand the contemporary debates and tensions between traditional leadership 
institutions and governments in Africa. 
It further discusses the role played by the institution of traditional leadership in 
opening the space for colonists to penetrate indigenous societies. It also demonstrates 
how African countries experienced the system of indirect rule. 
The chapter concludes by showing how most countries attempted to establish 
democratic regimes and how nationalists interacted with the institution of traditional 
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leadership. This is presented through two case studies: Ghana and Uganda. These 
country case studies reflect the relationship between traditional rulers and government 
in the process of political transformation. Most of the arguments are placed in 
understanding local government reforms in Africa. 
2.1.2 Debates between modernists and traditionalists 
Keulder' s work argued that most of the work done by scholars on the relationship 
between traditional and modern systems was inspired by the works of Max Weber 
which emphasise that there are clashes between the 'modern' and the ' traditional' 
system (Keulder, 1998: 291). Weber' s conception was criticised since it brought a 
great distortion of the realities of many concrete situations (Gusfield, 1971: 16). This 
criticism was based on studying the relationship between traditional and rational 
economic behaviour of economic growth. Others argued that Weber' s conception 
was more relevant to Germanic history, therefore it could not be easily generalised. 
Gusfield (1971: 15) argued that the model of change which was brought through 
modernisation saw ' existing structures, and values, the content of tradition as 
impediments to changes and are obstacles to modernisation' . 
The African experience, however, shows that old and new leadership institutions are 
not antithetical to each other. For example, researchers such as Nyarnnjoh (2003: 93), 
drawing from the experience of Botswana, argued that Africans are far from giving up 
chieftaincy. Botswana is a country which is a prime case in practising liberal 
democracy in Africa. Using this country as a case study, Nyamnjoh (2003: 94), was 
able to debunk the views expressed by other authors regarding the relationship 
between old and new leadership institutions. This argument criticises modernists who 
tend to be insensitive to cultural structures of African societies. Accordingly, the 
modernists are convinced that the traditional leadership institution has no room in the 
African context as it is seen to be primitive, repressive and unchanging in character 
(ibid, 2003: 94). This traditional leadership institution/chieftaincy seems to be 
repudiated on the ground that men dominate it. Nyarnnjoh (2003: 101) in this case 
study revealed that traditional leadership is far from being dominated by men today. 
This places a message that political developments in Botswana were able to reform 
the traditional leadership institution so that it could accommodate women. 
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Researchers such as Keulder (1998: 293) observed that the clashes between the 
modern state and the institution of traditional leadership need to be seen as primarily a 
contestation for social control. This observation is related to both the colonial and 
post-colonial governments. Keulder (1998) repudiated the view that traditional 
leaders still fall under traditional institutions. Instead, he suggested the view that 
traditional leaders are part of the modern institutions which were created by colonial 
and post colonial governments (ibid, 293). This observation provides a space for one 
to argue that colonial governments transformed traditional institutions in such a way 
that they now tend to be similar with modern institutions. 
Potholm (1977: 124), studying the relationship between tradition and modernity in 
Swaziland, rejected arguments which hold that 'traditional symbols inhibit political 
development and that over time the entire set of beliefs and values associated with 
traditional Swazi social and political life may well prove dysfunctional to the 
attainment of a modern, achievement-oriented society'. He contended that these 
traditional patterns proved to be major sources of national unity to date. Potholm 
(1977: 135) revealed that power for the Ngwenyama has not yet decreased. It was 
remarkable that the Ngwenyama served as an agent of modernity in the socio-
economic system. 
Potholm (1977: 140) further argued that' Swazi traditional authorities used intrusions 
of modernity and modern political techniques to enhance their position and to emerge 
victorious in a protracted struggle against the British, the Pan African parties and 
Europeans'. This suggests that traditional societies easily adapt to modern conditions. 
Without doubt, traditional institutions in Swaziland used homegrown political 
ingredients and techniques to defeat political parties of the time. Political parties of 
the time had no knowledge about the people on the ground. They imported ideas 
from around the globe on which their leaders grounded their philosophies. 
Mngomezulu, writing on the later political developments in Swaziland, found that 
there are debates between traditionalists and modernists. He observed that 'King 
Mswati has an arduous task of satisfying those who tenaciously insist that the 
kingdom's old structures should be retained and at the same time respond to the 
'modernists' who unabashedly argue that such structures are outmoded and should be 
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replaced with something new' (2001: 2). Keulder (1998: 294) argued that those who 
criticise old structures are bound in the ' traditional-modern dichotomy in which 
traditional is seen as backward and modern as advanced ' . Although these researchers 
conducted their research in different countries, they were of the view that 
development can be promoted by different structures. Keulder (1998: 294) was 
sceptical about those who view tradition as static because they are bound to ignore 
that ' traditions are often ' invented ' and hence very 'modern' in context' . 
Mngomezulu (2001: 15) argued that there is no harm in change but that it should be 
grounded on something tangible. It is justifiable to argue that in regional political 
development the debate between traditionalists and modernists is at the centre stage. 
Keulder (1998: 292) observed that the cynical nature of modernists about traditional 
leadership institutions contribute to the debate between traditionalists and modernists. 
For modernists the institution of traditional leadership is seen to be incompatible with 
democratic governance, nation-building and development. This presented a myopic 
view that traditionalists represent backwardness and autocratic rule. Keulder (1998: 
293) suggested that there is no need to worry about sceptical attitudes of modernists 
on traditional leadership institution because that on its own allows an opportunity for 
'political elites with a potentially powerful instrument to strengthen the state, to 
enhance its capacities, to monopolise social control , and to contribute to national 
projects such as development and nation-building' . Keulder (1998) advanced this 
view because he is sceptical about the state of affairs in Africa. Accordingly, research 
seems to suggest that there is a need in Africa to strengthen the state because it has 
proved to be a weak institution; it fails to generate the social energy needed for 
development. 
Gusfield (1971) and Rudolph (1967) stressed that there is a relationship between 
tradition and modernity. The current relationship between traditional leadership 
institution and democratically elected councillors is conflictual. The formal 
(municipal) institution is far from the people, therefore people lack faith and use the 
accessible traditional institution. Bornstein (2000: 200) remarked that the division of 
responsibilities between elected and traditional authorities remain fluid and in that 
way allows a space for conflict. One could argue that this polarisation may be due to 
overemphasis on modernity without considering the historical fact that these two 
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concepts are interrelated. Failure to consider historical facts can easily result in the 
dismissal of tradition as being outmoded and irrelevant to the current situation. 
Gusfield (1971: 19) argued as follows: 
The capacity of the old and new cultures and structures to exist without 
conflict and even with mutual adaptations is a frequent phenomenon of social 
change; the old is not necessary replaced by new. The acceptance of a new 
product, a new religion, a new mode of decision-making does not necessary 
lead to the disappearance of the older form' . 
Gusfield (1971: 19) studied these two concepts in details and showed how each 
concept is important to the other. He argued: ' traditional structures can supply skills, 
and traditional values can supply sources of legitimation which are capable of being 
utilized in pursuit of the goals and with new processes ' . In other words Gusfield 
reiterated the view that traditional and modern leadership institutions play a 
complementary role to each other. In his view, the quest for modernity is dependent 
upon, and often finds support in, the ideological upsurge of traditionalism (Gunsfield, 
1971:22). 
Friedman (2003: 13) writing from a civil society perspective, argued that traditional 
institutions in the South are founded on ' ethnicity and hierarchy, which exercise 
coercion over subjects in a manner of states, persist and playa significant role in some 
citizens ' response to democracy and development'. The argument was constructed in 
a study undertaken to evaluate the response of rural communities on social policy 
issues. According to Friedman (2003 : 13) this study produced tentative evidence that 
chiefs in some regions did play a decisive role in securing social goods for their 
subjects. It is justifiable to argue that traditional leadership institution is important in 
the implementation of some public policies of the state. Friedman (2003: 13) 
maintained that there are instances where citizens see traditional institutions as 
conduits/channels for addressing social needs. This view challenges the weakness 
and inappropriateness of the state in implementing social policy. Given this state of 
affairs people/citizens are always looking for viable alternatives in addressing their 
social needs. This justifies a need to harmonise sustainable relationship between 
traditional institutions with democratic institutions. 
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The debates between modernists and traditionalists are likely to throwaway valuable 
ingredients that are critical in the implementation of developmental policies. This 
may be caused by a romantic tendency in Africa of generalising about the institution 
of traditional leadership which is often placed to give space to modern institutions. 
Most generalisations about this institution tend to be biased. Friedman (2003: 13) 
warned that excluding traditional leadership from political participation or a role in 
the distribution of social goods and services may threaten the stability of newly 
democratic systems. This warning is placed in the South African context. 
Gyekye (1997: 134), writing from a European experience, argued that 'the way to the 
establishment of democracy was not easy for any European-nation-there were in the 
histories of these nations revolutions and civil wars, institutional trials and errors, 
public executions of monarchs and public officials, adoptions and adaptations of alien 
political structures' . This vividly shows that there was no country which was 
democratic by nature. Instead, democracy was achieved through contestation. 
Krishma (2001 : 27), writing about the Indian experience, noted that ' the debates 
between modernity and tradition is a sterile one, as our examination of north Indian 
village institutions has shown. The most effective institutions are those that combine 
elements of tradition with aspects of modernity, and which are efficient along with 
being legitimate and locally controlled' . Accordingly, the success of democracy is 
dependent on the cultural and historical experience because culture and historical 
experience guide them to express how they need to be governed and to govern 
themselves. In addition, it needs to be pointed out that there is a danger in 
transplanting modern institutions on traditional institutions. 
2.1.3 Dialectical modernisation theory 
Dialectical modernisation theory (DMT) is defined as social phenomenon where both 
types (tradition and the modern systems) change in the process and where the result is 
the hybrid and more emphasis is put on experience and interpretation of politics 
(Rudolph, 1967; Gusfield, 1976 cited in Martinussen, 1997: 41). The dialectical 
modernisation theory was originally based on studies conducted in India in the 1960s 
and 1970s within anthropology, sociology and political science. Rudolph is one of 
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the most influential American scholars of South Asia in India. Her scholarship 
transformed the study of politics and other disciplines in political science, social 
sciences and humanities (Fernandes, www.apsaneLorg: 823). Most of the 
interpretations are drawn from India to build this theory. Most of the material in 
Gusfield ' s (1971) paper entitled: 'Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in 
the study of social change' was drawn from modem India. Although Rudolph (1967) 
used the contemporary interpretations of India to challenge and to rethink some of the 
central concepts of political science, one could construct an argument that political 
history and its analysis was used for the construction of this theory 
Empirical studies, which took place in the 1980s in African societies further 
contributed to the construction of this theory, but in Africa there has been a shift from 
micro-level to macro-level analysis. The contribution through empirical studies made 
Martinussen (1997: 173) to suggest that there was a need for focusing on theories of 
political and social order in which shed light on traditional societies and the forms of 
regime and decision-making process. 
Johnston (1996: 35) argued that there was a task of 'reconciling traditional African 
institutions with democratic politics which might provide a useful opening to common 
ground rather than division, as was the case in the past'. Johnson made this 
submission after an overview at the new political dispensation in South Africa 
whereby the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
tried to reconcile something African in a political and social transformation which 
was conspicuously lacking authentic indigenous elements (Johnston, 1996:32) 
The dialectical modernisation theory is retained from classical modernisation theory 
which provides the division of social phenomenon into two categories 'traditional and 
modem'. Dialectical modernisation theory facilitates the distinction between 
'traditional and modem', and at the same time adds nuances and more dynamic 
understanding (Martinussen, 1997: 41). Martinussen (1997: 172) revealed that most 
proponents of this theory (DMT) repudiate the view that tradition can impede 
development. Instead, traditional institutions would playa major role in promoting 
political development so as to have a smooth transition from old practices to new 
ones. Gusfield (1971: 22) holds the view that modernity which is directed to political 
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authority and economic development, tradition is acknowledged to have a potential 
for sustainability of both political and economic development. The central idea is that 
to separate these two concepts may be problematic for development. Martinussen 
(1997: 172) concluded that there are moments where modern institutions can obstruct 
development and not function properly as expected because they may be incompatible 
with the tradition of the societies concerned. This does not mean that traditional 
societies are not open to change. 
Gusfield (1971: 17) advocated that ' tradition has been open for change before its 
present encounters with the West with purposeful, planned change'. It is worth noting 
that traditional institutions are not always reactionary but may be very dynamic, 
heterogonous and vigorous. Perhaps tradition and modernity need to be seen as 
reinforcing each other instead of being perceived as systems in conflict (Gusfiled, 
1971 : 20). This challenges the common practice, that of placing tradition and 
modernity against each other. The crux of the matter is that the imposition of modern 
institutions can curtail development. 
According to Martinussen (1997: 172) dialectical modernisation theory also 
emphasises experience. Gusfield (1971: 21) demonstrated this experience in India 
showing that existing traditions could be used to achieve new changes. He argued 
that ' in the contemporary political process of India caste, village and religious 
community is utilized as basic segmental groups through which the individual and the 
family are drawn into modern political systems'. What is worth noting is that it is not 
only a political system that transforms people to modern political institutions, instead 
there are other supporting structures which need to be recognised. Gusfield (1971: 
17) further argued that the currently so-called ' traditional society' is a product of 
change. Within the Indian experience, it is demonstrated that Gandhi used Indian 
cultural traditions and such ' traditional ideals contributed to Indian modernisation by 
developing a form of public ethic that transcended narrows obligations of family and 
kinship' (Krishma, 2001: 28). 
Dialectical modernisation theory proponents warn people from different ideological 
perspectives/disciplines that there is a need to acknowledge the uniqueness of 
developing countries. Although they can survive under the modernisation process but 
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they are more dynamic and heterogonous when it comes to the processes of 
development. The central idea is that the fusion of modernity and tradition can result 
in dialectics, 'where both phenomena are altered in the process of change' 
(Martinussen, 1997: 172). This theory places more focus on the following: firstly, 
'indigenous social, political and cultural structures, institutions, practices and norms' 
(Martinussen, 1997: 173). Within this focus, Rudolph (1967: 87) warned that 
'modernisation did not have to take a predetermined path recapitulating the Western 
model but could be continuous with the indigenous cultural traditions of a nation-
state' . This approach is sustainable. Quite often it is argued that other societies may 
have the desire to be modern without necessarily losing their traditional outlook. 
Lastly, this theory dismisses the notion that 'development is universal, defined solely 
its end goals: the greatest possible similarity to the North Western countries ' . This 
challenges the dominant view of generalising about development whilst studies and 
experiences of new nations show that there are a number of wide varieties of 
outcomes and possibilities for change and continuity (Gusfield, 1971: 16). 
Martinussen (1997) acknowledged that the dialectical modernisation theory 
contributed to the understanding of complex dynamics involved in modernisation 
theory. It is also important to understand that the basic idea propounded by dialectical 
modernisation theory is that the encounter of tradition and modernity does not always 
result in development. 
Observers revealed that the proponents of this theory challenge the modernisation 
proponents and Marxist scholars, particularly those who had an assumption that 
'cultural traditions of newly emerging nation-states were either outdated forms of 
behaviour that would naturally disappear with . time or obstacles that needed to be in 
path of modernity' (Rudolph, 1967: 89). Gusfield (1971: 26) maintained that 'the 
past serves as support, especially in the sphere of values and political legitimation, to 
the present and the future ' . This shows that history always plays an important role in 
development, but that does not mean that the past cannot be challenged. 
Now that the relationship between traditional and modern systems has been 
demonstrated, it is fitting at this juncture to take a closer look at the political history 
of traditional leadership in certain countries in Africa. It is through political history 
that one can be able to conclude on whether traditional leaders fully welcomed 
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colonists or were forced. Without the political history or such information conclusion 
that one would arrive at could be incomplete. 
2.2 TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: AN 
OVERVIEW 
There is vast literature on the diverse history of traditional leadership institutions in 
Africa. Therefore it is important to draw from this body of knowledge in order to 
trace the origins of the current tensions between traditional leadership institutions and 
governments in Africa. The history of traditional leadership institutions and political 
developments in Africa provide a means for exploring developmental local 
government in a rural context in South Africa. Thus, it is fitting to trace the political 
history of traditional leadership in order to establish how the involvement of African 
leaders in colonial policy-making impacted on development and also how it afflicted 
the autonomy and relationship they had with their people in the pre-colonial period. It 
is through such an investigation that one can interpret the current situation. 
Lemarchard (1977: 14) warns that generalising about transformations of African 
kingships under colonial rule is a risky business. A key issue in this study is to look 
at the nature of the relationship between the modem structures and traditional 
structures and its impact on development. 
The institution of traditional leadership operated as local government in most African 
countries. Rugege (2002: 13) observed that throughout history in Africa traditional 
leadership formed the basis of local government. Rathbone (2000: 11) acknowledged 
that ' local administration and justice was dominated by chiefs and their councils ' . 
With changes in political systems in countries where the institution of traditional 
leadership was encouraged to take on local government functions, the institution had 
to change its functioning. Some argued that these changes have proved to be 
problematic for development and for the functioning of chiefs. The historical 
conditions under which these chiefs operated give one a space to construct an 
argument that these chiefs were overloaded with 'a growing stuck of civic 
responsibilities ' (Rathbone, 2000: 7). Chazan et al (1999: 82) argued that ' traditional 
political structures, though often greatly altered or transformed, remain in place in 
most parts of the continent' . This argument is premised on the fact that traditional 
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leaders still control land and have access to communal labour. In addition, these 
traditional leaders still enjoy being judges and arbiters in local disputes. 
Most of the literature reviewed in this section is drawn from sources inside and 
outside South Africa. This is due to the reality that international experience shows 
that tensions between the institutions of traditional leadership and governments are 
not unique to South Africa. Many countries in the world underwent different regime 
changes in response to people' s demands. They introduced various forms of 
government, but that does not mean there have been no challenges. Therefore, it 
remains important that the study is done in South Africa for the purpose of 
influencing public policy making. 
2.2.1 The pre-colonial period 
Research on the institution of traditional leadership confirms that it has a long history 
in Africa. According to Goodenough (2002: 1) this history of traditional leaders is 
useful in attempting to understand a role of the institution today. Gyekye (1997: 120) 
argued that 'chiefship is certainly the most outstanding feature of the traditional 
African political structure and the linchpin of the political will which can be used to 
assess the democratic character of the traditional political structure'. Zungu (1996: 
162), for example, cautioned that heredity 'was not automatic instead succession was 
dependent upon fitness or mentality competent to govern'. This rejects the idea that 
traditional leadership institution was autocratic as viewed by some of the political 
scientists and historians (Simunyu, 1987). 
Rathbone (2000: 3) did a reVIew on the institution of traditional leadership and 
concluded: ' chiefdom has its own particular contingent history dating from depths of 
the largely unknowable past to the present'. Boaten (1996: 122) revealed that 
intricacies within the traditional leadership institution were introduced by the realities 
that the system was developed by the pre-literate society. Jordan (1969: 66) observed 
that in West Africa ' even though chieftaincy was hereditary in most centralized states 
but rulers were chosen from a consortium of lineage and there was contestation over 
who become a chief. In other words, chieftaincy depended on mutual supportive 
networks of relationships. Despite the twists and turns of history there is plenty of 
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evidence to support the idea that the traditional form of government espouses certain 
principles of democracy. 
There were always differences in understanding the operation and the practice of 
democracy in Africa. Jordan (1969: 67) compared the way centralized 
kingdoms/chiefdoms operated before the colonial era. He maintained that ' in 
centralized kingdoms or chiefdoms, councils operated like modern cabinets, because 
their members either had specialised experience or they were put in charge of 
particular departments' (1969: 67). It could be argued that these leaders were given 
these positions because of their expertise and contribution to their societies. 
lroko (1996: 104), writing in Benin, argued: ' the monarchic reality was a major 
political system in the pre-colonial history of this country '. The experience of Kenya 
provides a different view in understanding the institution of traditional leadership. 
Oyugi (1996: 94) stressed that in traditional Africa succession for leadership was 
determined by the socio-political structure of the society. The practise was that top 
leadership in the centralised state systems was inherited. Inheritance was determined 
by ascription in the leadership structure. This was easily disturbed by the penetration 
of the colonial system (Oyugi, 1996: 94). Oyugi (1996) revealed that in Kenya it was 
not difficult to recruit traditional leadership because of the ' absence of hereditary ' . 
However, Oyugi does not account whether there were any problems associated with 
hereditary practices when it comes to the recruitment of traditional leadership in 
traditional societies in Africa. There have been some critical reflections about 
whether traditional leadership were democratic. 
2.2.1.1 Traditional leadership and democracy 
The key issue was whether the hereditary system of traditional leadership could be 
democratic. The democratic nature of traditional leadership in pre-colonial Africa 
was observed by numerous researchers such as Tapscott (1996), Zungu (1996), . 
Rugege (2002), Mokgoro (1994) and Mamdani (1998). These writers acknowledged 
that there was a kind of democracy in the pre-colonial African societies. Potholm 
(1977: 136), writing about Swaziland, observed that 'each chief had his own council 
and responsibility for the people in his area although they may appeal his judgment to 
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the N gwenyama and N dlovukazi ' . This suggests that autocracy is not associated with 
this institution. 
Mutibwa (1992: 1) argued that the traditional political system of Uganda was more 
democratic in nature: 'Uganda had a highly sophisticated political system where states 
not only had kings but also parliaments, a hierarchy of chiefs, and laws that governed 
the relationship between the rulers and the ruled ' . It is possible to argue that the 
presence of such a sophisticated system was disrupted by of colonial rule in Uganda. 
However, Mutibwa (1992) fails to give a convincing account about how the hierarchy 
of chiefs practiced democratic principles. There has been some debate about 
democratic procedure versus consensus seeking. 
Mokgoro (1994: 3), argUIng from a feminist perspective, stated that ' in Africa 
traditional leadership was hereditary' . However, this did not mean that there were ' no 
electoral processes ' or ' democracy' . The electoral process for leadership positions 
was only taking place among adult men who had skills and proven leadership 
qualities in contributing in the welfare of the tribe (Zungu, 1996: 165). Zungu (1996: 
173) further observed that the pre-colonial chiefs were answerable to their ' tribes and 
structures' as chiefs were products of these tribes. These accounts illustrate that 
election was not competitive by nature. Thus people could show dissatisfaction about 
chiefs by 'deserting him for another' (Rugege, 2002: 13). 
Research indicates that in other regions ' unpopular chiefs were deposed or were 
killed' (Tapscott, 1996: 292). Gyekye (1997: 125) concurs that autocratic actions by 
chiefs led to his disposition. Most writers conclude that in the traditional political 
practice chiefs relied on their subjects for their rule despite the hereditary nature of 
their high office. This further assists in understanding that in most traditional African 
societies, it was rare for chiefs to oppose decisions that were reached through 
consensus. It was not even possible for the chiefs to oppose decisions as the 
traditional system created no distance between chiefs and their subjects or between 
'government' and the 'governed' . 
In an important article entitled: ' When does reconciliation tum into a denial of 
justice?', Mamdani (1998: 2) rejected the perception that ' traditional chiefs in pre-
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colonial Africa had unchanging powers over every domain of social life' . This was 
because in pre-colonial Africa pluralism defined the way of life of traditional chiefs. 
He holds: ' there were clan-heads alongside chiefs, age-sets alongside gender groups, 
each with a legitimate say in a clearly defined and limited domain' (Mamdani, 1998: 
5). It was a justification from the side of the colonial government as if they had 
intervened in order to rescue the subjects who were traditional chiefs' victims. 
Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000: 277) viewed the autocratic nature directed to traditional 
chiefs as artificial. According to this view, traditional chiefs are 'perceived as 
problematic and parasitic to the subjects' (Gildenhuys and Knipe, 2000: 277). 
According to Gyekye (1997: 125) the expression of popular will was expressed within 
Akan political system in Ghana. He noted: 'even if people as a whole do not have 
power to choose their ruler directly, but they have power to remove him directly or to 
have him removed by the electors' . This demonstrates that those who were directly 
responsible in electing the chief had a challenge to understand the wishes of people. 
After election the chief had to understand the will of people so as to govern in 
accordance with that popular will. These ideas further challenge policy-makers to 
understand the intricacies within the traditional leadership institution. Accordingly, 
the traditional political system has never been a model of harmony and homogeneity. 
For Chazan et al (1999: 32) heterogeneity and complexity define the traditional 
leadership institution in the African continent. There is a need to reject the romantic 
tendency of treating this institution in a singular form without understanding the 
intricacies within it, particularly in most countries in Africa. 
The problem of determining concretely the democratic nature of traditional leadership 
institution during the pre-colonial period is complicated by the exclusion of the 
majority of people such as women and the youth, since it was only adult men who had 
rights to participate in decision making on important matters affecting them 
[particularly] in general assemblies (Rugege, 2002: 13). Potholm (1977: 136) 
demonstrated the exclusion of women in Swaziland, and noted that the Ngwenyama 
was not an absolute monarch, because he was expected to take advice from his senior 
male relatives and from his advisers. There is no mention of what kind of advisers , 
but it was highly unlikely that women would have been advisers. 
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Research conducted by Gyekye (1997: 126) in Ghana within the political system of 
Akan Kingdom is contrary to what had been postulated by Rugege (2002) and 
Potholm (1977). Gyekye (1997: 126) argued that 'no one was hindered from 
participating in the deliberations of councils or general assemblies and thus from 
contributing to the decisions of these constitutional bodies'. However, he was unable 
to identify the channels which were available for those excluded in the deliberations 
of these councils. There is growing consensus that traditional system reserves the 
wisdom and experiences of the elders in the community, and confers on them great 
responsibility for making decisions on behalf of the group. 
The tribes and kingdoms in most part of Africa and in South Africa liked to live in 
harmony. Harmony has been inspired in different ways. Rugege (2002: 13) writes: 
These traditional leaders served as political, spiritual and cultural leaders and 
were regarded as custodians of the values of society. They looked after the 
welfare of their people by providing them with land for their subsistence needs 
through agriculture and providing land for grazing. They also provided for the 
very poor and orphaned. Traditional leaders were responsible for the defence 
of their people against external aggression and for keeping order in their 
communities. They resolved disputes with the emphasis on reconciliation, 
thereby ensuring harmony among neighbours. 
Most studies challenge the idea that traditional rulers were autocratic and 
authoritarian as the pre-colonial constitutionalism was based on the system of checks 
and balances. Tapscott (1996: 292) argued that 'traditional leaders were not as 
autocratic and tyrannical during pre-colonial times as it is most suggested' . These 
studies were based in comparing the operation of traditional rulers during the pre-
colonial and colonial era. Lemarchand (1977: 14) warned that comparing the 
operation of traditional systems under colonial rule is a risky business: Mamdani 
(1996: 43) argued that 'restraint on pre-colonial authority flowed from two separate 
though related tendencies: one from peers, the other from people'. Mamdani (1996: 
43) concluded that 'the colonial state really liberated administrative chiefs from all 
institutionalized constraints, of peer or people, and laid the basis of the decentralized 
despotism' . 
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Simunyu (1987: 51) writing from a historical perspective, maintained that 'there has 
been no democracy in traditional African political system' . Simunyu builds his 
arguments on the basis of the hierarchical, nonegalitarian, gerentocratic, and sexist 
features of African political structure. These are assumptions of his argument: 'what 
comes out of a careful examination and analysis of the political institutions and 
mechanisms of the pre-colonial African societies is a mixture of rudiments or 
democratic tendencies and practices on one hand and aristocratic, autocratic and or 
militaristic practices and tendencies, with varying degrees of despotism on the other'. 
Simunyu (1987: 68) formulated all his arguments by comparing African experiences 
with advanced forms of Western democracy. Simunyu realised that the traditional 
hierarchies were oppressive but he fails to acknowledge that the institution of 
traditional leadership was practically dismantled by the colonial system and it got 
distorted. Simunyu's approach falls short of explaining the continued role of the 
traditional African political system, although his work was able to explore the 
historical trends that traditional African system had undergone. Consequently, 
Simunyu ' s arguments were criticised by Gyekye (1997: 119) for using entirely3 to 
dispute that African tradition was not democratic. Gyekye holds that there is no 
explanation of the word entirely and that comparing African democracy with advance 
forms of Western democracy is dangerous. Gyekye (1997: 122) qualifies his 
argument: ' chief is never to act without the advice and full concurrence of his 
councillors, who are the representatives of people'. This suggests that democracy as 
an idea is interpreted in a different way by intellectuals in different disciplines. 
2.2.2 Colonialism and traditional leadership in Africa 
This section will analyse the relationship between the colonial system and traditional 
leadership institution in Africa. It will demonstrate how the traditional institution was 
incorporated into the colonial system. It will also assess the role played by the 
institution of traditional leadership in opening the space for capitalism to penetrate 
indigenous societies. 
3 For Gyekye the conc~pt is understood in a collective way and Simunyu had such an idea that is why 
he binds all the African traditional societies. Gyekye questions the concept entirely because of his 
research he conducted in Akan Kingdom in Ghana. 
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The system of colonialism was interpreted differently by its architects. Ake (1976: 
199) writes: ' the British interpreted colonialism as a "mandate" to help backwards 
peoples, whilst the French, Portuguese and Belgians saw colonialism as a civilising 
mission or tutelage ' . Colonialism was a subject of great debate among certain 
scholars of developing countries. This conferred them an opportunity to pose 
numerous questions associated with whether there was any intention for colonialists 
to develop Africa. Phillips (1989: 1) repudiated the view that capitalists had any 
intention to develop third world countries, as 'it became clear that more could have 
been done to develop social services, promote political participation, or establish 
ground work for industrial growth' . She supported the view that capitalism, which 
was introduced through colonialism, blocked or arrested development. Instead of 
modifying 'pre-colonial techniques' it introduced forced labour with minimal wages 
coupled with long working hours. 
Some authors like Ake (1976: 199) show how force was used to secure raw materials 
in Africa: 'in the colonial economy, force became the key instrument of profit motive, 
force was used to allocate roles, force was used to ensure the supply of labour, and 
force was used to extract and allocate the economic surplus' . There was a system of 
compulsory labour which disrupted all forms of traditional social structures (Morrell 
et aI, 1996: 51). The colonial economy had to obtain labour from a subject population 
that was not in a monetary economy (Ake, 1976: 200). Consequently, people were 
forced to work by imposing taxes such as hut tax which was compulsory and had to 
be paid in cash. In the process traditional social structures were undermined or 
destroyed. 
Morrell et al (1996: 35) argued that the support for chiefs was used ' to rule Africans 
through their own chiefs, with an aim that people would become 'civilised ' by going 
out to work for European settlers ' . Ake (1976: 199) conceded that in as much as 
people were forced to work for the colonial economy, it was beneficial to the 
colonized since some were able to improve their lives. However, the improvement of 
the quality of life led people to start criticising their own traditional structures. 
Criticism was mostly guided by the view that these traditional structures were thought 
of as static and as enemies of rapid transformation (Rathbone, 2000: 3). 
26 
Mamdani (1996: 16) argued that traditional leadership had limited choice under 
colonial rule. He constructed his argument based on the civilised/uncivilised 
dichotomy. He argued that ' there could be single legal order, defined by the 
"civilised" laws of Europe. No "native" institutions would be recognised' . The 
colonial state had introduced new structure of authority and power as a way of 
excluding indigenous Africans from participating in civil activities. Mamdani (1996: 
17) further argued: ' citizenship would be a privilege of the civilised, the uncivilised 
would be subject to all-round tutelage '. The latter view is exclusionary and 
discriminatory in terms of racial discourse and power relations. Oyugi (1996: 98) 
pointed out that the introduction of the new structure of authority and power ' did not 
give any space and subordinated traditional institutions to new colonial order' . 
Numerous writers have studied the nature of colonial power. Mamdani (1998: 2) 
holds: ' the colonial state was a bifurcated power. It claimed a dual legitimacy, both 
modern and traditional. Modern power was urban based and spoke the language of 
rights. In contrast, traditional power, rural-based, spoke the language of culture' . In 
this argument it is the modern power which claims to be ' civilised'. There is no doubt 
that everywhere where the colonial state was established, the civilised/uncivilised 
language exists. Within this context, the colonisers were the citizens, whereas the 
Africans were the subjects. The citizens were the one to enjoy civil rights. To a 
certain degree the lives of the subjects were regulated by chiefs under customary law, 
and on the other hand the lives of the citizens were regulated by modern law. 
According to Mamdani (1996) the terrible legend that seems to be witnessed in most 
post-colonial states in Africa is that of succeeding to deracialise but not to 
democratise the bifurcated state. In as much as the institution of traditional leadership 
was retained under British rule, but homogenisation (under customary law) destroyed 
the powers of the institution. The heterogeneous nature of Africans was ignored, 
particularly in the countryside. Simuyu (1987: 52) noted: 'Africans were lumped 
together as natives, without much distinction'. Consequently, the heterogeneity of 
Africa was not taken into consideration. 
Some studies attempted to demonstrate how the colonial state manipulated the power 
of custom and tradition within the African society. Philips (1989: 117) tried to 
determine the nature of capitalism in colonial Africa through the veil of pre-capitalist 
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modes of production. Mamdani (1996) focused more on the nature of power relations 
within the colony through the distortion and exploitation of pre-capitalist modes of 
social relations. Mohanty (1992: 11) conceptualised these views thus: 
The colonial government in the style of Hobbes' s Leviathan, managed to 
impose comparative inter-tribal peace. The impact of colonial administration 
on tribal institutions was two-fold. On the one hand, it affected the breakdown 
of the traditional system, and on the other hand, by reducing the power of the 
chiefs or traditional leaders, it greatly undermined the communal and clan 
responsibility, and also adversely affected the kinship and communal ties. 
Basically, the colonial administration imposed a political system which challenged the 
operation and functioning of traditional leadership. Mamdani is highly critical in how 
he views the colonial powers making use of custom and traditional forms of authority 
within African society. The power and authority of the African traditional chiefs, he 
believed, was distorted and ' sculpted' into an instance of pure despotism, beyond the 
framework of traditional forms of accountability, placed within the new larger 
framework of the colonial power (Mamdani, 1996: 49). 
Phillips (1989: 4) contended that the colonial powers operated through the 
maintenance of customary practices and traditional forms of authority within African 
society. Mamdani (1996: 49) argued that the ' sculpting' of custom in Africa implies 
the creation of a new and unique form of tradition, based on 'partly salvaging' and 
'partly sculpting' pre-colonial African custom into something more suited for 
European rule in Africa. 
Mamdani (1996: 59) felt that the limited political and financial autonomy of 
traditional rulers encouraged them to support corruption, coercion and violence as 
means to improve their economic positions. This is perceived as the crisis of indirect 
rule. Ultimately, he believed that the practice of colonial powers of maintaining 
customary tradition resulted in the division into separate ' ethnic containers ', which 
survived after independence (Mamdani, 1996: 61). 
Phillips (1989: 11) viewed the nature of alliances that were established between the 
colonial administration and the local chiefs as resulting in a 'makeshift settlement' , 
implying an unstable and temporary solution to gaining control within the colony by 
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the administration. Mamdani (1996), however, does not consider the nature of the 
alliances between the chiefs and administration to be 'makeshift' at all , but rather the 
explicit containerization of local communities resulting in a ' bifurcated settlement' -
that of citizen and subject. According to Phillips (1989: 11) the alliance between the 
colonial states with local chiefs was the only reliable guarantors of labour, which in 
turn dictated the terms on which colonialism operated. Chiefs revolved around 
alliance as land and labour was crucial for the colonial state. Mamdani (1996) 
remained cautious about the transformations in the African states which encompass 
the worlds of ' citizens and subjects ' . The course for concern for him is that an 
African state can democratise but that does not mean that the world of citizens will no 
longer be bifurcated and despotic. 
2.2.3 Indirect rule and traditional leadership in Africa 
Most African countries experienced the system of indirect rule. Studies show that the 
colonial powers had one common goal for indirect rule, it was to govern Africans 
with their own institutions. Through this system some of these African institutions 
lost their autonomy. Lord Lugard was regarded as one of the influential architects 
and the man behind indirect rule, and who emphasised that implementing the orders 
of the colonial administrators lay in the traditional leaders or chiefs (Mamdani, 1996: 
62). Lord Lugard was not the only man behind indirect rule. There were others who 
were more influential in different African countries. For example, Theophalous 
Shepstone could be counted as one of the proponents of indirect rule in South Africa 
during the colonial period, particularly in Natal. 
According to Ladouceur (1979: 6) ' indirect rule relied on local institutions which in 
practice meant chiefs and their councils; where chiefs and councils did not exist, they 
were often created, sometimes replacing democratic or egalitarian traditional 
institutions by much more authoritarian chiefly structures'. This assertion illustrates 
how traditional leadership served as an agent of colonial administration. 
According to Appiah (1994: 5) chiefs were co-opted under the policy of indirect rule. 
This arrangement suggests that governing through traditional rulers was not a 
permanent arrangement. Instead, it was an interim arrangement aimed at giving some 
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people schooling in administration. Appiah (1994: 5) concluded that for British 
colonial rule governing through traditional rulers and chiefs was a matter of 
expediency, and was not designed to be permanent. 
According to Jordan (1969: 6) indirect rule was designed to create a political 
compromise between western and traditional forms of government. The 
policy/system of indirect rule did not disallow traditional rulers from governing. 
Jordan (1969: 160) further argued that the introduction of the modern system of 
administration did not aim to destroy the traditional constitutional system. Instead, it 
aimed at encouraging local people to assume responsibility for participating in 
community improvement schemes. This system was working on the assumption that 
the English model of local government could be able to incorporate traditional forms 
of authority by using the Western bureaucratic procedures. Consequently, through 
indirect rule some traditional leaders became more powerful, whilst others lost their 
autonomy. Therefore lack of popular participation was witnessed at a local level, in 
that attempts were made to transform indirect rule structures into more secular, 
democratic institutions inspired by the system of local government in England 
(Ladouceur, 1979: 6). 
According to Forde and Kaberry (1967: 203) indirect rule was introduced to re-
establish the traditional political structure of the state for the purpose of local 
government. According to Ladouceur (1975: 54) the system of indirect rule needed 
chiefs to learn to exercise political authority within a simplified framework of modern 
local government. Within this framework, one could argue that chiefs were forced to 
learn the art of modern government and administration. The traditional political 
structure was seen as a viable system of local government where chiefs would be in a 
position to collect direct tax. 
Numerous studies continue to show that the operation of indirect rule introduced in 
Africa is currently complicating the implementation of some of public policies in the 
post-colonial era. This colonial policy emphasised differences through the policy of 
divide and rule (Mutibwa, 1992: 4). Kiwanuka (1975: 31) maintained: 'European 
subjugation of Africa resulted in the emergence of two major groups of Africans who 
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we may describe as collaborators and resisters,.4 One could argue that those who 
welcomed the colonial rule were said to be collaborators and served as the backbone 
of colonial rule in rural areas. Kiwanuka (1975: 42) further contended that these 
' collaborators were awarded with positions which they never occupied in the pre-
colonial set up' . 
Evidence suggests that the system of indirect rule did not prove to be harmonious. 
Kiwanuka (1975 : 48) maintained that ' indirect rule was challenged by new classes 
which emerged as a product of the same system' , particularly those who were 
concerned about accountability. This challenge was initiated by the reality that 
equality was not the business of the day. Also traditional leaders were no longer 
accountable as before. The scenario was illustrated through the case of Uganda where 
the commoners challenged appointed chiefs who were protected by the colonial rulers 
(Kiwanuka, 1975). 
Kiwanuka (1975: 49) further observed that in colonial Africa the main beneficiaries of 
the fruits of colonialism were chiefs. However, studies showed that not all chiefs 
were the beneficiaries of the colonial system. Traditional leaders who were 
sympathetic to nationalists suffered tremendously as some of them lost their positions 
and were replaced with other appointed chiefs. According to Ladouceur (1975: 89) 
the failure of some chiefs to assist the colonial rulers in their plan to implement 
colonial policies proved to be an invitation for punishment, suspension and detention. 
The benefits associated with supporting nationalists proved to be varied in the post-
colonial state. After independence, some countries formulated policies that would 
both benefit traditional rulers and nationalists. However, nationalists in some African 
countries introduced policies that did not give any space for the functioning of 
kingdoms, chieftainships and traditional institutions (Kiwanuka, 1975: 51). The latter 
tendency seems to have facilitated the overthrow of traditional political system in 
certain countries in Africa. It is within this background that one may construct an 
argument that countries that facilitated the latter were driven by the overwhelming 
view that democracy was incompatible with traditional leadership institution. 
4 Collaborators were those who welcomed the colonial system without any objection, whilst resisters 
were those who were against the system but had no alternative and had to live with it. 
31 
2.2.3.1 Weaknesses of indirect rule in Africa 
There are several criticisms levelled against indirect rule in Africa by different 
authors. Ladouceur (1979:6) criticised indirect rule as follows: 
• For not making clear how the traditional authorities, 'with their aristocratic 
overtones, would reconcile with the demands of representative democracy' . 
• For treating chiefs as subordinates through whom orders were passed on to 
the people, rather than as political representatives possessing some innate 
authority. 
• It was incapable of evolution towards real local government by the people 
themselves. 
• It gave the latitude for chiefs to exploit the people under the guise of fulfilling 
the wishes of the colonial masters. 
• Little attempt was made to study the history and custom of local people. 
• This system was constructed within the Native Authority system which came 
with a blue print about what a traditional political system should be, rather 
than an understanding of existing pre-colonial systems. 
Bennet (1998: ] 5) argued that indirect rule undermined checks and balances that 
regulated traditional life in Africa. These were criticisms directed to those traditional 
rulers who were co-opted to the colonial administration. These traditional rulers did 
not look for their subjects' approval before being co-opted by the indirect rule system 
(Bennet, 1998). 
2.2.4 Traditional leadership and rural development in post colonial Africa 
With the advent of the independence, most countries in Africa attempted to establish 
democratic regimes. These new developments took place at the expense of excluding 
traditional leaders in sub-Saharan Africa. Zungu (1996: 165) remarked that even 
those who retained the institution of traditional leadership have still not yet found an 
appropriate expertise to heal this ' festering wound' . Therefore, most countries in 
Africa started focusing on searching for an appropriate place for traditional leaders in 
governance (Goodenough, 2002). 
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2.2.5 Case Studies 
Comparing Uganda and Ghana with South Africa would illuminate some of the 
trajectories which these countries went through with the institution of traditional 
leadership. It could be argued that the experiences of these countries are not the 
same. However, the experiences of these countries (Uganda and Ghana) are relevant 
for the present study because it shows the relationship between traditional 
rulers/leaders and governments in the process of political transformation. 
2.2.5.1 Uganda 
Uganda had a highly sophisticated traditional political system which was destroyed by 
the establishment of colonial rule. The colonial penetration did not only destroy 
traditional political systems, but also divided the country using physical features, such 
as mountains and rivers which became the problem for post-colonial Uganda. 
Mutibwa (1992: 4) aptly argued: 
When British Colonial policy went to emphasise differences in order to 
implement their policy of divide and rule, it is not surprising that the people of 
Uganda remain foreign to each other. This never erupted into physical 
conflict while the pax brilanicca remained, but as soon as protecting powers 
departed, these different groups started jumping at each other' s throats. 
Therefore, this created plural societies which have been a great challenge and a 
primary task for most post-colonial leadership to integrate (Gertzel, 1975: 217). It is 
true that Uganda' s independence inherited many problems which had to be attended 
to by nationalist leaders. As Mutibwa (1992: 24) remarked: 'Apollo Milton Obote 
had the formidable and unenviable task of welding the various communities of the 
country into modern nation-state called Uganda'. A thought-provoking question could 
be phrased thus: is democracy possible in ethnically plural societies? 
Uganda was like most African countries. It had kingdoms which were powerful and 
well-armed. Gukiipa (1972: 32) observed that ' the hierarchical political system of the 
Buganda Kingdom was a merit system where excellence in war, demonstration of 
administrative ability and personal acquaintance with the king were the key to high 
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office in the power hierarchy'. The system of indirect rule which was mostly applied 
by Britain operated in Uganda. The Buganda kingdom was more influential in 
implementing the indirect rule policy. Gukiipa (1972: 33) argued that Buganda 
became the cornerstone of indirect rule in Uganda. This view suggests that as 
Buganda was a powerful Kingdom in Uganda, it was able to use its influence to 
collaborate with the colonial system. 
The relationship between Buganda and the colonial government was viewed with 
suspicion by other kingdoms and people in Uganda. During the transition to 
independence traditional leaders suspected that they might loose their power. The 
colonial government tried to ensure that this would not happen. As Mutibwa (1992: 
54) puts it: 'British did all they could to solve the peculiar political problems that 
faced Uganda before independence and did their best to secure a constitution in which 
the position of Kabaka of Buganda and other traditional rulers would be guaranteed 
within an independent state'. This did not suffice as Uganda experienced a 
constitutional crisis regarding the issues of traditional leadership. Mutibwa (1992) 
argued that the abolition of the kingdoms/traditionalleadership institutions in Uganda 
was termed constitutional crisis because traditional institutions were the 'bedrock of 
Uganda culture for several centuries' (Mutibwa, 1992: 42). According to Gertzel 
(1975: 224) after the abolition of the kingdoms Uganda was divided into four districts. 
These kingdoms were given powers in the 1962 constitution, but with the 1966 
constitution the amount of power granted was decreased. The 1966 constitution even 
abolished all local governments (Gukiipa, 1972: 7). 
Although Buganda Kingdom was trying to embrace the idea of independence, they 
were concerned about the agreements they had made with the colonial government. 
In 1960 Buganda wrote a memorandum which clearly stated what should be taken 
care of and entrenched on the constitutional plans for independence. This suggests 
that they needed to have a constitutional guarantee as to what would be their roles and 
functions in the post-colonial government (Gukiipa, 1972). 
Under colonial rule there was no application of equality in development activities in 
different parts of Uganda. The work of Mutibwa (1992: 66) revealed that 'nowhere 
was the disparity of development emphasised more than in education; it was the 
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means by which southerners, particular Buganda, came to dominate the affairs of the 
country'. Anthony (2002: 7) noted that most of the social infrastructure such as 
schools and hospitals was concentrated in Buganda. Mutibwa (1992) argued that 
unequal development in Uganda was implemented through kingdoms. The arrival of 
colonialists in Uganda has been of benefit to Buganda kingdom and most 
development activities took place within that kingdom. This serves as a crucial 
question even in the contemporary problem facing the development of political 
landscape. 
Gukiipa (1972: 166) maintained that Obote's activities of abolishing traditional 
structures made him an unpopular leader in the old kingdoms. It could be argued that 
Obote shifted economic and political power from traditional rulers to urban elites. All 
these activities took place at the expense of the traditional forms of leadership. 
Arguably, Obote took his own direction making drastic changes which were not well 
understood by the majority of Uganda people. Obote arrested most members of his 
cabinet who demanded an investigation of him and the ousting of Amin and thereafter 
suspended the Constitution (Gukiipa, 1972: 166). 
Uganda's first government after independence abolished kingship or kingdoms such 
as Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro etc. The abolition of traditional leadership in 
Uganda under Obote's regime took place because they were seen as hostile to the 
creation of the 'republican African state' (Mutibwa, 1992: 49). Surprisingly, those 
who formed the post-independence government were from powerful kingdoms. 
These Africans who were in power failed to protect these kingdoms. Post-
independence Uganda did not only witness the abolition of old-order of hereditary 
rulers, it was followed by radical transformation (Mutibwa, 1992: 23). Writing about 
how traditional institutions were abolished, with reference to countries which 
achieved political independence through radical transformation, Kiwanuka (1975: 55) 
argues as follows: 
The militant African desired to be modern and Africans had been told by 
every Western journalist and political scientist that traditional institutions are 
feudal and feudalism was against anything a modern state stood for. In order 
to have rapid economic progress, so the western scholar told the African 
radical, it was necessary to get rid of all alleged structures. 
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It is clear that the relationship between traditional rulers and the process of 
transformation in Uganda turned sour. This institution of traditional leadership 
enjoyed a honeymoon with the Europeans but it suffocated under nationalist leaders. 
Studies show that when Museveni took power in 1986 as President of Uganda the 
Kingdom of Buganda was restored and continued enjoying political power as in the 
pre-colonial and colonial periods. Anthony (2002: 22), for example, observed that the 
Buganda Kingdom was popular and crucial in implementing the policy of the 
'National Resistance Movement to lock out political parties in Buganda' . The 
alliance between traditional leadership institution and National Resistance Movement 
did shape the political landscape in Uganda between the Uganda government and 
political parties. Evidence suggests that politics in most cases is about power and it 
depends on how one uses that power. 
2.2.5.2 Ghana 
According to Jordan (1969: 129) Ghana before independence was divided into two 
opposing camps ' there were chiefs who were traditional elites who worked with the 
British, while modern elite in the coastal cities campaigned against the British 
Administration' . This means that some were collaborators whilst others were 
resisters. 
Ghana, like most other countries, had her own kingdoms long before the arrival of 
colonialists. Colonial administrators believed that ruling through traditional rulers 
would be preferable to 'modern forms of government' (Rathbone, 2000: 11). The 
institution of traditional leadership was linked to the politics of Ghana since the 
colonial era. For Rathbone (2000: 151), ' chieftaincy retained a significant place in 
the hearts and minds of many Ghanaians' . As Boafo-Arthur (2001: 1) aptly 
concurred: ' the fact that chieftaincy is the nucleus around which micro-administration 
of the Ghanaian society is effectively carried out. Its resilience could, therefore, be 
attributed, in part, to the overwhelming support for the institution by the generality of 
the people as well as its ability to adapt to changing situations' . This suggests that the 
institution played a role of linking the people with the central government and in 
mobilising people for development. 
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Scholars such as Rathbone (2000: 15) observed that ' the vast majority of Ghana' s pre-
colonial states had become subjected to colonialism by treaty rather than by 
conquest' . This suggests that this institution in one way or another was made to act as 
the agency of the colonial government. Such co-option resulted in the chiefs virtually 
losing most elements of their earlier autonomy. There is an indication that this 
traditional structure proved to be vulnerable. Rathbone (2000: 161) concluded that 
the traditional leadership institution became more dependent upon the government for 
its legitimacy, maintenance and survival. 
Authors like Jordan (1969: 122), analysing the political system in Ghana, noted that 
'political parties were a major source of political instability and undemocratic 
principles'. He indicated that there were those political parties who were in support 
of combining traditionalism and liberal democracy. Jordan (1969) further argued that 
political parties worked with traditional rulers. The major political party in Ghana 
formed in 1947 had a good relationship with chiefs and even with the colonial 
government. As Jordan (1969: 130) eloquently put it: 'the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC) relied on chiefs to campaign for support in the rural areas '. It is 
strange that UGCC political party sided with colonial government. One view is that 
the majority who formed this political party were traditional elites who were 
collaborators. It was therefore not surprising that Nkwane Nkrumah who was viewed 
to be radical to chiefs and even to the colonial system, left the party and formed 
Convention People' s Party (CPP). Nkwane Nkrumah' s aim was to concentrate more 
in social and economic reforms. For Jordan (1969: 130), ' the CPP did not rely on 
chiefs for support rather looked for support in other urban wage-earners and the rural 
villagers ' . However, both these parties did rely on rural people for support. 
Boafo-Arthur (2001 : 4) argued that Nkwane Nkrumah' s attempts to subjugate chiefs 
faced strong resistance and led to strong support directed to the National Liberation 
Movement (NLM). This support was linked to Nkwane Nkrumah' s strategic intention 
to strip chiefs' power especially that linked to their ability to control land. Since land 
was serving as an economic base for most chiefs in Africa, it is possible to argue that 
deprivation of their livelihood strategy they felt obliged to link themselves with the 
government for their survival. 
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2.2.5.2.1 Traditional leadership and independence in Ghana 
According to Rathbone (2000: 99) Nkwane Nkrumah had problems with chiefs, that 
is why few months after independence there was a transformed chieftaincy. 
Nkrumah' s failure to downplay chieftaincy was because ' chiefs were protected by 
subsequent constitutions and were able to wield power through formal and informal 
organisations' (Chazan et ai, 1999: 87). Consequently, chieftaincy was regarded as 
an arm of government by the CPP (Rathbone, 2000: 110). 
Chiefs in Ghana co-operated with the CPP government and their loyal co-operation 
gave more power to the post-independence government in Ghana to be flexible and to 
change political and legislative areas without fear of chiefs. This resulted in chiefs 
participating in rubber-stamping government policies (Rathbone, 2000: 145). It is 
possible to construct an argument that these traditional rulers were forced to 
implement government policies. Chiefs ' loyal participation and co-operation in 1964 
led to the decline of any effective opposition parties in Ghana. The CPP remained the 
only political party which was exclusive in nature with less support because of its 
Detention Act which aimed to destroy urban opposition parties (Jordan, 1969: 130). 
2.2.5.3 Traditional leadership and local government 
There were many policies which impacted on traditional leadership, especially in 
terms of modernising of local government. Rathbone (2000: 125) conceptualised the 
views that negatively impacted on traditional leaders and modem local government as 
follows: 
The frustration which led government to combine active interventionist 
policies with palpable intimidation was real enough. The newly independent 
state' s local government structure, its capacity to collect revenue and to 
promote rural development remained in disarray. While some of these 
deficiencies were almost certainly systemic, much of the mess could be 
attributed to the clumsy statutory linkages between modem local government 
and the remnants of the old Native Authority system which rested upon 
chieftaincy. 
In Ghana independence came with local government reform which became a political 
battleground for different political interests (Rathbone, 2000: 45). Planners had to 
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implement development projects in this stand-off between traditional and modem 
structures which were unresolved. For Rathbone (2000: 57) development delivered 
by these parallel systems of governing has been a mess. He further argued that 
independence did not bring any smooth running of local government and embraced 
the view that 'part of the blame for this lay with the messy nature of local government 
structure for which CPP was not responsible and for its over-rapid implementation, 
for which it was' . Therefore, he warned that 'traditional structures need to be 
recognised in all reformed government structures' (Rathbone, 2000: 46). 
By 1962 Ghana had formally declared that each and every village should have 
development committees. Authors like Amonoo (1981: 141) write: ' the development 
committee system had been introduced at a time when the system of native 
administration and local government was under severe criticism from the young men, 
latter day CPP leaders and functionaries'. The local government units were under 
chiefs and elders. These chiefs and councils of elders were criticised by young men 
who were convinced that councils were unrepresentative and insufficient. Chiefs 
were seen by the dominant party masses in Ghana of the 1960s as failing to provide 
improvement. As Rathbone (2000: 157) eloquently put it: 'village development 
committees whose creation had been encouraged by government and which had been 
in many cases initially chaired by chiefs were taken over by local CPP branches and 
were sucked into local administration' . Nkwane Nkrumah's views of chiefs would 
have been infused to CPP masses. There was a view that the formation of these 
development committees was to dismantle local government system which was 
dominated by chiefs in Ghana. As Amonoo (1981: 142) suggests: 'development 
committees flourished where the criticism against the chiefs and elders was severest'. 
Amonoo (1981: 143) further argued that these young men who were involved in the 
activities of development committees refused to work with traditional representatives, 
even those involved in new local authorities. It was questionable as to why the youth 
was not interested in working with traditional leaders. At times the youth was driven 
by the idea that their initiatives were to promote local self-determination and 
grassroots democracy (Amonoo, 1981). 
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The dominance of chiefs in development in Ghana was changed by the operation of 
local development committees. In villages chiefs and local development committees 
had to operate on an equal footing. As Amonoo (1981: 147) eloquently put it: 
'villages therefore became to a considerably extent internally united as the traditional 
barriers between the chiefs and youngmen were lowered. Through the development 
committees traditional authorities were increasingly neutralised and given new 
perspectives'. Division of functions and responsibilities seemed to have neutralised 
the relationship between traditional leaders and local development committees. These 
development committees were in business of serving the model of CPP regime but 
had limited powers (Amonoo, 1981). It was concluded that they had 'no statutory 
provision in matters related to exacting labour' (Amonoo, 1981: 149). 
Local government in Ghana in 1964 faced challenges which were posed by paramount 
chiefs. Amonoo (1981: 160) argued that some of the paramount chiefs demanded the 
creation of separate local authorities. This pressurised traditional authorities' 
representatives in the National Assembly to challenge or to ensure that the legislation 
was enacted that would support the creation of separate local authorities and the . 
extension of local council's jurisdiction in rural areas. These were advocated by 
paramount chiefs to local authorities and further exacerbated long-standing tensions in 
rural areas. 
According to Amonoo (1981: 160) the exclusion of chiefs from local authorities 
proved to be of no benefit to local government structure. Chiefs became hostile 
because local authorities did not give enough support to traditional authorities 
(Amonoo, 1981). Indeed, such inadequate support contributed to inequality as chiefs 
did not have enough resources to provide their subjects which were far from local 
authorities' services. As Amonoo (1981: 161) eloquently put it: 
It was a common practice that councillors from the headquarters areas, who 
were usually in the majority, collaborated with the District Councils (DCs) in 
discriminating against the rest of the council areas. They outvoted and 
outmanoeuvred the majority councillors from the peripheral areas in matters 
concerning the distribution of amenities and services. 
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All these activities contributed to existing tensions within and among local party 
organisations. Conversely, these local authorities ensured that CPP regime model was 
dominant. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The conceptual framework in this chapter explored the debates between modernists 
and traditionalists, which was drawn in the works of Max Weber. Scholars argued 
that Max Weber' s conception was more of Germanic history but councillors and 
traditional leaders can draw more lessons as they are entrusted with the mammoth 
task of transforming the lives of ordinary people in the 10zini Municipality. This 
chapter demonstrated that African experience showed that people are far from giving 
up with chieftaincy. Traditional and modem structures are potential agents for social 
change, even if they operate in a constraining environment and in parallel grounds. 
This chapter also explored dialectical modernisation theory which emphasised the 
ways in which traditional and modem institutions can operate. This theory suggests 
that a mutual relationship can be developed in an environment like 10zini 
Municipality and a lot can be achieved. 
The literature review in this chapter revealed that pre-colonial history informed the 
contemporary debates about traditional leaders. In the pre-colonial times, traditional 
leadership institutions exercised numerous powers such as legislative, executive and 
judicial powers. As Mamdani (1996: 54) argued that ' the chief is the petty legislator, 
administrator, judge and policeman all in one ' . Such observation informed African 
debates among different scholars, which led to a dichotomy in public policy 
formulation and debates. It was demonstrated in this chapter that there are different 
views when it comes to debates about traditional leadership in the post-colonial state. 
On the one hand there are those who were advocating for the eradication of traditional 
leadership institutions. At the same time those who advocated for its restoration also 
supported their case. Some argued from a feminist perspective others argued from a 
historical perspective whilst others insisted that there is a lot that needs to be 
uncovered about the traditional African system. 
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A comparative analysis drawn from country case studies such as Uganda and Ghana 
led to the conclusion that traditional leadership institutions have undergone 
transformation as a result of formal colonial rule and parliamentary democracy after 
independence. It can also be concluded that it has become a common practice in most 
countries that various local government reforms that are understood as capacitating 
local government are almost directed at subjugating traditional rulers of their control 
of economic livelihood-the land. In Ghana, CPP attempts to deprive traditional rulers 




3.1 TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the reader with three periods of the political history of South 
Africa, that is, colonialism, apartheid and the democratic transition period. The body 
of literature reviewed in this chapter raises questions with respect to the relationship 
between governments and traditional leadership institution in the aforementioned 
periods. The chapter draws attention to the actions of individual people as social and 
political actors. This chapter further contextualises different legislations put in place 
by various governments and how the institution of traditional leadership responded to 
such laws. Most of these legislations were silent about the roles and powers of 
traditional leaders in local government for rural development. 
The first section of this chapter examines the roots of tensions between governments 
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(colonialism, apartheid and democratic) and traditional leadership. The second 
section demonstrates how the apartheid government consolidated colonial practises 
where traditional leaders found themselves serving as local government in rural areas. 
The third section focuses on the restructuring of local government in the democratic 
era. 
3.1.2 Traditional leadership in South Africa before 1948 
Like most other countries, the institution of traditional leadership in South Africa 
dates back to the pre-colonial period. Chazan et al (1999: 77) argued that 'the 
political culture of group action was deeply embedded in pre-colonial Africa' . This 
pointed out that when Europeans reached the shores of Africa, there were so many 
institutions and rulers with which they had to come to terms. It would be very crucial 
to understand the relationship between colonists and traditional leadership. This feeds 
into the contemporary debates between traditional leaders and democratically elected 
councillors which will be discussed at length below. 
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3.1.3 Contextualising the role of traditional leaders under colonial rule 
Most studies done by various scholars about the role-played by different chiefs forms 
the foundation to understand the role of traditional leaders. Welsh was among the 
writers who studied the chieftaincy but with strong emphasis in Natal. It was widely 
accepted that colonial penetration in Natal found many tensions existing. Minnaar 
(1991: 11) argued as follows: 'tensions between the various tribes and clans in Natal 
were exacerbated by Sheptone's (who was a colonial administrator and the man 
behind indirect rule) policy of controlling the black population by using African to 
keep order by means of indirect rule'. Morrell et al (1996: 35) argued that 'in Africa 
Natal was the first region where British colonial officials had to face up to the 
problems of how a capitalist imperial power was to rule numerous communities of 
non-capitalist, homestead-based producers ' . 
There is another dimension from the literature which demonstrates the role played by 
chiefs and associated issues. Welsh (1971: 111) argued as follows: 'the use of chiefs 
in administration in the early days of Natal's existence as a British possession was 
largely necessitated by the small number of civil servants available to rule the African 
population'. Welsh (1971: 11) provided us with figures to justify the importance of 
chiefs in administration. He noted that in 1871 the African population in Natal was 
300 000 with only eleven magistrates. The incorporation of chiefs as civil servants 
was not problem free. Instead, it changed the foundations of traditionalism and chiefs 
complained about losing control of their own people (Welsh, 1971: 220). With their 
incorporation chiefs became paid servants. Welsh (1971: 230) argued that 
'maintaining the tribal system was a cheapest way of governing Africans'. To a large 
extent, their incorporation contributed to both social and economic decline. 
Consequently, the relationship between chiefs and the people changed dramatically. 
Comparatively speaking, various colonial administrators had different goals in using 
chiefs as civil servants. Minnaar (1991: 11) reminded that every method was used to 
reduce the state of independent chiefs had with an aim of making them to be the 
subordinate to colonial authority. To a large extent, those who did not voluntarily 
give their powers to the colonial government were punished by authorities (Minnaar, 
1991:11). 
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Research conducted in Natal under Shepstone revealed that his long-term goal was to 
'make legitimacy of hereditary chieftainship decline' (Welsh, 1971: 125). On one 
hand, Shepstone assumed that the decline of hereditary chieftaincy would assist in 
dismantling tensions chiefs had with other chiefs. Shepstone was convinced that the 
continuation of wars and battles among tribes was because young chiefs had to fight 
wars of their forefathers. Conversely, most tribes in Natal openly welcomed 
colonialism. These tribes assumed that Shepstone was protecting them from the Zulu 
Kingdom which was very strong. Tribes were always in fear that Zulu warriors 
would attack them. Mngomezulu (1999: 5) argued that 'the Zulu state came to be 
regarded by the British colonial authorities as an obstacle to their plans to dominate 
the whole of Southern Africa'. 
The colonial system encouraged the appointment of chiefs. Chiefs became paid 
servants and worked under specific conditions. As Welsh (1971: 118) puts it: 'the 
people of whom he has been allowed to take charge, are not his people, that they 
belong to and are subjects of this government and that he is allowed to take charge of 
them on behalf of this government'. Chiefs in such circumstance were prevented 
from applying their discretion in governing their subjects. 
One of the important tasks chiefs had to perform was to collect hut tax. The tax 
collection function added more problems for chiefs. The relationship between chiefs 
and subject was in disarray. Welsh (1971: 125), for example, argued that the 
introduction of hut tax contributed to chiefs losing their traditional source of income. 
It was further noted that in 1852 'magistrates influenced chiefs to induce their young 
men to work for white farmers' (Welsh, 1971: 123). To a great extent, the 
introduction of hut tax was a strategy to force young men to work for white farmers. 
Morrell et al (1996: 35) observed that the colonists noted that ' it would be more 
realistic, to rule Africans through their own chiefs, with intent that they would 
gradually become 'civilised' by going out to work for European settlers'. 
According to Welsh (1971: 184) Shepstone fought hard to secure African land rights 
and to withstand the colonists' aims of forcing individual land tenure upon Africans. 
Colonists believed that freehold title was going to lead Africans to sell their land and 
permanently force Africans into becoming available at the labour market. Welsh 
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(1971: 184) argued that Shepstone refused individual tenure, because he believed that 
such an introduction by colonists would undermine the position of chiefs together 
with the tribal system. Harries (1989: 99) observed that ' tenant and freehold forms of 
African land tenure had undermined the chiefs' maj or source of political power, their 
ability to control the distribution of land' . Conversely, White farmers were in need of 
African labour as it was viewed to be cheaper to employ Africans as compared to 
Indians (Welsh, 1971: 180). It is beyond reasonable doubt that white farmers needed 
labour. Tensions between chiefs and Europeans hindered the supply of labour. 
Welsh (1971: 223), for example, argued that ' the traditional system was regarded as a 
bottleneck inhibiting the flow of labour' . Therefore, whites needed something to be 
done because they needed access to labour. The labour question did not mean land 
was no longer a central issue. 
According to Mngomezulu (1999: 3) land was a chief source of conflict in South 
Africa. This view was given substance, in part by the fact that the 1913 Natives Land 
Act kept aside 93% of South Africa' s land for white purchase only (Chazan et ai, 
1999: 469). Scholars noted that this reservation was done for two critical demands, 
the need for cheap labour for mines and for white farmers (Chazan et ai, 1999: 469). 
The Native Trust Act of 1936 consolidated the Native Land Act of 1913. The Native 
Trust Act extended powers to chiefs to levy special taxes particularly those who were 
in need of purchasing tribal land, arguably as a form of control (Harries, 1989: 99). 
Harries (1989: 99) further argued as follows: 'attempts to bolster the power of chiefs 
were not merely aimed at strengthening the Native Affairs system; they were also 
perhaps primarily, aimed at supporting the chiefs whose political power was 
increasingly threatened by the rising African petty bourgeoisie' . 
It is true that chiefs were incorporated and protected under the colonial system, but 
their protection resulted in depriving chiefs of land, legitimacy and autonomy they 
enjoyed with their subjects. The sale of land exacerbated deprivation (Harries, 1989). 
Chazan et al (1999: 42) concluded that ' although colonial governments retained many 
indigenous social institutions and brought about the redefinition of others, colonial 
rule superimposed a new administrative structure on these social and political orders'. 
Evidence suggests that colonists transformed and created boundaries they would use 
for the effective implementation of their policies. 
46 
3.1.4 Traditional leadership and indirect rule 
The policy of indirect rule was introduced in most African countries. According to 
Glaser (2001 : 23) indirect rule granted the colonial government ways of serving 
money on African administration. It was further argued that African societies were 
too diverse and complicated to be administered by somebody who did not understand 
them. Indirect rule could be interpreted as a colonial strategy used to weaken African 
kingdoms and ensure that costs associated with administering African kingdoms were 
reduced. Despite arguments from different observers in South Africa, particularly in 
Natal, Shepstone used indirect rule for the problem he faced that of inadequate 
personnel. Studies provided that Shepstone did not have enough staff to implement 
colonial policies (Welsh, 1971). 
Comparatively speaking, Glaser (2001: 25) argued that the use of indirect rule system 
in Natal was twofold: Firstly, it was used to maintain stability in African societies; 
secondly, it was used to protect the political needs of whites. Such activity 
demonstrated that the whites saw that they couldn' t succeed in Africa without using 
the traditional political system. The justification of using traditional leaders as civil 
servants because of the shortage of personnel is not convincing. The question that 
arises is what is it exactly that made the relationship to change between traditional 
leaders and their subjects if what they were doing had good intentions of assisting 
Africans? 
3.1.5 Contextualising traditional leadership under apartheid regime (1948-1994) 
Most commentators viewed apartheid as a crime against humanity. Apartheid came 
into effect when the National Party in South Africa won the majority of seats in the 
1948 elections. This assisted the process of indirect rule to be incorporated and 
consolidated. Mngomezulu (1999: 12) argued that ' apartheid consolidated some of 
the British colonial laws and aggravated the situation by enacting more inhuman 
stipulations which Africans of all ethnic groupings found difficult to respect' . Pycroft 
(2002: 110) argued that there were contradictory and complex relationships between 
rural communities and traditional leadership during the apartheid era. 
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The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was taken as the first step by the apartheid 
government to set a strategy for divide and rule. Studies showed that the notorious 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 'bolstered the power of chiefs by modernizing and 
expanding their tax basis to include all the members of the tribal authority' (Harries, 
1989: 103). The designers of this law needed to revive chieftainship. For Amtaika 
(1996: 23) the apartheid regime resuscitated the institution of traditional leadership 
through its policy of separate development, therefore the institution became an 
essential element in the 'masculine and hierarchically ordered view of the Zulu nation 
in the KwaZulu Bantustan'. Some studies suggested that Bantu Authorities Act 
(BAA) divided the very same chieftaincy it was intended to revive. This legislation 
produced collaborators and resisters. Those who collaborated in the promulgation 
betrayed their own subjects. Mare and Hamilton (1987: 27) observed as follows: 
The Bantu Authorities Act of that year both did away with the NRC and made 
provision for tribal and regional authorities, redefining and re-emphasizing the 
resolve of white political authority to maintain control through untraditional 
static and strong 'traditional tribal' structure. What must be borne in mind is 
that while the origins of these structures lie in the policies developed by the 
colonial authorities in Natal from the mid 19th century onwards, their purposes 
have changed overtime. Initially they served as an economic and political link 
between pre-capitalist society and colonial administrators. Today chiefs and 
tribal authorities (with some notable exceptions) form part of the control 
mechanism over an African population superfluous in the long and short term 
to capitalist labour needs. 
The above citation demonstrates how the institution of traditional leaders was 
changed by those in power. The BAA provided three levels of administration. 
Through the BAA the apartheid state employed a range of institutions at its disposal 
so as to maintain racial segregated order. This Act offered an opportunity to the 
apartheid state to have a close link with those who supported or who served as 
collaborators with it in a wide range of issues such as land and implementing 
segregation policies. Mare and Hamilton (1987: 28) argued that Verwoerd was 
convinced that 'the three-tier system was one to re-instate or reintroduce traditional 
tribal democracy to African people'. Conversely, it is unclear whether BAA was 
really needed to revive chieftaincy in South Africa. Mare and Hamilton made two 
conclusions, firstly, they noted that apartheid needed to weaken the institution so as to 
continue ruling with the colonial bureaucracy; lastly, it needed to rely on the 
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institution for administration matters (Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 27). Relying on the 
institution for a number of issues was entrenched in Natal for decades. Ntsebenza 
(2002: 6) reminded that traditional leaders in the rural areas of the former Bantustans 
enjoyed unlimited powers 'over a range of activities' . 
Observers showed that the National Party government made policies such as BAA 
because of a growing pressure from within South Africa and the international 
community. As Mare and Hamilton (1987: 29) eloquently put it: 
The ' wind of change' of African nationalism that swept through the continent 
after the Second World War set an example as they forced aside the direct 
control of the colonial powers. Verwoerd acknowledged the effect of 
international pressure when he commented that 'we cannot govern without 
taking into account the tendencies in the world and Africa' . 
It is through the wind of change that tribes and chiefs rejected BAA. The former 
African National Congress (ANC) President Chief Albert Luthuli made clear that they 
reject BAA (Mare and Hamilton, 1987). 
Researchers like Mngomezulu (1999: 18) have been critical in demonstrating 
historical facts that show the relationship between chiefs and BAA. He criticised 
King Cyprian from the Zulu Kingdom for opening a fertile ground for ploughing 
apartheid policies by supporting the implementation of BAA. There was also a 
warning that the acceptance of BAA by Cyprian should not be understood to mean 
that all Zulus accepted it and that not all chiefs should be seen as ' collaborators' . 
Mzala (1988) argued that when Verwoerd went to address chiefs at Mona (outside 
Nongoma) in October 1955 they refused to adopt and implement such legislation 
(BAA). Instead, they requested to be given more time to think about it. Tapscott 
(1996: 293) argued that 'under the Bantu Authorities Act, the powers of chiefs were 
considerably strengthened but, at the same time, their popular legitimacy was 
undermined as they were compelled to introduce unpopular laws such as the 
"Betterment Schemes" which resettled communities against their will '. 
There are numerous lessons to be learnt from these quotations. Firstly, there is a need 
to understand historical facts that would add value in our contemporary debates. 
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Secondly, there were lesser chances for apartheid policies to be unanimously 
welcomed by chiefs. This suggests that the relationship between chiefs and 
governments has never been smooth, as other studies seem to suggest. Lastly, any 
legislation that involves governments and chiefs cannot be easily implemented; as the 
government would wish it to be instead time would be needed so that traditional 
leaders would adapt to that particular legislation. 
3.1.6 Traditional leaders and local government in KwaZulu 
The granting of KwaZulu to be a self-government territory opened a new chapter for 
traditional leaders or chiefs. Mare and Hamilton (1987: 88) observed that the 1978 
elections5 ' reduced the total dependence on chiefs but it left them as a numerically 
dominant component within K waZulu politics' . The dominance of chiefs within 
K waZulu politics seemed to be forced upon them. Research indicates that before the 
1978 elections, there was an Inkatha meeting which took place in September 1977, 
where it was explained on what role chiefs could play in elections. Research 
confirmed that meeting held in 1977 symbolised that ' the institution of chieftainship 
would last as long as it served the interests of the people, and their role in Inkatha' 
(Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 88). It was further pointed out that KwaZulu urban 
representative observed that ' chiefs had resisted being drawn into Inkatha because 
they believed the state' s accusation that the movement would strip them of their 
powers' (Schrnahrnann, 1978: 304 cited in Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 88). The 
meeting for Inkatha was called to clarify the position of chiefs and it was addressed 
by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. 
According to existing research Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi warned that ' if chiefs did 
not involve themselves in the affairs of the movement it would be regarded as 
dereliction of duty and active involvement against Inkatha' (Mare and Hamilton, 
1987: 89). These chiefs were also reminded that they were no longer controlled at 
5 This refers to K waZulu Bantustan elections which was held in 1978. The Central Committee of 
Inkatha controlled the selection of candidates to stand for movement in ' Parliamentary and Local 
Government' elections. These elections was delayed for sometime because of Buthelezi ' s and 
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly ' s (KLA ' s) insistence that KwaZulu citizenship certificates be used for 
voter registration. Buthelezi was skeptical of the use of reference books because opportunities for 
irregularities would have taken place and that pass book was a ' badge of oppression ' that people who 
had not paid their tax would not register (see Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 81-88) 
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Pretoria instead their ' fate as chiefs' would be decided at Ulundi . What Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi presented in that meeting could be interpreted in different 
ways. Firstly, it could be understood to mean that he was intimidating chiefs and that 
their survival depended at Ulundi. Secondly, it could be interpreted that Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi believed in the position of chieftainship and its validity in 
society as he was a chief himself. Lastly, it could be interpreted that through his 
presentation it was a concerted efforts to make chiefs more effective. 
Mare and Hamilton (1987: 89) further argued that many people lost their lives 
opposing and resisting structures which were created through Bantu Authorities Act 
for years in KwaZulu (KZ), Buthelezi ' activated tribal authorities as a central element 
in local government' . Amtaika (1996: 137), for example, acknowledged that the 
'KwaZulu Bantustan conferred the functions of local government on tribal 
authorities ' . These chiefs were expected to function as the base of government in 
KwaZulu so that they could be able to implement rural development projects. 
According to Pycroft (2002: 110) the majority of South Africa' s rural population were 
concentrated in homelands; where elements of public service delivery normally 
associated with local government were provided by different systems of traditional 
leadership. Some observers indicated that although these chiefs were supposed to be 
in the forefront with local government functions, they were not trained for their 
duties. The absence of training and unclear boundaries given to chiefs resulted in 
tribal institution being criticised for failing to deliver services. McIntosh (1996: 240), 
for example, argued that ' traditional leaders were severely neglected by responsible 
departments and obtained little funding to perform their duties ' . Most of this proved 
difficult to integrate. There was a criticism levelled against the incorporation of 
traditional leaders' in local government; such incorporation undermined their roles as 
traditional leaders as they found themselves having to serve the interests of a 
particular political party (Inkatha Freedom Party). This leaves a question whether 
traditional authority structures were set up to undertake development issues or were 
intended to implement unpopular apartheid policies. 
Tapscott (1996: 297) argued that ' the tribal authority system was portrayed as the 
primary administrative structure through which rural development programmes would 
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be channelled, despite the evidence that the vast majority of chiefs and headmen 
lacked any training or skills in the administration of development programmes'. It 
seems difficult to blame traditional leaders for failure of development projects. As 
tribal authorities had no resources to deliver services and to implement rural 
development projects let alone developmental skills. 
Amtaika (1996: 59) did research on the role of traditional leaders in the democratic 
KZN which revealed that on the wave of the late 1980s to 1990s the Indaba took a 
lead in KwaZulu and recommended that local government would operate through the 
system of traditional authorities as the already existing structure. According to Zungu 
(1996: 169) there were numerous proposals made by the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba in 
1986 about the position of traditional authorities. In the urban and peri-urban areas 
traditional authorities were to be encouraged to evolve into part of the system of local 
authorities. The KZN Indaba recommended the establishment of a Council of Chiefs 
and Cultural Councils to represent the interest of traditional authorities (Zungu, 1996: 
169). It was recommended that Cultural Councils were to deal with the protection, 
maintenance and promotion of religions, language and cultural rights. Evidence 
suggests that KZN Indaba through its recommendations seemed to be advocating for 
the traditional leadership to take a lead in local service delivery in rural areas. This 
concretised the idea that traditional authorities would function as local authorities in 
rural areas. 
3.1. 7 Contextualising the South African negotiations process and traditional 
leaders 
The restructuring of local government in South Africa remained on top of the political 
agenda after 1990. This was as a result of service boycotts and restructuring 
processes experienced by local government in the 1980s and 1990s in South Africa. 
Spitz and Chaskalson (2000: 185) reminded us that ' the crisis paved a way for 
negotiations for the transformation of local government in South Africa'. Conversely, 
Amtaika (1996: 65) observed that 'at the commencement of Convention for 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA), major political parties had not yet announced 
their plans concerning the institution of chieftaincy'. The insufficient nature of the 
non-announcement about chieftaincy could be partially condemned because it led to 
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the 'failure of new local government arrangements to incorporate existing, legislative 
institutions' (McIntosh, 1996: 244). It can be argued that such failure undermined 
existing mechanisms of mutual support which were found existing to other 
communities and structures. 
The Local Government Negotiation Forum6 (LGNF) was officially established in 
1993 to integrate and to provide a co-ordinated national framework for the 
transformation of local government in South Africa (Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000: 
185). Statutory and non-statutory bodies formed this LGNF. Observers pointed out 
that representation was dependant upon control of councils in different parts of 
provinces. Organisations which had no control of municipalities or councils did not 
have representation in charting a way forward for new local government. Spitz and 
Chaskalson (2000: 185) argued that political parties like Democratic Party and Pan 
Africanists Congress were not part of LGNF as these parties lacked local government 
profile to justify their representation. According to Pycroft (2002: 111) the forum was 
criticised for focusing on urban issues, a bias that framed the Local Government 
Transition Act. Spitz and Chaskalson (2000) do not mention what happened to rural 
areas, particularly in KZN as traditional leaders were trained in local government 
techniques. 
Amtaika (1996: 65) observed that traditional leaders were excluded from the 
proceedings of CODESA. Such exclusion was viewed as a political strategy, and 
since then there has been no common understanding and agreement about traditional 
6 Local government crisis could be regarded as one of the factors forced the National Party government 
to succumb and to agree to negotiations in 1990s. Such negotiations were carried through in the Local 
Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF), a body that included statutory and non-statutory structures. 
This comprised of a fifty-fifty former local authority personnel (mainly white) who had vast experience 
in local government and new interests groups who were previously excluded from apartheid structures 
(mainly black). The LGNF was established to negotiate structure for local government. The 
establishment of LGNF provided a platform for widespread debates on the form and functions of local 
government and provided a framework for the transition process to unfold. Agreements reached from 
the LGNF formed the basis for the Local Government Transition Act (LGT A) of 1993. The LGT A 
laid the foundation for Metropolitan and Transitional Councils that constituted combined structures for 
former white areas/towns and the black townships and traditional rural areas. (see Chris Tapscott, 
1996. The Institutionalization of Rural Local Government in Post Apartheid South Africa in 
Hofmeister, Wand Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and Contemporary Forms of Local Participation and 
Self-Government in Africa. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung 
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leaders. Some have argued that traditional structures should be abolished because 
they worked as extended arm of two lethal forces, colonialism and apartheid. 
Furthermore, research conducted by Amtaika (1996: 141) led to the following 
comment: 'many rural areas did not have these local authority structures or non-
statutory bodies which were important for local government negotiations and charting 
a way towards local government restructuring' . The negotiation process was more 
concerned in attending urban crisis which was contributing to the collapse of black 
local authorities particularly in urban areas. McIntosh (1996: 248) holds that 'the 
absence of pre-interim process for rural areas and the failure to consult timeously in 
developing and implementing rural local government systems, has led to conflict 
among rural stakeholders' . It is against these provisions that there seems to be sour 
relationships among stakeholders operating in rural areas. Lahiff (1997: 19), for 
example, suggested that the product of insufficient arrangements of pre-interim 
processes was that of two parallel systems of local government in rural areas which 
are now competing with each other. This study argues that implementation of 
development policies in rural local government would suffocate because it is difficult 
to implement policies in such an environment which is full of political stand-off. 
CODESA was able to incorporate all claimants to authority in South Africa, 
particularly homelands governments and various political parties. The crux of the 
matter was that of traditional leaders. Most negotiators argued for the institution of 
traditional rule to be democratised so that it could have a space in the interim 
constitution. Spitz and Chaslalson (2000: 395) further observed that ' the KwaZulu 
government and Bophuthatswana government strongly favoured the constitutional 
entrenchment of structures of traditional authority' . The incorporation of traditional 
leaders in the constitution took place after length discussions which were a 
compromise. 
According to Amtaika (1996: 74) ' the method and procedures of incorporating tribal 
authorities in the structures of the democratic government were provided in the 
interim constitution, because of the complexities of the constitution of tribal 
authorities in different provinces in South Africa' . McIntosh (1996: 249) argued that 
' the interim constitution recognised traditional authorities for advisory roles at 
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provincial and national levels, but it did not specify what roles such authorities should 
play at local level except by reference to other applicable laws' . 
3.1.8 Traditional leaders, Interim Constitution and Local Government 
Transition Act 
Although there was a limited timeframe to finalise local government transformation, 
negotiators were able to come up with two documents which had vague references to 
the roles and functions of traditional leaders. These documents were Chapter 10 of 
the Interim Constitution and the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA).7 This 
meant a serious omission of the key instrument for development in rural areas. 
Pycroft (2002: 111) argued that 'the absence of municipal structures within rural areas 
meant that rural negotiating forums were not created, and guidance for new rural 
council structures was not included in the original ' . The Interim Constitution was 
criticised for its silence on the roles and functions of traditional authorities. Amtaika 
(1996: 148) argued that another criticism was the LGTA' s failure to make any 
specific distinction between urban and rural areas. He further argued that the 
institution of traditional leadership did not receive constitutional focus (Amtaika, 
1996: 6). A point of departure was the agreement reached at the bilateral meetings 
over a ten-month period (April 1993 to January 1994) (Cloete, 1995: 2), which 
concluded that ' at local level, traditional leaders within the jurisdiction of a local 
authority would be ex-officio members of the local government' (Spitz and 
Chaskalson, 2000: 399). 
Observers from different disciplines pointed out numerous issues about the existing 
relationship between traditional leaders and democratically elected councillors. 
Mbatha (2003: 191) observing from a feminist perspective revealed that during 
negotiations 'participation was secured for a wide range of interests groups except 
traditional leaders and women's groups'. Ngcobo (1997: 67), for example, pointed 
out that 'the absence of strong local government in KZN quite often presented 
7 This legislation did not provide much guidance on the constitution of local government councils in 
rural areas and it left to provincial government to decide on what form of rural local government was 
most appropriate. It is worth remarking that the system wh ich was used to the run up of the first local 
government elections adopted for rural areas was proportional representation, which leaves no great 
space for elected officials to be accountable to the voters or their constituency, instead it leaves more 
space for elected officials to be accountable in their political parties (see Ntsebenza, 2004) 
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enormous challenges even to Reconstruction and Development Programme' . It is 
justifiable to argue that such signs were early warnings about the need to clarify the 
roles and functions of traditional leadership in development for the benefit of rural 
societies. A major problem was tensions between IFP and ANC in KZN over the roles 
of traditional leaders. 
3.1.9 First Local Government Elections in KZN 
The transition failed to run first democratic elections in KwaZulu-Natal on the 
stipulated period because of the political stand-off between the IFP and ANC. Pycroft 
(2002: 111) argued that 'the discretion given to MECs has meant that different 
institutional forms of rural local government have developed from province to 
province ' . KwaZulu-Natal is a prime case. Reddy (1999: 203) observed that local 
government elections did not take place in 1 November 1995 in KZN and Western 
Cape because of disputes centred around demarcation and the inclusion of tribal areas. 
The absence of a model for rural local government was the other problem. In a 
similar note, Hart (2002: 239) writing about KwaZulu-Natal acknowledged that local 
government elections did not take place in November as scheduled because of 'on-
going violence in the province' . 
According to McIntosh (1996: 247) 'the incapacity and lack of national direction on 
local government activities enforced some other provinces to go to elections without 
primary structure in rural areas ' . There was a growing incapacity to resolve political 
problems even in the post-apartheid government between major political parties. This 
was witnessed through local government elections where a compromise was reached 
between the IFP and the ANC, but which was not translated into long-term and 
sustainable relationship between local government and tribal authorities (Amtaika, 
1996: 135). Instead, it served as short-term solution just for local government 
elections to take place. 
3.1.10 White Paper on Local Government and traditional leaders 
The White Paper on Local Government was drafted soon after the first democratic 
local government elections. Numerous studies agree that The White Paper on Local 
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Government is a comprehensive document that gave direction of local government in 
post apartheid era (Hilliard and Wissink, 2000: 96). Lodge (2002: 86) observed that 
integrating democracy at local level has proven to be difficult because of 'material 
conflicts among South Africa' s different communities which is most evident in the 
local allocation of resources'. The White Paper on Local Government pays little 
attention to resolving tensions. Instead, it made broad statements about roles that 
traditional authorities could play in local government. 
The White Paper on Local Government (1998: 77) revealed that 'there are some 
overlapping responsibilities between traditional authorities and municipalities, which 
has tended to be a source of tensions and seems to cripple development in certain 
rural areas'. This paper is silent about the roles and functions traditional leaders 
should play in development. Bomstein (1998: 187) on a similar vein also asked as to 
what should be done with local government services which were historically within 
the domain of traditional administration as democratic local government did not exist 
in rural areas. The White Paper on Local Government seems to have paid much 
emphasis on democracy but did not focus on the role of traditional leaders in 
development. 
According to Lodge (2002: 95) traditional leaders and their representatives in Inkatha 
Freedom Party and Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA)8 were criticised for becoming hostile to the new system of local 
government. These two parties worked together in that they took a vanguard position 
to challenge the government at the Constitutional Court on the issue of establishing 
municipalities under their jurisdiction. They took a stand against the ANC led 
government that of boycotting the first democratic local government elections in 
South Africa in 199511996. Evidence suggests that opposition parties forged a 
relationship around issues of local government. 
The current literature opines that both traditional leaders and democratically elected 
councillors have problems associated with the implementation of development 
8 This is an organization which is historically aligned to ANC but differed with ANC on the issue of 
traditional leaders and advocated for it incorporation in the transitional period. It is throuoh this 
organization that traditional leadership was even recognized in the Interim Constitution. 0 
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projects, particularly in rural areas. According to Pycroft (2002: 110) traditional 
leadership became largely discredited as a political institution, although allegiance to 
traditional authority remains strong in rural communities. The White Paper on Local 
Government (1998) revealed that there are overlaps between traditional leadership 
institution and local government but it did not fully resolve those overlaps. Instead, it 
introduced developmental local government approach which shall be discussed below. 
3.2 DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The vast changes experienced by the local government in South Africa since the 
1990s have been manifested through strategic redesign and numerous changes. The 
concept 'developmental local government' was conceived out of the local government 
strategic redesign and changes. These changes were introduced in favour of 
institutions which were going to be capable of developing, managing and delivering 
services particularly to those who were excluded by apartheid policies. Mogale 
(2003: 216) argued that in response to damages caused by apartheid policies there was 
a need to reduce such historical backlogs through synergic partnerships which should 
be among all stakeholders involved in development activities. 
This section reVIews the literature on developmental local government and 
demonstrates how academics, practitioners, activists and observers from different 
disciplines articulate their views. Some scholars link developmental local 
government with South Africa' s political system but with a strong emphasis on rural 
local government. Institutional building and financial resources are key to the 
realisation of developmental local government. This section analyses the various 
debates and observations from different viewpoints pertaining to developmental local 
government. 
3.2.1 Definition of developmental local government 
Developmental local government (DLG) means different things to different people. 
In fact, DLG is a contested concept or approach in South Africa' s development 
discourse. According to the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 17), 
developmental local government is described as ' local government committed to 
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working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to 
meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives '. 
Although most definitions from various proponents draw from the one on the White 
Paper on Local Government, the reality is that there are many definitions and 
interpretations given to developmental local government. These definitions and 
interpretations range from a narrow focus to broader perspectives on political , social 
and economic causes and consequences. 
According to Pieterse (1997: 21) 'developmental local government can 
simultaneously be developmentally oriented and also entrepreneurially positioned to 
maximise all strategic opportunities to address poverty, deepen social justice and 
foster sustainable and balanced economic growth'. This is a broader definition of 
developmental local government which challenges the local state to form dynamic 
partnerships with all relevant stakeholders and interest groups. For dynamic 
partnerships the local state through DLG 'needs to understand the divisions of local 
communities and it has to ensure how it would promote the participation of 
marginalised and excluded groups' (Van Donk, 2002: 214). Pieterse (1997: 21) 
monitored the relationship between progressive social movements, political parties 
and responsible business. He concluded that developmental local government needs to 
(re) define its main tenets and endogenous local compacts that recognise their 
limitations and yet attempt to mediate global pressures through focused interventions. 
Oldfield (2002: 98) argued that ' the division between the ruling party and opposition 
parties creates complex politicisation that plays out at the local level in a myriad of 
ways ' . It is justifiable to argue that DLG needs to be interpreted and viewed in 
different ways, but it should consider the interests of those concerned, and the manner 
in which they participate in developmental processes. 
Van Donk (2000: 6) defines developmental local government as ' local government 
meaning to promote social and economic development for all its residents, create a 
vibrant local democracy by involving local communities in council matters, be 
accountable and work towards equity and redistribution' . This is a narrow definition 
as it is more directed to residents and also in deepening local democracy. However, 
this definition does not specify how to go about ensuring that residents benefit from 
economic development, at the same time it does not specify how women could benefit 
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by being involved in council matters. Largely, it is justifiable to argue that 
municipalities are thrown in the deep end for building local alliances and partnerships 
and more so to use their limited resources ' to fulfil their obligations in terms of the 
Constitution' (Chipkin, 2002: 76). 
Achmat (2002: 3) argued that 'developmental local government challenges the old 
technocratic way of planning which was excluding people from planning'. Parnell 
and Pieterse (2002: 79) pointed out that DLG was born out of the imperative to 
radically transform the apartheid system which operated along racial lines in the 
provision of local government services in South Africa. Oldfield (2002: 94) was of 
the view that DLG offered a space at the local level for voicing a diversity of interests 
and at the same time provides processes within which to prioritise these interests. 
Achmat (2002: 4) acknowledged that DLG has given a chance for the establishment 
of a 'holistic system at the municipal level that is integrated across all sectors and 
between layers of government, which is accountable and oriented towards addressing 
the needs of all it's citizens'. Parnell and Pieterse (2002: 86) argued that the 
integrated holistic approach which DLG recommends is too comprehensive and 
inclusive in that it is advocating for the incorporation of informal groups into 
democratic local government which is a formal structure. Equally important, this 
inclusiveness would not happen overnight without assistance from the national and 
provincial government. Instead, it could vehemently happen by ensuring that these 
non-state actors invited through DLG approach have a clear understanding on the 
functioning of municipalities. Embracing DLG requires more resources that will 
assist in capacity building of both official and unofficial policy makers such as civil 
society organisations. 
Although these writers argued that DLG has combined many goals such as poverty 
alleviation, growth creation and participation, Oldfield (2002: 98) quickly warned: 
'national government needs to manage effectively the opportunities and the conflicts 
that emanate from the imperative to implement developmental local government'. 
These writers do not repudiate the fact that there are opportunities for conflict brought 
about by participation, but the challenge is directed to government to deal with it. 
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Oldfield (2002: 92-93) sees developmental local government as ' the primary delivery 
mechanism of services and infrastructure, the foundation to the national goals of 
reconstruction and integration' . Pycroft (2002: 120) challenges this delivery 
mechanism by arguing that the ability to provide improved service delivery by rural 
local government is not only dependent on financial resources but is also upon the 
relationship between traditional leaders and elected councillors. Pycroft (2002: ] 20) 
reasons: ' consultation is challenged by the constitutionally protected position of 
traditional authority '. 
3.2.2 Developmental local government and its challenges to the nation state 
Mogale (2003) challenged the proponents of developmental local government 
considering the high socio-economic inequality and unrelenting poverty in South 
Africa, particularly in the era of global spread of capitalism. Against this backdrop, 
Mogale (2003: 228) argued that ' developmental local government is elusive, 
extremely impressive, passing for manifold phenomena, and underpinned by vague 
theory' . He further argued that developmental local government ' is not constrained 
by ideology, but is rather able to switch gears effortlessly from market-to government 
directed growth, or vice versa depending on the contingent circumstances. Often, this 
approach combines both market and state direction in a synergic manner when 
opportunities beckons' (Mogale, 2003 : 229). 
Mogale was not rejecting DLG. Instead, he was concerned about tensions arising 
partly from the nature of the formal dispensations that underpin the mandates of the 
three spheres of government. He was also concerned about policies which are 
supposed to serve as vehicles for local development and poverty reduction. These 
policies are constrained by macro-economic parameters and the need to conform to 
market driven modalities. What Mogale averred is that the challenge of poverty 
reduction and service delivery is not the responsibility of individuals. Instead, it 
requires partnership. He holds the view that there is a need for strong civil society 
which will add value in a decentralised governance system that will address poverty. 
What is important local government should be developmental and should not only 
promote growth and development but should also device strategies to maintain and 
sustain the process. 
61 
Advancing the debates on global capitalism, Parnell and Pieterse (2002: 79) argued 
that DLG will face the contestation of Growth Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) and Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) at the local level. 
There have been many debates within these two development policies, proponents of 
each policy arguing from a different perspective. Researchers such as Pape and 
McDonald (2002: 2) observed that ' under the market-oriented GEAR, South Africa 
embarked on a range of legislative and policy ventures that entrenched the power of 
corporate capital at the expense of workers and poor citizens in the country ' . 
Accordingly, the view held by these researchers is that most policies in South Africa 
are informed by neo-liberal principles which are evident in local government where 
service delivery is taking place. With the dominance of neo-liberal practices at local 
government level and with the advent of GEAR, research seems to reveal that there 
has been ' steady cut-backs in central government allocation to local authorities ' (Pape 
and McDonald, 2002: 5). 
Pape and McDonald (2002: 23) further pointed out that ' these cutbacks enforced most 
local authorities to introduce fuller the cost recovery strategy as a way of financing 
and expanding service delivery' . Although these authors do not indicate in which 
local authorities there have been a cut in budget allocation, there is strong evidence 
that those are urban municipalities. An intriguing question that arises is how rural 
local government will cope with all these contradictions which emanate from the 
nation state, taking into consideration that they are rarely having sources of income in 
their jurisdiction. Hezelton (2001: 39) maintained that ' in the new dispensation 
towns, villages and rural areas are institutionally integrated in single municipalities 
and that in many municipalities councillors representing the rural poor form a large 
majority' . 
Pycroft (2002: 106) maintained that the challenge facing rural local government is to 
create sustainable livelihoods and reduce poverty in South Africa. This may be due to 
different problems which rural municipalities are facing. As Pycroft (2002: 109) 
observed that ' rural local government has remained largely underdeveloped, as 
structured during the transitional phase (1995-2000), lacking sufficient financial and 
administrative capacity to have a significant impact on rural local government'. 
Atkinson (2003: 120) in a similar vein observed: ' in 2002, the political order at local 
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government level has not yet settled down fully, and many councillors are still 
grappling with their new roles and political responsibilities'. 
DLG has to politically and economically integrate the views of different evangelists. 
Oldfield (2002: 98) argued: 'political integration is a complex process that illustrates 
competing discourses of development and notions of governing within the state and 
society'. Pycroft (2002: 113), for example, holds the view that developmental local 
government is seeking at restructuring the local government sphere with an aim of 
complementing the GEAR strategy. Hezelton (2001: 40) analytically conceptualised 
this scenario thus: ' although the new local government system, with its larger 
municipalities, aims to ensure that each municipality has a solid financial , 
administrative and operational capacity, the reality on the ground is far from ideal ' . 
Quite often, there are distortions of resources which could make it difficult for the 
new municipalities to eradicate poverty in the poor rural areas in South Africa. 
Although GEAR emphasises the importance of non-state players and private sector in 
development, the reality is that the private sector will not provide services to the poor 
at below cost (Chipkin, 2002: 57; Pape and McDonald, 2002: 26). 
Atkinson (2003: 122) argued: ' rural municipalities, with few skilled staff, have been 
particularly hard hit by these organisational changes '. It is evident that there are 
problems in rural municipalities, which vary from political to administrative. 
Atkinson (2003: 122) validated these problems, and criticised the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) in ' lacking understanding of the real 
dynamics taking place in municipalities ' . This is evident through support 
mechanisms which do not always address both political and administrative problems. 
Atkinson (2003: 126) acknowledged that there are many challenges facing 
municipalities, let alone the constitutional crisis, particularly Section 153 which gives 
no clarity how the municipality that will bring development should look like. In her 
acknowledgement, she revealed that most of the work for rural municipalities is done 
by consultants and they have proven to be expensive. Despite the fact that many 
people working for municipalities do not have appropriate skills, 'municipalities have 
top management and frontline workers with almost no middle-level management and 
supervisors' (Atkinson, 2003: 127). It can also be pointed out that within this top-
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management and frontline workers there are those who are politically deployed. 
There are insufficient mechanisms from many senior officials and municipal 
managers to evaluate staff performance, this is made difficult by those who are 
politically deployed without the capacity. Although it does not mean they can remain 
without capacity, a major issue is the backlog of service delivery that municipalities 
have to address. Atkinson (2003: 128) warned that appointments done through 
'political patronage ' should be avoided by municipalities for the sake of their own 
development. She recommended that staff should be appointed through their 
' qualifications and experience in development management, programme management 
or projects management' (ibid, 128). 
Researchers such as Chipkin (2002: 65) have been critical in trying to understand the 
link between DLG and people (officials and councillors). DLG is premised within the 
principles of community participation. According to Chipkin (2002: 65) old officials 
lack the experience and knowledge to implement projects effectively which are 
premised on principles of community participation. In his argument, he is concerned 
about the newly elected councillors who may show interest in implementing policies 
according to council resolutions, but they may face some problems associated with 
minimal knowledge and lack of experience. 
Hazelton (2001) challenged these old guard practices, noting that for new local 
government to effectively facilitate equitable and sustainable service delivery that will 
address socio-economic development there is a need for these municipalities to 
restructure themselves and even consider the dynamics of their people centred 
mission. Against these shortfalls of insufficient skills, Hazelton (2001) recommended 
that new and old councillors and municipal officials need to be trained in 
development approaches. The point of departure is that even if new approaches could 
be introduced, if the workforce is not trained these will not yield effective results. 
3.2.3 Developmental local government and traditional leaders 
Most researchers are critical about the new local government with its constitutional 
recognition of traditional leaders, but which does not give much clarity about their 
roles and functions. Pycroft (2002: 121) advocated: 'the government needs to resolve 
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the constitutional and legal ambiguity that surrounds the relationship between 
democratic local government and traditional authority', as this would adversely 
impact on development projects. Pycroft (2002: 121) further argued that ' traditional 
authorities retain a constitutional right to be consulted on all issues that have bearing 
on land under their control ' . 
The relationship between traditional leaders and elected councillors needs to be 
addressed so that development does not suffocate. Pycroft (2002: 121), for example, 
observing this contestation, comments as follows: 
Traditional leaders remain an integral component of rural local government's 
constituency-not viewed as individual citizens within a uniform democratic 
system, but as a special interest group worthy of careful consultation. 
Through such negotiation and by ensuring that the development agenda of 
traditional leaders and their constituents is integrated into the development 
plans of the rural municipalities, confrontation should be replaced by co-
operation to the benefit of all, particularly the rural poor. 
There is a view that these two institutional systems are largely operating separately 
and in isolation, but local communities seem to be relying on both institutions. 
Research conducted by Bornstein (2000: 185) revealed that the process of establishing 
the new local government system resulted in enormous costs. The other cause for 
concern in this study given the constitutional protection of local government system is 
how this local government sphere is actually going to promote social development 
and democracy at local level given the contradictions stemming from the legal 
framework. The failure by South Africa to attend these contradictions/tensions 
between traditional leaders and councillors would actually lead the country in 
experiencing similar socio-economic and socio-political trends obtained in other parts 
of the African continent (Mhome and Edigheji, 2003 : 350). 
3.2.4 Developmental local government and social capital 
DLG aimed at involving people in development activities. Commentators such as 
Harrison (2002: 219), for example, observed that DLG will experiment social capital. 
As he puts it: 'very little empirical work has been undertaken, and, thus far, local 
government has not expressly tried to experiment with the concept'. Harrison (2002: 
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220) further argued that for social capital to effectively operate local government 
should develop a more ' astute understanding of its citizenry and the circumstances 
under which communities will actively engage in synergic relationships with the 
public sector' . According to Pycroft (2002: 122) 'DLG requires municipalities to 
coordinate the activities of local development actors, organisations and institutions, 
and thus improve the community' s access to social capital' . Hezelton (2001) 
concretises this issue by noting that the new local government approach calls for the 
engagement of communities in the affairs of municipalities and in particular in 
planning, service delivery and performance management. 
Cashdan (2002: 174) appreciated the progress done by the White Paper on Local 
Government in recognising social capital, but criticises its failure to explain what kind 
of social capital would tip the balance of power in civil society in favour of the poor. 
This is a valuable critique because most conflicts that emanate from participation are 
due to power relations which are unequal. Conceiving social capital in local 
government where there are different opinions among different stakeholders DLG 
would be able to assist in preventing the conflict that might occur. The social capital 
would also assist in capacitating community members so that they would be able to 
identify skills that would assist them in maintaining and identifying sustainable 
development projects. This view is put forward because social capital involves 
networking skills which are rare in rural local government. 
3.2.5 Developmental local government in the rural context 
Lemon (2002: 25) was highly concerned about local government restructuring which 
seems to put more efforts in 'consolidating power at national or local level, or at 
undermining the position of powerful competing groups at local level ' . Lemon does 
not specify who those competing groups at local level are. He remarks: 'it is 
important that national government does not use developmental local government as a 
means of shifting responsibility. The limited financial and human capacity of many 
local authorities is an obvious constraint, especially in rural areas ' (Lemon, 2002: 28). 
Mogale (2003: 217) stated that ' the main challenge for developmental local 
government in South Africa will be to ensure that existing decentralisation moves 
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hand and hand with deliberate efforts to mobilise and strengthen civil society 
structures, processes and institutions at lower levels in a manner that would allow 
their relationship with central and sub-national governments to be more interactive 
and mutually reinforcing'. Although new local government has some autonomy but, 
it has to ensure that stable relationship is maintained with other spheres of 
government and even with other stakeholders involved in development. Mogale 
(2003: 239) further argued that 'most of the writing and documentation on 
developmental local government does not make explicit connections nor interrogate 
the relationship between structural transformation, good governance, integrated 
planning and poverty reduction' . 
Hazelton (2001: 42) maintained that it is necessary to motivate communities to 
engage with developmental local government, because ' rural people are already 
loosely organised and conscientised from the days of the mass struggle for political 
freedom and are still prepared to work hard to change their lives' . To him, rural 
people have long been prepared to work hard and they demonstrated that in the 
liberation struggle before 1994. Hazelton was able to capture as to what have brought 
democracy and change in local government, but he fails to account whether people on 
the ground that need to be motivated to engage with developmental local government 
are aware of the democratic and public policy processes. In view of this, if people are 
not aware of these public policy and democratic processes, they would automatically 
view or conclude that DLG is excluding them. However, the problem will be situated 
on the unclear understanding of the proper channels to follow so as to have access on 
local government processes. 
According to Hazelton (2001: 42) power hungry councillors who are the ones who 
prepare a fertile ground for opposition by spreading lies that 'government will supply 
everything, and where municipal officials are consciously or unconsciously still 
aligned to the previous order with respect to how things should be done' . Such 
councillors can do such activities so that they will be able to protect their constituency 
and secure votes. 
It should be noted that at times councillors do not have adequate training in that they 
even bridge the code of conduct. Councillors must adhere to the code of conduct at 
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all times when serving the council. It could be suggested that the code of conduct 
should not be ignored by rural councillors with an aim of trying to be popular in 
constituencies since they are competing with other powerful structures such as 
traditional leaders. 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the literature in South Africa aimed at demonstrating how 
traditional leadership was changed to fit the government ruling at that (colonial 
government, apartheid government etc) time. The views of different scholars were 
studied at length to provide a basis for understanding the roots of tensions between 
governments and traditional leadership institutions in South Africa. This is done to 
reflect what has always been taking place between governments and traditional 
leadership institutions. 
This chapter also captured three fundamental periods which are crucial in the history 
of South Africa: colonialism, apartheid and the democratic period. Through these 
periods, the chapter aimed at covering the relationship between governments or 
political systems. Under colonialism, the chapter covered how colonisers used chiefs 
in administration as did not have enough personnel who could deal with social control 
of "natives". 
This chapter revealed that the apartheid government consolidated most colonial 
practices, aimed at implementing apartheid policies of racial segregation. Under 
apartheid, it has been demonstrated that the BAA was an Act that most traditional 
leaders did not understand. It was also shown how traditional leaders in KwaZulu 
associated themselves with implementing local government services. 
The wave toward democratisation and certain legislations were scrutinised 
particularly those which intended to facilitate the relationship between the two 
structures. It can also be concluded that the relationship between traditional leaders 
and elected representatives is a subject for great debate in the public sphere. 
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The part on developmental local government in this chapter reviewed the literature 
which covers a wide range of debates from various academics, practitioners, activists 
and observers from different disciplines. What was revealed within the literature is 
the fact that more people who have written on developmental local government are 
driven by the comprehensive definition found on The White Paper on Local 
Government. Among these writers, it can be concluded that there are those who 
express their view driven by historical observation of the political system of South 
Africa, and it gives them lesser space to believe that DLG would be able to face the 
challenges of two lethal forces colonialism and apartheid. 
It is also on developmental local government part in this chapter that the two broad 
development policies (RDP and GEAR) were discussed in tandem. Other scholars 
who are critical of these development policies argue that these policies are premised 
within neo-liberal agenda which could make difficult for service provision to be 
directed to poor citizens. Other writers shifted such debates from development 
policies to political factors. It was argued that the prevalence of political deployment 
would partly disturb the implementation of DLG, because there is also a 
transcending of boundaries between councillors and municipal officials. As stated, 
there are so many councillors who are grappling with their new roles and political 
responsibility. Others direct their arguments to economic implications which may 






The research approach employed in undertaking this study was a case study approach 
and the methodology used for data collection was in-depth interviews and 
observation. The study also entailed an overview of the relevant literature on an 
interdisciplinary basis. As Bless and Higson-Smith (1995: 22) stated, literature 
review provides background information that can be used to sharpen and deepen the 
theoretical fran1ework, identify gaps, discover connections, analogies or relations 
between different research results through comparing various investigations. The 
chapter provides the background information of the area under study-Jozini 
Municipalit/ and the background is studied in the light of broader social, economical 
and political transformation of South Africa as a whole. This chapter also focuses on 
explaining the methodology of the study. This is followed by a case study approach. 
4.2 Background of Jozini Municipality 
This section provides an overview of Jozini Municipality whose history pre-dates 
apartheid. It further provides some critical reflections on changes brought by the 
post-apartheid governn1ent in Jozini 
Jozini Municipality is one of the five local municipalities within Umkhanyakude 
District Municipality - one of the municipalities dominated by vast rural areas - and 
has a rich history of tourist attractions. This municipality includes village/towns of 
Ingwavuma, Jozini, Mkuze and Ubombo. Ingwavuma was a centre of controversy in 
the early 1980s when Pretoria tried to incorporate it into Swaziland. 
9 The name Jozini comes from the word "jozi" which means a short spear, and Jozini is an IsiZulu 
name and it means "cave" where spears can be hidden. Jozini Municipality was named after a well 
known dam (Jozini Dam). This dam is a pride of the community and it is among the four biggest dams 
in South Africa. 
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Historically, Ingwavuma and Ubombo were not part of the original Kingdom of 
Zululand. According to Lock and Quantrill (2002: 286) the Zulu Kingdom was 
divided into thirteen ' chiefdoms' (see figure 4.1 below). The northern boundaries of 
the Zulu Kingdom were not clearly demarcated in the 19th century (Uphongolo Sub-
Regional Development Plan: Development Perspective, 2000: 105). In the north lay 
the Swazi Kingdom and in the north east the direct authority of the Zulu King shaded 
into the tribute areas of the Thonga Chiefdoms. A cluster of small, independent tribes 
loosely grouped together as the Thongas ', inhabited the region between the Lebombo 
Mountains in the west and the sea, their territory included the southern reaches of 
present day Mozambique. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the divisions of the Zulu 
Kingdom. 




Source: Lock and Quantrill (2002: 286) 
Historical studies confirmed that the Thonga paid a mark of respect to their powerful 
southerners; they did not form part of the Zulu Kingdom and were thus not defeated 
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by the British in 1879. In 1887, when the British annexed Zululand, it incorporated 
the southern reaches of Thonga territory into the area it was annexing and thus 
brought them under British Administration. Subsequently, the Thonga in the Kosi 
Bay area asked for British protection and in 1895 their land was proclaimed a British 
protectorate. When Zululand was handed over to the Natal Settler government in 
1897, Thongaland was included with it (Uphongolo Sub-Regional Development Plan: 
Development Perspective, 2000: 105). This whole area thus came under the control 
of the white settlers in Natal and was subjected to the determinations of the Zululand 
Delimitation Commission. 
The most contentious issue in this area until the 1980s was the Ingwavuma land deal. 
Pretoria developed an interest in the Ingwavuma area in the late 1978, as part of 
consolidating programmes resulting from the van der Walt Commission of Enquiry 
(in which it was proposed that Ingwavuma be incorporated into Swaziland). The land 
exchange was discussed between Pretoria and Swaziland, but not with the K waZulu 
Legislative Assembly. This resulted in the initiative being put on the back burner until 
May 1982. According to the Uphongolo Sub-Regional Development Plan (2000: 
106) Chief Buthelezi revealed that Pretoria offered K waZulu 30 000 ha of land in 
exchange for agreeing to Swaziland taking over the Ingwavuma district. This resulted 
in a storm of protest, and again Pretoria was forced to back down. The land question 
was high in that a lot of activities had to take place such as agriculture and nature 
conservation as discussed below. 
4.2.1 Agriculture and Conservation 
Commercial agricultural development encouraged by the parastatal agencies such as 
former KwaZulu-Development Corporation, the Industrial Development Corporation, 
Mjindi Farming and KwaZulu Finance Corporation (KFC) led to the removal of 
people off land that they were formerly dependent on for farming. The north eastern 
region of KwaZulu-Natal witnessed several examples of people being removed to 
make way for development projects. Conversely, many of these projects were poorly 
conceived and implemented, and made little or no contribution to solving problems of 
underdevelopment in the region. 
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Subsistence agriculture is the main economic activity In the area under study. 
Potential areas for agricultural activities are found around Mkuze and the Makhatini 
Flats. The rich nature of the physical environment of the municipality resulted in a 
number of areas proclaimed for conservation purposes. 
4.2.2 Jozini and its development activities post apartheid, 1995-2004 
During the post-apartheid era, particularly during the transitional phase of local 
government (1994-1999), most areas which are covered by 10zini Municipality today 
were under Uphongolo Sub-Region, which was bordered to the north by 
Mozambique, Swaziland and the Zululand Regional Council (currently known as 
Zululand District Municipality) to the east; and the Umfolozi Sub-Region of 
Uthungulu to the south (refer to figure 4.2). The key characteristic of the Uphongolo 
Sub-Region was the low level of services and infrastructure provision in the urban 
and rural areas. The Lebombo Spatial Development Initiative (LSDI) recognised that 
infrastructural development was a key contributor to promote economic development. 
The poor road infrastructure was considered to be a contributing factor to the minimal 
tourism and agricultural development. 
Figure 4.2: Uphongolo Sub-Region bordered north by Mozambique, Swaziland 
and Zululand Regional Council (DC 26) 
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Water projects were key serVice delivery initiatives provided by the Uthungulu 
Regional Council-under Uphongolo Sub-Region. Table 4.1 provides a summary of 
water projects. 
Table 4.1: Water Projects Provided by Uthungulu Regional Council under 
Uphongolo Sub-Region 
Project Name District Tribal Authority %Com Remarks 
plete 
Tshongwe/Maloben Ubombo Ntsinde, 100% Completed and Handed 
i Water Supply Mashabane, Jobe over 
and Mabaso 
Mayaluka Water Ingwavuma Mathenjwa 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Kuzahleni Water Ingwavuma Mathenjwa 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Odwaleni Water Ingwavuma Mngomezulu 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Mbalekelwa Water Ingwavuma Mngomezulu 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Mhlekazi Water Ubombo Ngwenya 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Empini Water Ubombo Zikhali 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Thokazi Water Ubombo Mashabane 100% Completed and handed 
Supply over 
Mhlabuyalingana Ubombo Siqakatha 100% Completed and handed 
Water Supply over 
(Source: Uphongolo Sub-RegiOnal Development Plan: Development Perspective, 
2000:56) 
Numerous projects were provided by the Jozini Municipality since it inception. Some 
of these projects are called Local Economic Development (LED) and are provided 
through the capital budget of the municipality. Table 4.2 provides the summary of 
LED projects. 
Table 4.2: LED Projects Provided by Jozini Municipality 
Project Name Ward Tribal %Complete Remarks 
Authority 
Tshanini Poultry 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Sinamuva Gardening 2 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Ophansi Market 3 KwaJobe 100% Completed 
Qedindlala 4 KwaJobe 100% Completed 
Gardening 
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Ward 5 Bakery 5 KwaSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Igugulethu 6 K waS iqakatha 100% Completed 
Gardening 
Siyanqoba Garden 6 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Maize Meal 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Grinding 
Duduzanani Tent 8 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Singeni Gardening 9 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Phawini Gardening 9 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Sinamuva Gardening 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Sovana Gardening 11 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Masekweni 12 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Gardening 
Asihlezi Piggery 13 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Sizanani Youth Club 14 Mngomezulu 100% Completed 
Mgedula Gardening 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Mlilo Farmers 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Association 
Sibahle Block 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Making 
Amandlethu 16 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Gardening 
Hlahlambana 16 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Gardening 
(Source: LED Projects 2003/04 Status Report as at 05 November 2004) 
In local government projects are provided with different funding. The Mayoral 
Fund I 0 projects are provided with a budget which is normally allocated to a mayor. In 
order to access this funding communities are encouraged to identify projects in their 
respective areas and to submit business plans for the identified projects. These 
projects are aimed at fighting poverty and hunger. Therefore, communities are 
encouraged to identify income generation projects. Most wards benefit from this 
funding. Table 4.3 provides the summary of Mayoral Fund Projects. 
Table 4.3: Mayoral Fund Projects Provided by Jozini Municipality 
Project Name Ward Tribal Authority %Complete Remarks 
Mpileni River 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Zamokwakhe Garden 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
V ukusebenze Garden 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
JO This refers to funding which is allocated to the mayor by the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government. At certain times Mayors receive this money from external sources such as outside 
countries. What mayors are normally using to access this funding are IDPs of their municipalities. 
This funding also assists in dealing with emergences and items which are not budgeted for in the 
capital budget. 
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Ehlanzeni Creche 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Zamumcebo Garden 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Vukuzithathe Garden 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Khiphikhono Garden 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Vulamehlo Garden 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Msunduze Creche 1 Ngwenya 100% Completed 
Siyaphambili Piggery 2 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Zamani Creche 3 KwaJobe 100% Completed 
Nompi Creche 4 KwaJobe 100% Completed 
Makhonyeni Women's 5 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Club 
Ophande Sewing 5 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
lhluzo Art and Craft 5 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Art and Craft P Gumede 5 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
lsulethu 6 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Udondo Youth Club 6 K waSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Zimele Club 6 KwaSiqakatha 100% Completed 
Ebhokweni Project 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Intando Yamakhosikazi 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Simunye Project 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Vukukhanye Creche 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Asithuthukengamasiko 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Mpondwane Arts and Craft 7 Nsinde 100% Completed 
Phaphamani Garden 8 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Obhokweni River Fencing 8 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Silwanayo Garden 8 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Qophumlando 9 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Mpumelelo Poultry 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Siyathuthuka Poultry 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Vukuzenzele Baking 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Vukukhanye 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Madanishini 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Xoshindlala 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Vezikhono 10 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Mthonjeni Garden 11 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Thembalethu Garden 11 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Mlawu Creche 12 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Zamimpilo 12 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Vukuzakhe Sewing Project 13 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Vukume Sewing Project 13 Nyawo 100% Completed 
Oshabeni Development 14 Mngomezulu 100% Completed 
Clinic 
Iyaphi Youth Project 14 Mngomezulu 100% Completed 
Ekujabuleni Creche 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Khwne Women's Club 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Good Look 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Mgedla Communication 15 Mathenjwa 100% Completed 
Project 
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I Vukanimakhosikazi I 16 I Mathenjwa 100% I Completed 
(Source: Mayoral Fund Projects 2003/04 Status Report as at 05 November 2004) 
4.2.3 Institutional Analysis 1995-2004 
Regional Councils formed the third level of government, that of municipalities and 
replaced areas that were formerly under the jurisdiction of the Joint Services Boards 
(JSBs). Under these regional councils, there were some Transitional Local Councils 
(TLCs) and Sub-Regions. Sub-regions had the so called Sub-Regional Standing 
Committee which provided a link between the sub-regional community and the 
Executive Committee (EXCO). Most regional councils were grappling with funding 
and provision of services to meet the needs of under-serviced communities, although 
their performance was critical to the delivery of services on the ground. 
Probably the most contentious issue was that of the role of traditional leaders and 
regional authorities in local development. Most regional councils such as Uthungulu 
Regional Council involved traditional leaders; apart from being ex-officio members 
they were also represented in the Executive Committee. II In the first council meeting 
the Uthungulu 12 Regional Council held on the 20th of August 1996 after the first 
democratic elections held in June 1996 in KwaZulu-Natal councillors insisted that 
they could not discuss any issue related to development in the absence of traditional 
leaders. The Speaker insisted that they learnt a lot of things on how important it is to 
work with traditional leaders in development issues. The traditional leaders were 
tasked to report to other traditional leaders on the deliberations of the Uthungulu 
Executive Committee. The late Inkosi Mathenjwa was sitting on the Uthungulu 
Regional Council Executive Committee and was serving as the Chairperson of 
Ingwavuma Regional Authority. His participation resulted in a direct communication 
between traditional leaders and the Uthungulu Regional Council. 
Most sub-regions within Uthungulu Regional Councils had TLCs, but Uphongolo 
Sub-Region had no TLCs. Instead there were fourteen traditional authorities which 
were found under two regional authorities. There were ten traditional authorities 
II Interview with the Speaker of Jozini Municipality 25/ I 0/2004 
12 Where lozini Municipality is today, it was part of the sub-region of Uthungulu Regional Council 
before December 2000 elections. 
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under Ubombo Regional Authority and four under Ingwavuma Regional Authority. 
Their names are shown in the following table. 
Table 4.4: Traditional Authorities under Uphongolo Sub-Region 
Ingwavuma Regional Authority Ubombo Regional Authority 
• Mathenjwa • Nsinde 
• Mngomezulu • Ngwenya 
• Tembe • Siqakatha 







(Source: Uphongolo Sub-Regional Developmenet Plan: Development PerspectIve, 
2000:36) 
Although the Uphongolo Sub-Region had no TLCs, most towns were managed by the 
former Development and Services Board (DSB) later known as Umsekeli Municipal 
Support Services. Ubombo, lngwavuma and Mkuze were administered by Umsekeli 
Municipal Support Services. 
Within the consolidation phase (from 2000) of local government, there were many 
institutional changes that took place. Most of the areas which were part ofUphongolo 
Sub-region are now found under Umkhanyakude District Municipality. This district 
municipality is made up of five local municipalities-Umhlabuyalingana, Big Five 
False Bay (Umzinene), Hlabisa, Jozini, Mtubatuba. Worth noting, such changes 
contributed to the change in traditional authorities and their boundaries. Currently, 
there are areas of other traditional authorities which are found in certain 
municipalities, this is because there are some overlaps of traditional boundaries from 
one municipality to the other. Consequently, most traditional authorities under 
Umkhanyakude District Municipality are not serviced by single municipalities. 
Instead they are serviced by different local municipalities. 
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Figure 4.3 below summarises the above paragraph about the current state of affairs 
under Umkhanyakude District Municipality. 13 
Figure 4.3: Local Municipalities under Umkhanyakude District Municipality 
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What should be noted is that out of fourteen traditional authorities, seven remained 
under lozini Municiplaity which is the area under study. 14 There are still two regional 
authorities under lozini Municipality. These are Ingwavuma Regional Authority and 
Ubombo Regional Authority. Traditional authorities under lozini Municipality are 
shown in figure 4.4 below: 
Figure 4.4: Traditional Authorities under Jozini Municipality 
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14 Duri~g the ti~ne of this research T~mb~ Traditional Authority was still part of Ingwavuma Regional 
Autho~l~y. ThiS reflects that there IS stili a parallel operation between municipalities and regional 
authOrities but there were some arrangement for this traditional authority to be taken to be party of 
Umhlabuyalingana Municipality. 
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Since the year 2000 local government elections 10zini Municipality has seven 
traditional authorities. Each traditional authority has its traditional council made up 
of elders dominated by men. Women are only included in community structures 
which are project specific. What is interesting within the traditional structure is that 
each headman is allocated a certain portfolio as is the case with the modern 
institutions, and most headmen are close relatives of chiefs and even share similar 
surnames. Most of the headmen in traditional authorities are not commoners. In 
addition, each traditional authority has its own secretary paid by the government and 
most of them are females. These secretaries report directly to district offices of the 
Department of Traditional Affairs in the case of KZN. Most of the traditional 
authorities' files are audited in the nearby district office of the Department of 
Traditional Affairs. In essence one of the important stakeholders for the Department 
of Traditional Affairs is the traditional authorities. 
The number of headmen vanes from one traditional authority to the other; the 
formations of traditional councils are dependent upon traditional wards whilst other 
traditional councils also include chiefs' advisers who are nominated from amongst 
elderly men. For example, the Mathenjwa Traditional Authority is made up of twenty 
one headmen who come from three wards according to municipal boundaries. 
Traditional authorities under 10zini Municipality are made up of between five to 
twenty five headmen. It should be noted that the traditional structures are very 
complicated and this adds to the difficulty of understanding these structures. 
Regional Authorities l5 are formed by different representatives from each traditional 
authority. Each traditional authority has three representatives which comprise a chief 
and two members, one elected from headmen and the other being elected from and by 
community members. Once it is clear as to who represents a certain traditional 
authority then these members sit down and elect the chairperson of the regional 
authority (refer to figure 5.3 in chapter 5). It is inevitable that the chairperson should 
be a chief. The regional authority meeting is held once in three months. It is worth 
15 Regional authorities were created for the administration of the kings, so-called paramount chiefs. 
These paramount chiefs, sat together with the leaders of the traditional authorities, the so-called chiefs, 
as well as appointed on the basis of their expertise in identified fields (see Nkosi Phathekile Holomisa, 
2004) 
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noting that in these regional authority meetings development issues are discussed such 
that each traditional authority gives updates on the implementation of the its 
development plans. It is in regional authorities where development activities are 
discussed and upcoming development projects are presented by various line functions 
departments. Regional authorities report directly to the Department of Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs in the case ofKZN. 
10zini Municipality has sixteen wards and a total of thirty two councillors. The 
combination of ward councillors and proportional representative CPR) councillors 
strike the balance. Ward councillors are the only representatives accountable to the 
public and in all spheres of government. These representatives are more important in 
South Africa's fledgling democracy. The 10zini Municipality is dominated by IFP 
male ward councillors, with only one ward belonging to the ANC. There are few 
women councillors in this municipality and they are PR councillors. Out of these 
women councillors few are given positions, for example out of six portfolio 
committees the municipality has only two women who serve as Executive Committee 
Members. 
In the case of KZN the establishment of ward committees l6 was not promulgated. 
This places more responsibility on ward councillors and all of them serve on a part-
time basis. Only the speakerl7 serves in a full-time capacity. Although in 10zini 
Municipality there are wards with ward committees, they are not fully functional 
because the incumbent had inadequate training. The municipality is servicing deep 
16 There are numerous debates leveled against ward committees which include the fact that the number 
in such a committee should not exceed ten. This presents a problem in the functioning of wards 
because they are too vast and there are a number of different interests that need to be represented. 
There is no guarantee of deepening democracy through the formation of these ward committees. rn the 
case of rural areas and in other areas there have been some tensions because structures which existed 
such as development committees saw ward committees as trying to undermine their functioning whilst 
in other areas development committees were changed to take on ward committee functions . This 
structure was recommended to deepen democracy and to development a culture of participation among 
community members. It is emphasized that within ward committees women should be equitably 
represented together with the diversity of interests in that ward. Municipalities are supposed to make 
administrative arrangements to enable the ward committees to perform their duties and exercise their 
functions effectively (see MuniCipal Structures Act of 1998) 
17 The speaker is the chairperson and presiding officer of the council , responsible for the control of 
proceedings. He/she is required to be neutral in debate and ensure fair play among the parties. In 
councils using the plenary executive system (councils with no executive committee, where decisions 
are taken by council) the mayor acts as the speaker. 
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rural areas. Most of these rural areas have big wards which have more than one 
proportional representative councillor. What was observed during the research was 
that other wards remain without PR councillors. 
4.3 Qualitative Research Design 
The qualitative approach was adopted as a methodology for data collection and 
analysis for this study. The qualitative approach was crucial in that it does not only 
tell you why a phenomenon occurs but also helps in developing ' a detailed 
understanding of individual views, attitudes and behaviour' (Moore, 2000: 121). A 
qualitative approach was crucial in that the study focuses on issues that are too 
complex to be understood by applying quantitative measures. Gillham (2000: 10) 
argued that ' qualitative methods focus primarily on the kind of evidence (what people 
tell you, what they do) that will enable you to understand the meaning of what is 
going on'. The qualitative approach to social science research is about researching 
human behaviour, looking for facts , opinions, experiences and preferences on the 
subjects (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995; Blaikie, 2000). To understand the dynamics 
typical in most rural municipalities require a researcher to see the world through 
communities' eyes. This allowed the exploration of complexities that are beyond the 
Jozini Municipality in implementing developmental local government. It was further 
necessary to investigate situations where little is known about what is there and what 
IS gomg on. 
4.4 Case study approach 
The strategy adopted in exploring developmental local government in a rural context 
is the case study approach, which is one of the ways of conducting social science 
research. According to Huysamen (1994: 168) 'case studies are directed at the 
understanding of the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of a particular case in all its 
complexity' . There was a rationale for adopting a case study approach. In a case 
study different methods are used such as interviews, observations and documentary 
analysis. This approach is called triangulation. Clarke et al (1999: 88) argued that 
'one of the main advantages gained from using triangulation as part of multi-method 
research design is that it allows the researcher to have greater confidence in the 
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research findings than is the case when a single method is used' . It is widely accepted 
that research methods have their own strengths and weaknesses. Those who support 
triangulation maintain that strengths of one method can be used to complement the 
weaknesses of another. 
Gillham (2000: 2) advised that ' no one kind or source of evidence is likely to be 
sufficient on its own. This use of multiple sources of evidence, each with its strengths 
and weaknesses, is a key characteristic of case study research' . It is for this reason 
that this study adopted the case study approach, because there are numerous units of 
analysis and sources of data. 
4.5 Strengths of case study approach at Jozini Municipality 
The case study approach may be utilised with several different instruments such as 
participant observation, questionnaires, and interviews in providing qualitative 
information (May, 2001). The use of this method in the study focusing on 
developmental local governn1ent in a rural context was to understand the Jozini 
Municipality and the activities taking place on an everyday basis, through the lens of 
the relationship between traditional leaders and councillors. Gillham (2000: 102) 
warned that this method is not expected to be wasted on issues which are unimportant 
for ' its real power is in part a function of the uses to which it is put'. He further stated 
that the case study research requires time and one should be prepared to commit the 
time. 
4.6 Limitations of case study approach at Jozini Municipality 
The disadvantage of the case study method is that it is impossible to observe and 
analyse every municipality because of time and cost constraints. Some of the 
recommendations from this case study could be utilised to facilitate the relationship 
between the traditional system of governance and democratic system. However, such 
recommendations calmot be replicated in their totality in municipalities in rural areas 
which are dominated by traditional leaders because of the specifics of geographical 
locali ties. 
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4.7 Negotiating entry 
There are vanous ways which were used to negotiate entry In Jozini. On the 
municipal side, the researcher started by having telephonic discussions with the 
municipal manager. 18 There were two main reasons for the telephonic discussion. 
Firstly, it was to establish interpersonal relations before the commencement of the 
actual interview process. Secondly, it was to communicate the objectives of the 
research project. 
The complexity and sensitive nature of the study necessitated the researcher to 
observe most of the protocols. After the telephonic discussion with the municipal 
manager, the researcher drafted a letter (see Appendix 1) which was directed to the 
municipal manager to serve as the follow up. Thereafter, the researcher had another 
telephonic conversation with the speaker of the municipality. The intention was to 
secure interviews with councillors. During the processes of negotiating entry, the 
researcher capitalised on three issues. Firstly, he was known in the area while 
working for the Centre for Public Participation (CPP) which focuses on capacity 
building of stakeholders involved in local government structures and other interests 
groups involved in development. Secondly, the researcher grew up in the area of 
jurisdiction of the municipality. Lastly, as a senior student of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) the authorities trusted him and offered co-operation and 
were not suspicious of his motives. Consequently, most interviewees were motivated 
to respond positively. To avoid problems and questions, it was made clear that the 
research was purely academic, and had nothing to do with the state, or political 
organisations. 
In accessing traditional authorities, the researcher used regional authorities ' officials 
who were able to give details as to when traditional authorities had their meetings. 
Some traditional authorities meet once a week, whilst others meet twice a week. This 
happens because of the workload traditional authorities have. Although the regional 
18 The Municipal Manager is the head of administration of a municipality. He/she is responsible for the 
formation and development of an economic, effective, efficient and accountable administration. One 
of his/her duties is the implementation of the municipality 's integrated development plan, and the 
monitoring of progress in the implementation. He/she is an accountable officer, responsible for all 
income and expenditures of the municipality. 
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authority's officials were able to give details about when traditional authorities meet, 
it was recommended that the researcher pays a personal visit to those traditional 
authorities. The researcher was able to establish interpersonal relations with these 
authorities. The objectives of the study were explained as was the case with the 
municipality. The researcher avoided suspicions by stating that 'I am doing a purely 
academic research and I am a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal'. Those 
who were interviewed requested that this take place in their homes. As the researcher 
was tape-recording most interviews traditional leaders needed to be assured of 
confidentiality. Although trust was developed, the researcher observed that they are 
afraid of the media. In other cases, the researcher had to produce his student card to 
develop trust. 
4.8 Sampling Technique 
According to Huysamen (1994: 37) it is not practically and economically feasible to 
involve all members of the popUlation in a research project. Instead, one can obtain 
data from population through sampling. Bless and Higson-Smith (1995: 274) define 
sampling as the process used to select cases for inclusion in the research study. 
Sampling was necessary for this study, given the complexity and vastness of the 
lozini Municipality. 
A non-probability sampling technique was used for this study. Within each 
community/traditional authority the judgemental or purposive sampling technique l9 
was used to obtain tbe population sample to be interviewed. This sampling technique 
was employed with a specific purpose in mind. According to Huysamen (1994: 44) in 
using this technique 'researchers rely on their experiences, ingenuity and lor previous 
research findings to deliberately obtain participants in such a manner that the sample 
obtained may be regarded as representative of the relevant population'. Bless and 
Higson-Smith (1995: 275) argued that 'purposive sampling has a great value 
especially when used by a person who knows the population under study'. Marlow 
(1998) argued that purposive sampling allows the researcher to handpick the sample 
according to the nature of the problem and the phenomenon being studied. 
19 Only specific groups of people who were crucial for rural development to take place were selected 
for this study. 
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Respondents were selected in terms of their involvement either on municipality, 
traditional authority or any other development activities. Table 4.5 illustrates the 
categories of people interviewed for the purpose of this research project. The people 
chosen represent the various groups of people that are relevant for development in 
rural areas. 
Table 4.5: Categories of people interviewed 
Category Councillors2O Ordinary Civil Society Traditional Municipa Traditional Total 
Members" Representatives Leaders I Official Authority 
Secretaries 
No 6 3 2 4 3 3 20 
Percent 30% 15% 10% 20% 15% 10% 100% 
4.9 Interview Process 
According to Gillham (2000: 77) interviewing is a central technique in a case study 
research. Given the nature of the study interviewing participants was more 
appropriate and flexible in nature. This study adopted principles of unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews. Huysamen (1994: 145) argued that semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews provided an opportunity for the interviewer to use probes with 
a view of clearing up vague responses, or to elaborate on incomplete answers. Given 
the nature of the study, Gillham (2000: 62) argued that 'interviews assist particularly 
where material is sensitive in character after trust has been developed. People will 
disclose things in a face to face interview that they will not in an anonymous 
questionnaire' . 
Exploratory in-depth interviews were carried out for a period of two months. The aim 
of qualitative in-depth interviewing was to provide an opportunity for the 
interviewees to speak freely and openly in their own terms and words. Huysamen 
(1994: 145) argued that in in-depth interviews questions on highly sensitive and 
20 This category is divided into two, it represents councillors which are elected through the proportional 
representation system and those elected through the ward based system. There are also councillors 
who serve as advisers of chiefs within certain traditional authorities. 
21 This study by ordinary members mean a group of people who are not necessarily affiliated to any 
social formations like political parties, social movements, associations etc. These members do not 
necessarily mean that they are less educated. Instead, they well vested with socio-political issues that 
affect a large number of communities in South Africa in general and in 10zini Municipality in 
particu lar. 
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emotional issues may be asked. Most of the interviews were conducted in 
respondents ' own language, which is isiZulu and isiSwati. The rationale for using the 
respondents ' language was to ensure that respondents articulated their views freely 
and clearly without being impeded. The researcher was in an advantageous position 
of understanding most of the local languages under the 10zini Municipality. 
The intention of these interviews was to understand the relationship between 
councillors and traditional leaders at 10zini Municipality and how this impacts on 
development, especially in promoting developmental local government. To a large 
extent, the researcher had an understanding of the municipality, but did not have all 
the latest developments of the area. The researcher started by surveying the broad 
area where the municipality operates, which was followed by spending time in each 
traditional authority with senior citizens, interacting with them with an intention of 
learning their development concerns. During that time traditional authorities ' 
meetings were attended where much of the observation took place about the 
proceedings and deliberations. 
Twenty people (municipal officials, councillors appointed through proportional 
representation and ward elections, traditional leaders, community members belonging 
to different local formations and traditional authority secretaries) were interviewed 
under the so-called elite interviewing. These stakeholders with whom qualitative 
interviews were conducted were seen as people involved in development activities in 
the 10zini Municipality. According to Gillham (2000: 63-64), 'elite interviewing is 
when you interview someone in a position of authority or especially expert or 
authoritative, people who are capable of giving answers with insights and a 
comprehensive grasp of what it is that you are researching' . Open-ended questions 
were identified as the appropriate method to obtain as much information as possible. 
Respondents were asked the same questions, but the researcher was able to adapt the 
formulation, including the terminology, to fit the background and educational level of 
the respondents. This was done because of the sensitive nature of the study and 
divergent backgrounds of the respondents. 
Most of the interviews were tape-recorded. As Clarke el al (1999: 78) argued: 'tape-
recording is advantageous, as for example, when conducting in-depth interviews with 
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senior policy-makers or where a detailed contextual analysis of the data is to be 
performed' . Interviews were later transcribed. These interviews were supplemented 
with information obtained during the researcher' s participation in local government 
seminars, training workshops, group discussions, conferences and forums organised 
by organisations who work on local government matters in the KZN. The analysis of 
10zini Municipality documents such as Integrated Development Plan (lDP) served as 
another method of getting a better understanding of local dynamics in the region. 
4.10 Ethical Considerations 
The researcher assured respondents that their identity would be concealed. As 
Huysamen (1994: 178) argued: ' research participants do not owe anything to the 
researcher and they are entitled to be treated with respect, dignity and courtesy' . 
Respondents were interviewed after consent was granted. Huysamen (1994: 180) 
further asserted that 'the informed consent of prospective subjects to participate in 
research should be obtained before hand'. Whenever the identity is revealed in this 
study, prior consent was obtained from person(s) concerned to do so. 
4.11 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is deemed one of the most crucial stages of research regardless of the 
method of research i.e. qualitative or quantitative. Glanse and Peshkin (1992: 37) 
maintained that data analysis involves 'organising what you have seen, heard and read 
so that you make sense of what you have learned' . Gillhan1 (2000: 25) supported the 
view that 'the purpose of analysis is to faithfully reflect in summary and organised 
form of what you have found ' . Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to 
analyze all the collected data and quantitative data is represented statistically. Results 
from interviews were analyzed thematically and themes were discussed separately. 
The rationale for doing this was to test data from one source against other source in 
order to get a better picture on each theme. In certain instances anecdotes from the 
field were used to authenticate infonnation from the secondary data. 
Maykut and Morehouse (1994: 128) recommended that the constant comparative 
method is useful when analysing qualitative data collected from focus group 
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discussions and individual interviews. The two authors argued that it is imperative to 
analyze data according to themes and unitize discussions into easily identifiable 
chucks of units. It is these bits and pieces of units that will convey the message to the 
reader(s). The data collected were divided into chucks organised around themes that 
are crucial for this study. Each theme was then dealt with according to the data 
collected. 
4.12 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a historical overview of Jozini Municipality. This was done in 
a chronological order aimed at illustrating the changes which were introduced by 
political transformation in South Africa. It is worth noting is that part (Ingwavuma) 
of Jozini Municipality was a subject for controversy in the 1980s, and is still a subject 
for debate. The changes that took place in the post-apartheid era impacted on 
traditional boundaries. 
This chapter showed that a qualitative approach was adopted for data collection and 
analysis. It also demonstrated that a case study approach was relevant in exploring 
developmental local government in the rural context, particularly where there are 
complexities and the sensitive nature of the study. It was relevant because of its 




POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE JOZINI 
MUNICIP ALITY 
5.1 Introduction 
The first issue that seems to be prevalent is the clash between traditional and 
democratic structures on their roles and responsibilities. The clash between the two 
structures is related to a power struggle over who controls the area. People are 
divided by age on the issue. Young people seem to be rarely aligning themselves with 
the traditional leaders, but elderly people still acknowledge the value of the system, 
whilst the issue of development looms large for traditional leaders and elected 
councillors. The traditional system is at times politicized. Therefore, while some 
communities would like to cooperate with the municipal system they are afraid to 
defy their leaders. These two power blocs seem to be aligned to different political 
parties. 
The data analysed in this study is divided into different themes. The first part of the 
chapter analyses the relationship between politics and traditional leadership. These 
themes give an overview of the main research questions such as the relationship 
between traditional leaders and democratically elected councillors and how this 
impacts on development. The second section considers the role of traditional leaders 
in implementing developmental local government. The ways in which the lozini 
Municipality interacts with traditional leaders is examined in detail. 
5.2 Politics and traditional leadership 
The relationship between political parties and traditional leaders is dependent on 
various issues such as the organisation to which the traditional leader is aligned. The 
majority of respondents claimed that the relationship of the two structures is good 
under the lozini Municipality with an exception of a few who were critical of the 
nature of engagement between political parties and traditional leaders. Traditional 
leaders who are aligned to political parties that are in charge of their areas relate well 
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with them, but under certain conditions. One of the major conditions is that political 
parties are not allowed to have meetings at traditional authority offices. This suggests 
that traditional leaders do not oppose political parties provided such organisations 
follow proper channels of communication and observe protocols. The second 
condition was that political party leaders were not allowed to use traditional structure 
representatives in inviting people to participate in party' s meetings. This shows that 
traditional leaders do not stand in the way of politicians and do not prevent parties 
from meeting people. The municipal speaker argued that 'what traditional leaders 
dislike is the situation where political parties are found having meetings without their 
approval. It must be remembered that political parties do not have people. People 
belong to traditional leaders or amakhosi ' . 22 One ward councillor argued thus: 
The relationship is dependent as to what makes you to relate with traditional 
leaders. If you relate with traditional leaders with something that threatens 
their power, the relationship will not be conducive. If you relate with them 
with something that will bring development, the relationship will be good 
because they also like development, but we cannot say the relationship is sour 
at the same time we Calmot say it is smooth (Interview, 12 October 2004). 
This view showed that the relationship is a compromised one because councillors who 
come from political parties that form the municipality have got money, whereas 
traditional leaders have none. It was argued that disputes start because traditional 
leaders are under pressure from communities. They then pressurize councillors about 
development activities. If councillors do not respond to this pressure then the 
relationship becomes sour. 
Some councillors maintained that the relationship is dependent on the reality that 
traditional leaders understand which political party rules and dominates in the lozini 
Municipality. A civil society representative argued 'my understanding is that 
traditional structures relate well with political parties specifically at lozini 
Municipality because the traditional structure is IFP orientated and the majority of 
councillors come from the very same political party which advocates for traditional 
leaders ' (Interview, 15 October 2004). This view was supported by one ward 
councillor who is part of the EXCO who argued as follows: 
22 Interview with the Speaker of 10zini Municipality who is a ward councillor and was given a mandate 
by the municipality to interact with traditional authorities before any development could take place and 
he also served while the part of 10zini Municipality was under Uthungulu Regional Council. 
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Traditional leaders are different, as the present government is informed by 
democracy, in that regard everyone has got a choice to go where he/she likes. 
What I can say is that the majority of traditional leaders are under IFP in KZN. 
In the Jozini Municipality they are aligned to IFP as it is the only party in 
KZN that recognizes traditional leaders (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
One civil society representative argued that traditional leaders are pretending as if 
they relate well with political parties, particularly with the IFP, because they feel that 
there is nothing they can do on their own (Interview, 12 October 2004). Even if 
traditional leaders are not satisfied, they cannot complain; instead they are tolerant for 
the sake of the political party to which they are linked. 
It is evident from figure 5.1 that 75% of the respondents hold the view that traditional 
leaders are not forced into party politics. There were different reasons advanced as to 
why traditional leaders were not forced into party politics. There were those who 
argued that it was optional for traditional leaders to be part of party politics. 
Traditional leaders' involvement was seen as an opportunity to practice their 
democratic rights which are entrenched in the constitution. Councillors argued that 
traditional leaders were not forced into party politics. Instead, they are part of party 
politics. 
Twenty percent (20%) argued that traditional leaders were forced into party politics 
and supported their arguments by comparing the apartheid regime with the democratic 
regime. Community members and civil society representatives argued that traditional 
leaders were forced into party politics during the apartheid era and were threatened 
that they would not get paid if they did not implement government policy at that time. 
Such an approach intimidated many traditional leaders. Other traditional leaders 
joined politics because they were given incentives by the leadership of certain 
political parties. Traditional leaders noted that in the democratic era they are no 
longer forced to participate in party politics. Furthermore, it was noted that other 
traditional leaders were indirectly forced into party politics through certain policies 
such as the KwaZulu Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act (Act No.9 of 1990) that 
were in place under the apartheid regime. Other traditional leaders involved 
themselves in politics for the sake of securing development projects for the people 
they represent. 
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The remammg five (5%) of the respondents argued that traditional leaders' 
participation in party politics is dependent on where they are, which party is 
dominating in that area and how members of that party behave. It was further stated 
that traditional leaders find themselves compelled to join politics as a survival 
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As shown in figure 5.2, 60% of the respondents see a need for traditional leaders to 
involve themselves in party politics. These views were supported in different ways. 
Some respondents argued that there was a need for traditional leaders to be involved 
in party politics, because they govern through politics. It was argued that for 
traditional leaders to be well posted or versed with political changes that will make 
them take effective decisions on behalf of their subjects there is a need to involve 
themselves in party politics. However, some contended that once traditional leaders 
do not involve themselves in party politics it means they are excluding themselves 
from development activities. As one traditional leader argued: 'if you exclude 
yourself from party politics development is skewed in your area, development is 
linked to politics ' (Interview, 11 October 2004). Others argued that if they did not 
participate it means they excluded themselves from exercising their civil and political 
rights. Some remarked that 'there is a need to be involved in party politics for better 
understanding the political developments and even how government institutions 
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operate, more specifically at the local level. And without being involved in party 
politics there is little one can understand' (Interview with PR councillors, 9 October 
2004). This was further supported by the view that the involvement of traditional 
leaders in politics is important because ' politics is an engine for everything and that 
such traditional leaders must involve themselves mostly with parties that advocate for 
and protect them' (Interview with ward councillor, 25 October 2004). 
Figure 5.2 further shows that 30% felt that traditional leaders should not be involved 
in party politics. As one senior official argued: ' traditional leaders must participate in 
development issues, but it is a pity that politics drives development in that regard if 
traditional leaders distance themselves in politics it would mean they are distancing 
themselves from development' (Interview, 14 October 2004). Furthermore, others 
felt that involvement in party politics could lead to a situation where traditional 
leaders become bias and that would disturb their functioning and decision making 
because they would find themselves failing to accommodate other members of certain 
political parties which they do not support. One community member argued as 
follows: 
There is no need for traditional leaders to be involved in party politics. 
Instead, there is a need for them to stand firmly in traditional leadership. 
Traditional leadership was there during apartheid and during the government 
of National Unity, and I am convinced that since they understand a lot of 
things in relation to rural communities they could have a strong influence on 
people and as communities since we know them and are close to us and our 
complaints will be directed to them. First and the foremost traditional leaders 
should make sure that they advocate for development from elected councillors 
because the elected have got the fixed term. Traditional leaders must make 
sure that within this fixed term elected councillors have to ensure that services 
are delivered. Once traditional leaders do not lobby for development in their 
respective areas, people would blame them, because they are always with 
people, and as their positions do not change. Traditional leaders should not be 
threatened by people (elected representatives) who conform to changes which 
are changing and twisting. In summary traditional leadership have got things 
which are static and which will be there for some times (Interview, 12 October 
2004). 
The remaining ten (10%) of respondents believed in both (that traditional leaders be 
involved and not be involved in party politics). The view that traditional leaders 
should be involved in party politics was supported on the basis that there are 
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traditional leaders who are already involved in party politics and already assuming 
roles and responsibilities in certain political parties. It was argued that 'politics is 
about power, so the traditional structure is a political structure on its own. Once they 
run away from involving themselves in politics they will end up with no voice. At the 
same time if they are not active they will be swallowed by history so they need to 
improve themselves by being involved' (Interview with ward councillor, 12 October 
2004). Councillors and community members argued that traditional leaders should 
not be involved in party politics because they look after all communities regardless of 
affiliation. One community member felt that there is no need to be involved in party 
politics because traditional leaders could still perform their administrative and 
development duties without necessarily getting involved in party politics (Interview, 







Figure 5.2: Is there any need for traditional leaders to 




















There were debates among stakeholders about the involvement of traditional leaders 
in party politics, and especially whether such involvement supports or impedes 
developmental progress. Most of the respondents (councillors, ordinary community 
members and civil society representatives) agreed that traditional leaders' 
involvement in party politics supports development. Traditional leaders argued that 
they support development activities provided that such projects were introduced in 
their jurisdiction after consultation. Some traditional leaders argued that they 
involved themselves in party politics for the benefit of their subjects, because if they 
excluded themselves from party politics their subjects would not receive any 
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development projects. Traditional leaders supported this view by stating among that 
'their involvement in party politics does not stop development. Instead, traditional 
leaders are waiting for development. In that regard we welcome councillors if they 
come with development activities' (Interview with traditional leader, 15 October 
2004). Two traditional leaders were reserved about their involvement in both party 
politics and developmental issues, but agreed with the view that it supports 
development. As one traditional leader argued, 'party politics support developmental 
progress, it is a matter that we need clarity on our powers in development so that we 
would be able to fully engage ourselves in developmental issues' (Interview, 25 
October 2004). 
One civil society representatives supported the VIew that traditional leaders' 
involvement in party politics promoted progress. This representatives commented 
that the promotion of development activities depends on how traditional leaders 
welcome ideas. It was further argued that 'developmental progress is supported by 
traditional leadership and is the best structure to work with, although their powers are 
not well defined, but we do acknowledge their presence in as much as we also 
acknowledge the presence of councillors' (Interview with civil society representative, 
12 October 2004). 
Two respondents who serve as traditional authority councillors, traditional leader 
advisers and municipal councillors23 agreed that traditional leaders' involvement in 
party politics support developmental activities. It was argued that 'traditional leaders' 
involvement in party politics supports development because co-ordination gets 
promoted and development activities get the fertile ground to be implemented and that 
if they are not involved in party politics development is retarded' (Interview with PR 
councillor, 9 October 2004). These views were supported with sentiments such as the 
following: 
Councillors are a product of politics and in such circumstances they are 
protected and governed through politics, therefore we need to work with 
traditional leaders for us to give development to people. If a traditional leader 
23 This refers to the fact that there are traditional leaders who serve in both the traditional and modern 
institutions. These members are well vested in understanding both institutions and are well placed in 
providing tangible solutions where there are some conflicts. 
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has a sour relationship with the councillor, then development is disturbed and 
skewed. The municipality has got money for development and traditional 
leaders have got land and its subjects need to be developed (Interview with 
ward councillor, 25 October 2004). 
This shows the relationship that exists in the 10zini Municipality which is viewed as a 
compromise because the traditional leadership institution is faced with the problem of 
insufficient resources to provide services to their subjects. In that regard there has to 
be an exchange of resources (land and money) for the implementation of development 
projects. 
In general, councillors were more impressed by the way the relationship between 
them and traditional leaders was taking shape. The Speaker commented as follows: 
In 10zini Municipality, we have got a good working relationship with 
traditional leaders when it comes to development and most of them understand 
who leads this municipality. It is my responsibility to interact with traditional 
leaders or traditional authorities when there are development activities that 
need to be introduced. Even if such development activities come through the 
District Municipality, it has to go through 10zini Municipality. What I do is to 
take development agents to introduce them to traditional authorities when 
there is a traditional authority meeting or at times I introduce them to the 
traditional authority council. It is expected that the development agents have 
to explain the objectives of the project that they need to provide and how they 
would like to do it. After the agents, are welcomed, the headmen (Izinduna) 
hold public meetings in their respective traditional wards with an intention of 
disseminating information to people about a certain project that will be 
forthcoming. If the project touches all traditional authorities under 10zini 
Municipality, I take development agents and go with them to regional 
authorities under the jurisdiction of 10zini Municipality to let them introduce 
such project(s) (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
This demonstrated the relationship that is currently taking place in the 10zini 
Municipality. However, this does not mean that these development agents are always 
welcomed in the traditional authorities as will be demonstrated later in this study. 
The comment from the speaker is summarized in figure 5.3 . 
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The Municipal Manager also supported the views from the speaker as follows: 
In terms of relationship in general we agreed or took a resolution in this 
municipality that the speaker of the municipality must visit regional 
authorities, traditional leaders' areas and traditional councils to present what 
the municipality is doing. It is believed that through such visits co-operative 
relationship would be promoted between these two structures. The 
democratically elected leaders do their ground work as they understand how 
traditional leaders' operate. There are few cases where we can say we have 
failed to develop a good relationship between these two structures because 
traditional leaders are not part of the municipal council (Interview, 04 
November 2004). 
The history of this municipality with regard to the political party agenda informs the 
kind of relationship that should be maintained. The IFP aligned Mayor argued as 
follows: 
What made the municipality of Jozini to resolve to work with traditional 
leaders is that the IFP is the party that recognises, respects and fights for the 
dignity and importance of traditional leaders. After the election of 2000, Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi invited all IFP councillors at Emandleni who were 
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instructed that in all municipalities that are under the leadership of the IFP, 
councillors must make sure that they respect traditional structures and all other 
relevant structures that work closely with traditional leadership institutions. 
We as a party that respects our leadership came back and took a resolution to 
work closely with traditional structures in our municipality so that we do not 
have any conflict with traditional leadership as the municipality has more rural 
areas and is dominated by traditional communities (Interview, 05 November 
2004) 
Two municipal officials' respondents were critical about traditional leaders' 
involvement in party politics. One senior official argued that ' traditional leaders' 
involvement in party politics supports development because where there is politics, 
development is also part of the agenda' (Interview, 14 October 2004). One councillor 
provided a critical view when he said: ' if 10zini Municipality is a state I would say it 
is a one party state, therefore, most traditional leaders aligned themselves with the 
ruling party so that development would not suffocate. And most of them are realistic 
at times because once they see development they indicate as to where they belong' 
(Interview, 12 October 2004). This suggests that for traditional leaders to benefit 
from development in the 10zini Municipality there is no escape from politics. This is 
a similar case with councillors, if they need to provide services to communities they 
have to co-operate with traditional leaders. 
One traditional leader and civil society representative noted that traditional leaders' 
involvement in party politics provide different opportunities for development. One 
traditional leader further argued that ' traditional leader' s involvement in party politics 
supports while at times it impedes development' (Interview, 15 October 2004). A 
key determining factor in this regard is that party affiliation influences who got 
services and who did not. Whether such involvement supports or impedes 
development can be seen from the argument that: 
In 10zini Municipality there was a situation where people did not accept the 
water scheme because of the fact that they would be seen as being associated 
with the ANC. This resulted in a situation where people distanced themselves 
from that water scheme. At a later stage some realised that those who 
accepted such delivery enjoyed the availability of water in times of drought 
while those who rejected such scheme suffered drastically (Interview with 
civil society representative, 15 October 2004). 
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The case of the water scheme was a good example of how the governments' 
commitment to poverty reduction and service delivery could be derailed by political 
tensions. 
The national government is aware of the tensions between traditional leaders and 
elected councillors. It responded to the matter through the formulation of various 
legislations such as the White Paper on Local Government and the White Paper on 
Traditional Leadership. In 10zini Municipality, there are no development projects that 
are provided without the consent of traditional authorities. This is facilitated through 
workshops and frequent visits to traditional authorities mostly represented by the IFP 
political leadership so as to open a space for councillors to operate effectively. The 
Mayor argued that ' councillors understand that their role is to work on development 
issues in traditional leaders areas. In a place where there were traditional leaders, 
before any development could take place it is our (Jozini Municipality) policy to 
ensure that traditional leaders or Izinduna were consulted and a consensus was 
reached as to how the project would be implemented' (Interview, 05 November 
2004). This view was supported by the statement that 'when we talk about 
development issues the relationship is good, but when it comes to issues that would 
eliminate the powers of traditional leaders the relationship takes another shape. This 
forces the municipality before any thing could happen to sit down and set terms of 
reference so that development could effectively take place ' (Interview with ward 
councillor, 12 October 2004). The drawing of terms of reference or a memorandum 
of understanding reflects how each structure is suspicious of the other. One 
councillor commented as follows on what informed the terms of reference: 
' traditional leaders thought that we as councillors were part of those who did not want 
to make any clarity about their role in local government. Traditional leaders forget 
that councillors work with policies enacted from the national government and 
provincial government which are supposed to be implemented at local government 
level ' (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
One ward councillor and ordinary community member argued that the government is 
running away from the responsibility of giving clarity about the roles and functions of 
traditional leaders and councillors. One community member argued as follows: 
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In my view the government does not want to come clear on the role of 
traditional leadership. We as conmlUnities acknowledge and witnessed the 
role of traditional leaders and they have vast responsibilities. At the same time 
we have observed that their responsibilities are disturbed by the shortage of 
funding to fulfil them. I argue that there is no need for traditional leaders to 
have responsibilities without resources and we also admit that traditional 
leaders need to be empowered (Interview, 12 October 2004). 
One of the IFP aligned councillors argued that ' it is a political agenda of the ANC 
government to do away with the institution of traditional leadership, especially in this 
province of KZN since the majority of traditional leaders support the IFP ' (Interview, 
25 October 2004). This is reflected in government policies which were enacted in 
favour of the elected representatives (Interview with traditional leader, 11 October 
2004). Table 5.1 shows the impact these tensions have on the lOP which is an 
important document for spearheading development at a local government level. 
As table 5.1 shows, 30% of the respondents agreed that these tensions are impacting 
negatively on the lOP because they give latitude to councillors not to observe 
protocols. At the same time they do not give feedback on development activities. 
This further contrib':ltes to the improper implementation of the IDP. Traditional 
leaders and community members also highlighted that these tensions left an open 
space for councillors to decide as to who gets development projects. It was further 
argued that at times development projects are provided in a non-conducive 
environment that makes such activities to move at a snail ' s pace. One ordinary 
community member provided balanced views by noting that ' there are traditional 
leaders who still want to prove to elected councillors that they are still in charge. 
Similarly, some councillors are unnecessarily arrogant in that they by-pass traditional 
leaders simply because they enjoy public support because they were elected into the 
office ' (Interview, 25 September 2004). 
Forty percent (40%) of the respondents, most of whom were municipal 
representatives, argued that they ensured that tensions were avoided by involving 
traditional leaders when identifying development priorities. This depended on the 
way in which councillors interacted with traditional leaders. It was argued that 
' conflict starts only if a ward councillor is not following the right structures or when 
the communication channels are not followed by either party. What is important in 
102 
10zini Municipality is that councillors should keep on updating traditional authorities 
about developmental progress, because they are working for people who support 
traditional leaders ' (Interview with municipal official, 14 October 2004). 
It was noted that most of the traditional leaders do attend IDP meetings because they 
were aware that IDP informs development activities. One councillor argued that the 
participation of traditional leaders in IDP processes should not be viewed as if clashes 
between these two structures (elected representatives and traditional leaders) do not 
exist. The study revealed that the attendance of most community members in lOP 
processes seems to be dependent on traditional leaders. As one official argued: 
'people always come to listen Amakhosi than the politicians in rural areas. When 
Inkosi invites people to come and listen to a councillor or a politician on development 
activities people come in numbers' (Interview, 14 October 2004). The Municipal 
Manager captured these views as follows: 
We are not pushing traditional leaders to compromise their positions. If there 
are gatherings such as IDP meetings, we do invite them and they do attend. 
Traditional leaders do playa role as they are recognised by the communities in 
making the environment conducive for participation and for project 
implementation. The resolution the municipality adopted in advance was to 
involve traditional leaders in municipal activities to prevent conflict that might 
emanate in future between the two power blocs (Interview, 04 November 
2004). 
It was found that in cases where ward committees were already established a 
relationship was forged between headmen and ward committee members. The 
resolution the municipality adopted was to report to traditional authorities, and what 
happens is that Izinduna (headmen) are allowed to sit in ward committees as ex-
officio members, in that way ubukhosi (traditional leadership) is kept informed 
through Izinduna about municipal activities. These headmen are also expected to give 
feedback to their respective traditional wards?4 It is only the Izinduna that participate 
in such ward committee25 meetings that may be able to report back to their respective 
wards or areas about municipal activities. This may widen the gap of information 
24 This refers to traditional wards which were created in a traditional way through natural boundaries 
such as mountains and rivers. 
25 This refers to modern wards which were established in municipalities ' jurisdiction as per the 
recommendation of the Municipal Structures Act. These wards are different from traditional wards 
because the modern wards combine many different traditional wards in each modern ward. 
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dissemination between those who may not be in a position to participate in ward 
committees and those who may not give feedback at all. 
Among the 30% of those who were uncertain on whether these tensions are impacting 
on the IDP, there were concerns that there are tensions between traditional leaders and 
elected representatives about who controls the area. It was noticed that people were 
divided by age on the issue. Young people seemed to be rarely aligning themselves 
with the traditional leaders, but elderly people still acknowledged the traditional 
political system. The study found that the IDP was introduced when there was an 
ongoing conflict between traditional leaders and elected representatives which were 
caused by the overlaps on activities and the misunderstanding on the side of 
traditional leaders as to how the modern system operates. Community observers 
argued that the IDP concept was very new to the current political leadership at local 
government level. Accordingly, respondents argued that there was still a top down 
approach because the IDP was not people driven; instead the consultants were driving 
the lOP. One community member and civil society representative argued that the IDP 
process was highly politicised, since other stakeholders were not consulted. The 
rationale behind the non-consultation was that communities were not organised. It 
was argued that people were invited to participate in the IDP once they are on the 
database and part of the lOP Forum.26 
Table 5.1: Are tensions between elected representatives and traditional leaders 
impacting on the lOP? 
Responses Number Percentage 
Yes 6 30% 
No 8 40% 
Uncertain 6 30% 
Total 20 100% 
Councillors argued that when the municipality started to operate it was difficult to 
work with traditional leaders who believed that councillors wanted to take away their 
26 This forum is made up of various representatives from government departments, civil society 
organizations and the business people around the jurisdiction of the municipality and other stakeholders 
that they know they would have something to provide to the municipality. This forum is criticized at 
times because of it exclusive nature as it is unrepresentative according to gender. 
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powers. The conflict was about power to govern people. Accordingly, this study 
revealed that what made the IDP process and concept more problematic was the fact 
that after recognising that traditional leaders are important stakeholders, when 
councillors were trained on IDP matters, traditional leaders were excluded. The 
municipal manager argued that traditional leaders were excluded because there were 
some outstanding issues about their participation in local government affairs 
(Interview, 04 November 2004). Officials were constraints as to what would be 
traditional leaders ' role should they invite them in municipal affairs. Also, they did 
not have a budget allocated for traditional leaders to participate in the municipality. 
Although traditional leaders were later invited they did not attend. Instead, some 
traditional leaders sent their representatives to IDP training sessions. One could argue 
that these traditional leaders were invited after realising that it was not easy to 
implement most of the programmes without their co-operation. 
Some of these initiatives included inviting traditional leaders to the launch of certain 
projects. Some of these attempts did not work because of the diverse nature of 
traditional leaders, their level of understanding of development issues and their 
leadership approach. A practical case was that of a certain traditional leader (at 
KwaSiqakatha Traditional Authority) who rejected a housing project which was a 
priority in the municipal IDP. People preferred low cost houses but due to the fact 
that the traditional leader had another opinion as to what should be provided for his 
subjects, this project had to be stopped. This suggests that the traditional leader had 
his own IDP for his people which was different from that of the municipality. In 
essence that traditional leader wanted his people to be provided with water. Water 
was not part of the services which fall within the powers and functions of Category 
B27 municipalities. In this regard the 10zini Municipality had some problems with the 
rejection of low cost houses because they had to shift the project to another area. 
This could be viewed as a tension which impacted negatively on poor conununities 
because of the failure of the two power blocs to reach a mutual agreement on what 
would contribute to poverty reduction. 
27 These are local councils which share similar decision-making with the District Council in whose are 
they fall , according to their capacity. 
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From the perspective of poor people, the problem was not that they were resisting 
development but rather that the municipal authorities had failed to consult the 
KwaSiqakatha Traditional Authority. They also resented the fact that the municipal 
authorities failed to treat people in rural areas according to tradition. Instead, 
traditional leaders were treated in the same way as urban dwellers, irrespective of 
their socio-economic predicament. The rejection of the housing project raised a lot of 
suspicions among stakeholders involved in development at Jozini Municipality. 
Some believed that the traditional leader was against the political party that governed 
the municipality. This led the Municipal Manager to argue as follows: 
If the Inkosi of KwaSiqakatha or a certain Induna of KwaSiqakatha was part 
of the municipality in charge such project would have been implemented 
because they would have shared the objectives of the project. It is clear about 
this project that these two structures had different views. In essence the 
councillor had a different view point as compared to the Inkosi of 
K waSiqakatha. The point of departure that I would like to see as the 
Municipal Manager is a situation where both structures would be able to take 
decisions together and such mutual agreement could effectively lead to such 
projects being implemented in time (Interview, 04 November 2004). 
The Municipal Manager was concerned about conflicts between councillors and 
traditional leaders, and wanted both structures to be involved in participating in 
decision-making. 
5.3 Traditional leaders and land under Jozini municipality 
According to the data collected traditional leaders still play a crucial role in land 
allocation under 10zini Municipality as demonstrated in Figure 5.4. Most community 
members in this municipality know that if they need sites what channels they have to 
follow as reflected in Appendix 2. The procedure in which business sites are 
allocated seems to be similar to residential sites. The difference is with the amount 
paid for business sites as compared to residential sites. What is worth noting in regard 
to a business site, and for other institutional buildings such as churches, is that a letter 
had to be written and be supported by the constitution or a business plan of that 
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institution so that the application could be debated at a traditional authority meeting.28 
Once the application had been approved at such a meeting, then a traditional stamp 
was put on the letter and filed. A copy of the decision was given to those who lodged 
the application. The channels which local residents follow for land requisition is 
different from the one followed by an outsider. Also, the amount which was paid by 
an outsider was different from that which was paid by local residents.29 An outsider 
pays the so called khonza Jee30 which refers to administration costs. 
It was further noted that in each and every traditional authority, there was land 
earmarked for public facilities such as clinics and schools. In certain cases it was 
argued that such earmarked land belong to certain family members. In such cases 
traditional leaders played a critical role in intervening and encouraging the 
community around the area and such families to donate with the land in question so 
that development could take place. In lozini the Municipality did not have any 
options except to go through traditional authorities if they require land to provide 
development projects for communities. One senior official argued that 'traditional 
leaders are the custodians of the land. In order, for a municipality to provide 
development activities they need land. Therefore, the municipality is forced to go 
through traditional leaders to get land, and follow proper channels and protocols. If 
they refuse to release the land then specific reasons are given' (Interview, 14 October 
2004). This view was supported as follows : 
The issue of land is clear. Land is under Amakhosi that is why if there is a 
project to be provided we go straight to traditional authorities, and traditional 
leaders allocate land for projects. It is good to approach traditional leaders for 
the sustainability of projects because land in rural areas belong to certain 
people and most of the time chiefs do not have any problem to discuss issues 
of land with such people. As the municipality we recognised that traditional 
28 Notes taken at Mathenjwa Traditional Authority meeting on the 06/1 0/2004 where a Zion Church 
requested land to build a church but created concerns among traditional council members that there 
were too many churches which were close to each other. 
29 Interview held at Mathenjwa Traditional Authority on the 06/ I 0/2004 showed that local residents pay 
R200-00 for residential sites and R I 000-00 for business sites. Outsiders pay R lOOO-OO for residential 
sites. I was told that the money is used to pay for local students at tertiary institutions; lack of hard 
facts prevents me from saying with precision that this was the case. I still do not know because 
auditing their books was not my intention. Interview with Nyawo Traditional Authority on the 
15/ I 0/2004 showed that the money is used to buy stationery for the traditional authority so that it could 
continue operating. I still also do not know because I did not have access to their books and reoisters 
b 
~nd they were going to view me with suspicion should I required to have access to their books. 
,0 This refers to a cash fee which is paid by a person coming from a different traditional authority. 
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leaders are the custodians of the land, and the municipality respects these 
powers. The municipality had certain resources to provide development, but 
did not have other resources such as land; that is why the municipality 
requested traditional leaders to provide land for development. If we by-pass 
traditional leaders it is likely that this may lead to conflict in communities 
(Interview with Speaker, 25 October 2004). 
This shows that access to land can lead to conflict, as the ownership is with traditional 
leaders. This attests to the view that the accomplishment of rural development is 
linked to supports from traditional leaders for specific projects. The Mayor argued as 
follows: 
Without respecting and recognising the role of traditional leaders in rural areas 
you cannot do anything. The role is important because people in rural areas 
strongly respect their traditional leaders. If you come as a councillor and you 
talk about development and start with traditional leaders it becomes easy 
because communities still respect traditional leaders. Traditional leaders and 
land are part of the life in rural areas. If a councillor comes and says I am here 
to provide you with development and you do not mention what their 
traditional leaders have said in relation to that development, people will not 
take you very seriously and you can go back with your money. In this regard, 
traditional leaders' role is very impoliant and it is very crucial to lobby 
traditional leaders for development. Once you win supports of traditional 
leaders it becomes easy for development projects to be highly accepted by 
communities (Interview, 05 November 2004). 
This attests to how influential traditional leaders are in development, especially with 
regard to issues related to land. One IFP aligned councillor argued that 'IFP 
councillors and IFP led municipalities were warned by IFP leadership that powers for 
land allocation and administration belong to traditional leaders. The problem is that it 
delays development processes because one should keep on requesting and making 
some follow up until they agree to release the land' (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
This situation has put councillors at the centre of conflict because communities would 
be looking to be provided with services whilst councillors at the same time would 
keep on requesting land from traditional leaders. Currently, it is up to traditional 




Figure 5.4: Role of traditional leaders in relation 
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It was noted that most respondents in all groups hold that there are no "no-go areas" 
under 10zini Municipality even though traditional leaders have a loud voice on issues 
related to land. This suggested that traditional authority areas are democratic to an 
extent that all people are allowed to exercise their rights. It was further argued that 
each and every community member can go anywhere without any disturbance no 
matter which political party dominates in that area. However, civil society 
representatives and ordinary community members felt that the traditional structures 
are still dominated by the old people who tend to be authoritarian and bureaucratic. 
This gives less voice to communities to express their views under this democratic 
regime. One councillor who was objective argued that 'it is not only traditional 
leaders who make the situation untenable at times, instead, some councillors with 
their attitude make it difficult for certain projects to kick start' (Interview, 12 October 
2004). 
5.4 Traditional political system and development 
Figure 5.4 indicates that 20% of councillors who participated in the study argued that 
both municipal and traditional structures should work together so that long-term 
development and sustainable projects are realised at 10zini Municipality. These 
councillors proposed that it could be advantageous for traditional leaders to become 
pat1 of the council atld advice on certain issues. If such a proposition was 
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accommodated, then traditional leaders would receive the same council agenda as that 
of councillors. One councillor argued that 'to make traditional leaders part and parcel 
of municipal processes would be an advantage for the municipality or councillors to 
lobby them to attend plmming workshops' (Interview, 25 October 2004). The 
councillor raised this issue because he observed that the sending of representatives by 
traditional leaders seem to be adding to existing conflicts/tensions. Observers argued 
that most representatives who were sent by traditional leaders do not report exactly 
what were discussed on meetings and what they were trained in during workshops. 
Instead, information got distorted. The complementary role was advocated because of 
the existing practise which was forged a long time ago under the jurisdiction of 10zini 
Municipality. It was revealed that there was an existing relationship that before 
development projects kick-started they were introduced at Regional Authority level, 
but for implementation such projects were introduced at traditional authority level. 
This suggests that such complementary relationships existed historically although it 
kept on changing due to the political landscape. 
Five percent (5%) of the councillors argued that they worked in an environment that 
was not well clarified and defined and without a clear mandate. The speaker argued 
that 'since the national government is silent about the matter of traditional leaders, we 
discuss with them because we understand what their role and functions were in the 
past ' (Interview, 25 October 2004). Evidence seems to suggest that the translation 
and implementation of policies at local government level are informed by historical 
experiences such as who was responsible for development projects before the 
democratic regime. 
Traditional leaders (30%) opined that the working together of both tribal leaders and 
elected representatives would sustain long-term development projects. What 
traditional leaders put as a condition in that mutual relationship was that they did not 
want to be instructed by councillors. It was argued that there was a need to witness 
the implementation of services and development projects instead of being promised 
projects which were later not provided. One traditional leader argued: 'I think there 
should be a working relationship between the two structures so that there could be 
long-term development activities. But if there is conflict that hinders progress, 
leaders from both structures should sit and discuss differences if there are any' 
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(Interview, 15 October 2004). Among traditional leaders 5% advocated for clarity on 
their roles in promoting development at the local government level. 
Officials who had got the mammoth task of implementing the day-to-day government 
policies supported a working relationship between both structures. The Municipal 
Manager argued as follows: 
My view is if Amakhosi are sitting fully in the Municipal Council Chamber 
and contributing effectively even though that would be compromising the 
Municipal Structures Act requirements on the way the municipality should 
function, but there would be no delays and duplications. What is currently 
taking place is that every councillor after each meeting is expected to meet 
with various traditional leaders and report as to what will happen within their 
areas. Some of the traditional leaders do not respond very quickly. I feel that 
development is delayed through such chains. There are some delays because 
respective councillors have to start securing appointments with traditional 
leaders (Interview, 04 November 2004). 
This illustrates the problems that officials are facing when implementing local 
government policies. It is these senior officials who have to be accountable at the end 
of the day. Although in cel1ain cases these officials assume that elected councillors 
do their ground work of forging a relationship with traditional leaders but this cannot 
be simply generalised as if all councillors do the same. There are those who support 
traditional leadership and those who are against. A similar situation prevails with 
officials. A senior official argued as follows: 
The municipal council and the traditional council must come and work 
together. It should be ensured that traditional leaders are involved in the 
budget process of the municipality. Traditional leaders' involvement in 
budget process would mean they own the process and they would be proud of 
the process. Being involved would also enable them (traditional leaders) to 
identify and be informed about development issues (Interview, 14 October 
2004). 
This notion seems to be against the practice of always informing traditional leaders 
about decisions taken in their absence. 
Community members who are also at the receiving end observed that there is a need 
for these two structures to work together. Twenty percent (20%) argued that for 
effective engagement these two structures should work together. One community 
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member suggested as follows: ' It would be preferable to bring both structures so that 
they would be able to understand each other. Other traditional leaders do not know 
where they stand' (Interview, 12 October 2004). 
Figure 5.5: Preferred ways of dialogue between 
traditional leaders and councillors 
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Civil society representatives were suspicious of the government for providing more 
powers to local elected representatives. Instead, of solving the political stand-offs 
between the two structures, it opted for giving more powers to elected representatives 
through the enactment of different policies. The granting of more powers to local 
government representatives resulted in tensions between these two structures. One 
community member warned that 'elected representatives should work with, not in 
competition with traditional leaders. Development meetings should not only be 
sanctioned by government but should be initiated by both parties on their own free 
will. They should also address public meetings jointly' (Interview, 25 September 
2004). 
As long as these structures continue to work parallel to each other developmental 
activities are bound to suffer because each would be tempted to oppose development 
activities introduced by the other. One councillor argued that 'the implementation of 
developmental local government in rural areas is dependent upon giving a voice to 
traditional leaders within this municipality' (Interview, 12 October 2004). In other 
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communities there are those who advocate for traditional leaders and those who 
advocate for councillors. It becomes difficult to work in such communities and this 
result, ultimately, in the discontinuation of development projects. 
What happens is that these groups (traditional leaders and elected councillors) 
criticise each other on development issues. It is worth noting that these criticisms 
seem to hold back development projects because where there are disagreements 
between traditional leaders and elected representatives, development is likely to 
suffocate. It was argued that elected representatives would not be able to report 
anything associated with any misuse of or vandalism to traditional leaders if 
councillors are not working closely with traditional leaders. This would be 
exacerbated by the invisibility of councillors in the constituency. This further limits 
time for giving feedback to communities about development issues. 
There were some respondents who argued that there is still some contestation among 
departments. It was noted that for developmental local government to be 
implemented there should be co-operation among government institutions. Some 
councillors interviewed were calling for some of the provincial departments to start 
respecting municipal IDPs. The Mayor maintained: 'some of the provincial 
government departments by-pass the municipality and launch projects with traditional 
leaders within municipal boundaries. These government departments are aimed at 
creating conflict between traditional leadership institution and the municipality at 
Jozini' (Interview, 05 November 2004). This kind of activity seems to create projects 
which would not be easily maintained. 
The consolidation phase of local government needed most stakeholders to work 
together for the achievement of developmental local government. This introduced a 
number of institutional changes at local government in order to support development 
in rural areas. It was clear in Jozini that traditional leaders were at the forefront for 
implementing rural development projects during the apartheid period and most line 
functions departments operated tlu-ough them. With changes in the political system 
rural communities became exposed to different structures providing basic services. 
Development projects which were provided truough traditional authorities before 
2000 had to be implemented truough municipalities. With the second democratic 
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local government elections III South Africa, traditional authorities witnessed the 
shrinking of their powers. 
5.5 Preferred structure to lead development in the Jozini municipality 
The distribution shows that 45% of the respondents prefer a joint service delivery 
(traditional leaders and councillors). This was supported for different reasons ranging 
from cost reduction to conflict resolution. Through joint service delivery it was 
hypothesised that the amount of resistance and opposition by the followers of each of 
the two parties would be reduced. Councillors and traditional leaders joint service 
delivery because most of the areas under 10zini Municipality are rural and dominated 
by traditional leaders. Existing evidence seems to attest that councillors would 
currently not be able to work in isolation. One senior official argued that these two 
structures should lead development projects because 'if one is leading without the 
other, one cannot succeed' (Interview, 14 October 2004). This view was supported by 
a traditional leader as follows: ' both structures should work together because we all 
lead people. Another important factor is that councillors may keep on changing and 
on that note people will keep waiting and crying for development activities. 
Traditional leaders are full-time at people3l and we need to be given a direction as to 
how we should work together' (Interview, 25 October 2004). This suggests that 
although there are those who advocate for working together, they do not have a clue 
as to how that should happen. Another view presented was that both structures could 
work together provided there is a memorandum of understanding. 
What emerged from this study was that 45% of respondents, the majority of whom 
were councillors argued that development activities should be led by councillors. 
Traditional leaders and councillors supported this view by stating that councillors 
form the legitimate structure which is part of the government. This structure was 
established through government policies. Councillors have tools to monitor 
development such as strong administration. Arguably, traditional authorities do not 
have all these tools except traditional offices. Some traditional authorities do not have 
expertise for managing and leading development projects such as planning and 
31 This refers to the fact that traditional leaders are always visible to communities as compared to 
councillors. 
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evaluation. To a certain degree, traditional authorities do not have budgets to 
implement projects. In addition, evidence attests that councillors should lead because 
they are part of the government which has got a mandate to deliver to communities. 
Two traditional leaders and councillors suggested that it was better for development to 
be led by councillors because it was easy to determine how money was utilised. This 
is all about following accountability principles. There was a view that once 
development was led by traditional authorities corruption was likely to take place. 
Evidence seems to suggest that controlling corruption in traditional offices was 
difficult because the accountability that takes place is different from the way it takes 
place in modem institutions. If any corruption occurred councillors could be sued and 
fired from the office, whilst this is not the case with traditional leaders. 
Councillors argued that development should be led by them because they had access 
to government funding. There was a view that access to government funding would 
be meaningless and would not guarantee the provision of services in the Jozini 
Municipality if there was no interaction between elected representatives and 
traditional leaders. One councillor argued that ' councillors should lead development 
because they are part of government and receive most of the mandate to deliver from 
government spheres. When the councillor receives development projects it should 
start consulting with traditional leaders' (Interview, 25 October 2004). This 
councillor was supporting the former view on how development should be 
implemented. 
As a result of conflict between traditional leaders and elected representatives 5% of 
the respondents argued that development should be led by non-governmental 
organisations until these two parties reach a consensus on priority projects and 
implementation. It was argued that once development is led by NOOs, traditional 
leaders and elected representatives would then have time to deal with their difficulties 
that impact negatively on development activities. 
Other respondents (5%) recommended that development should be led by community 
members themselves because they are the ones who are suffering because of the 
tensions between the two structures. This view was further supported by the 
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argument that traditional leaders and councillors were causing conflict in projects that 
were initiated by communities. These respondents argued that since communities 








Figure 5.6: Preferred structure to lead development 
































5.6 Legal frameworks 
Local government policies are difficult to implement because some bureaucrats and 
officials do not understand the new legislation. Most respondents argued that in many 
development projects implemented with traditional leaders, there were no directions 
as to how such projects should be implemented. This questioned the model used for 
disseminating information to people working at local level. It was crucial that new 
policies be made clear to local government officials and other stakeholders involved 
in development project implementation. It was noticed in this study that there were 
lot of institutional changes which were rapidly taking place at local government level. 
A good example would be the issue of traditional leaders and elected councillors and 
how they should work together for the implementation of rural development projects. 
Some admitted that most of the legal frameworks gave more powers to councillors as 
compared to traditional structures. As one councillor argued that 'legal frameworks 
are hindering development, because they led to the shift in recognition, in favour of 
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mW1icipaiities which is new in our community. Councillors are more recognised than 
traditional leaders, and this destabilises the traditional structure and such 
destabilisation becomes a source of conflict' (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
Some argued that local government policies were not complied with. Most of these 
policies seemed to support elected councillors and are silent about traditional leaders' 
role in development at local government level. But one can construct an argument 
that the implementation and the interpretation of legal frameworks are dependent on 
who is in power. Other councillors indicated' that they worked with traditional leaders 
because of their rural background and experience. In that respect, one traditional 
leader argued that councillors do have space to work, ' if there is no development it 
means that such a councillor is failing to attract development' (Interview, 25 October 
2004). 
It emerged in the interviews from different respondents that legal frameworks used in 
local government such as the constitution do not clarify the roles of traditional leaders 
in local government. Although officials do know what strategies can be used to deal 
with these practical problems associated with the political stand-off between 
councillors and traditional leaders, the municipality did not have sufficient financial 
resources to spearhead most of these strategies. One senior official argued: ' I would 
be happy to see a legal framework putting it straight as to what should be the roles 
and functions of traditional leaders in local government' (Interview, 04 October 
2004). 
5.7 Structures and mechanisms 
Different participants (traditional leaders and councillors) argued that there is minimal 
training provided to the institution of traditional leadership. It was noted in most of 
the local government policies that the institution of traditional leadership could playa 
role in development, but some of these policies do not indicate how they should be 
involved. What has been the cause for concern was to understand whether the 
government is taking any responsibility in capacitating this institution. Most of the 
policies were enacted at the national level so what is expected is for the central 
government to take an initiative in capacitating the institution of traditional 
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leadership. However, respondents argued that national government did not playa role 
in training traditional leaders, and limited support was provided by the province. The 
Mayor argued that only the municipality does training for these two structures 
(traditional leaders and elected representatives) with its minimal budget. It was 
further argued that NOOs also trained traditional leaders, but without any follow-up to 
assess the efficiency of such training. 
Councillors argued that chiefs who were gIven such training became more co-
operative when it comes to development issues. This depicts the marginalisation of 
some of the members within the institution such as headmen, despite the large amount 
of work in which they are involved. It needs to be noted that headmen are also 
important in rural areas in different ways such as facilitating public participation and 
resolving local disputes in the absence of chiefs.32 
Councillors argued that in other circumstances those traditional leaders provided with 
training programmes were more co-operative regardless of the fact that such training 
programmes were not well co-ordinated. Some of the training programmes were 
initiated by individual organisations on what they think is relevant to traditional 
leaders. It could be advantageous if such training programmes were developed in 
consultation with traditional leaders themselves. One traditional leader argued: 
' training given to traditional leaders is not enough, at times we feel that we should be 
given more, for development related issues. It is worth noting that traditional leaders 
are not the same. There are those who are not exposed to developmental issues whilst 
others are exposed. That is why we feel it would worthwhile to provide us with 
training' (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
The issue of training programmes is a highly contentious issue; the government is 
currently capacitating the elected representatives, rather than traditional leaders, 
despite the fact that they were constitutionally recognised. It could be argued that the 
government's failure to train traditional leaders seemed to indicate that it was 
eliminating them from playing an active role in the current system and in the new 
32 This has been noted at Mathenjwa Traditional Authority where the Chief Headman is acting as a 
chief since the death of Chief Mathenjwa. The same thing happened at Mngomezulu 
Chiefdom/Mngomezulu Traditional Authority since the death of Chief Mngomezulu. 
118 
approaches of development. Councillors contended that they were not aware of any 
workshop to capacitate traditional leaders. Instead, they were only witnessing debates 
about the issues of traditional leaders which are not productive at all at the end of the 
day. It is worth remarking that policies are in place but the government is lagging on 
the practical side. The Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act refer 
to the participation of traditional leaders in municipal affairs, but these frameworks 
lack clarity, and do not consider the tensions between the two power blocs. 
5.8 Relation between traditional leadership and government officials 
Some of the government officials were interacting well with the institution of 
traditional leadership. Other departments in KwaZulu-Natal Province (such as 
Department of Transport, Department of Education and Department of Health) even 
extended invitations to traditional authorities to show that they recognised the 
traditional leadership structure. Institutions such as schools and clinics were almost 
reporting most of their activities to traditional authorities. Even if there were new 
committees that were established, traditional authorities were kept informed. This 
was informed mostly by the experience and the knowledge that officials had about the 
structure. One traditional leader argued that 'committees which are functioning under 
traditional authority areas are compelled to open their files in a traditional authority so 
that they will know that they are functioning and if their terms end they are also 
compelled to go to the traditional authority and close their file' (Interview, 14 October 
2004). Other officials went to an extent of even attending regional authority 
meetings33 because it was where they were able to make presentations of the projects 
they were intending to implement. This shows that most officials who are working in 
rural areas understand protocols. It was a cause for concern as to what happens to 
officials who are working in rural areas who do not have any knowledge and 
experience of working with the structure of traditional leadership. 
What needs to be noted is that the relationship is different from one department to the 
other and from one sphere of government to another. What the study revealed was 
33 This is where different traditional authorities meet to discuss development issues. Regional 
authorities are formed by different traditional authorities. In most cases departments use this space to 
inform different traditional authorities about upcoming projects that might be provided in traditional 
authority areas. These meetings are held once every three months. 
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that there are departments which are working closely with traditional structures such 
as the Department of Transport in the province of KwaZulu-Natal in its project of 
alleviating poverty. The transport forum reports most of the activities to traditional 
authorities. With the officials under 10zini Municipality, there were also a kind of 
interaction between officials and traditional leaders. But the relationship that 
currently exists needs to be observed very closely. One official argued that 'most of 
our leaders or politicians under 10zini Municipality come from the IFP therefore we 
as officials are forced , like it or not, to communicate or to relate with traditional 
leaders' (Interview, 14 October 2004). This was supported by a councillor who 
argued that ' municipal officials respect traditional leaders because councillors respect 
traditional leaders ' (Interview, 25 October 2004). The councillor further argued that 
'Ingane ehloniphayo yenza njengomlayezo kababa wayo [which literally means: A 
child who respects does as his father has instructed him]'. This shows how officials 
were forced by the political leadership in the 10zini Municipality. 
Officials protect themselves by involving traditional leaders, because some 
councillors also supported traditional leaders to certain extent. There was no escape 
for officials as most activities at local government were guided by the political 
leadership in most municipalities. By involving traditional leaders officials prevent 
the frustration they might encounter during the implementation exercise should they 
exclude them. It was further argued that there were other government departments 
which by-pass traditional leaders and did the same thing even to the municipality. 
What was highlighted more often was that rural local government politicians who 
have rural backgrounds interact well with traditional leaders because they know how 
the institution of traditional leadership operates. 
There were different Vlews about how traditional leaders relate with elected 
representatives. These views came from traditional leaders and councillors. 
Traditional leaders complained that most councillors were part-time. Consequently, 
councillors played a minimal role in addressing the needs of the communities. 
Instead, they seem to commit themselves more on their full time work. Observers 
argued that councillors who work on a part-time basis contributed to the slow delivery 
of services. Traditional leaders complained that councillors were not visible to 
communities. What was required was for councillors to be introduced and to be 
120 
visible in traditional authority meetings. It was assumed that if councillors availed 
themselves in traditional authority meetings they would be able to achieve the 
common goal which was service delivery to communities. One traditional leader 
argued that ' traditional leaders would appreciate seeing councillors in traditional 
authorities if there are meetings, just to inform us about development issues' 
(Interview, 15 October 2004). 
It was pointed out earlier that the municipality of 10zini is headed by the IFP 
councillors and most of the councillors are IFP orientated. Notwithstanding, one 
councillor argued ' traditional leaders do not relate well with councillors and do not 
include us in their programme but need us to make them part of our programmes' 
(Interview, 25 October 2004). This seems to suggest that councillors involved 
traditional leaders in their programmes as a compromise, or as a way of respecting the 
ruling of IFP political leadership. 
Traditional leaders repudiated the view that they were authoritative and that at times 
they did not respect councillors. Instead, they argued that they respected councillors 
because they came from within the very same communities. In that regard they give 
them more support because what they are looking for is development that makes 
better life for conununities. 
5.9 Gender and traditional political institutions 
Women have limited access to traditional leadership because the elections is based on 
customary law. Others argued that despite the constitutional guarantee of equality 
women still have less power and are inferior. Some traditional leaders argued that 
they encouraged the participation of women such that they ensured that women 
constitute one-third in local structures. It was argued that women seem to exclude 
themselves in participating in these local structures. This repudiates the view that 
traditional leaders are not gender sensitive. One councillor argued as follows: 
Traditional leaders are not gender sensitive, so they need to be capacitated so 
that they can conform to democratic principles because the apartheid 
government did not emphasise the issue of gender. The new government 
should take an initiative in capacitating traditional leaders to be gender 
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sensitive. Training could assist them in seeing that they must appoint or elect 
females (Interview, 25 October 2004). 
Comparatively, even within the municipality there was a lesser role for women in 
municipal structures that take decisions. As one community member argued ' in 
theory women have the same status as men. In practice, they are under-represented 
and those that are there either suffer from inferiority complex or are out-voted when 
they raise gender issues. After all , the general assumption was that men are above 
women' (Interview, 25 September 2004). 
Although women were encouraged by traditional structures to pmiicipate in local 
structures to at least form one-third, this did not change the formal power that was 
dominated by men. This was one of the weaknesses of the traditional institution as 
compared to the modern institution. Leadership was dominated by men in many 
traditional authorities. This attests that women were formally excluded from 
traditional leadership and reveals the biasness of the institution. Whether the biasness 
of this institution in excluding women is a violation of human rights and democratic 
principles is a subject for considerable social, legal and political debate. 
5.10 Traditional political system and youth 
The youth have limited access to traditional leadership. Traditional leaders argued 
that youth do not want to participate in traditional structures. The youth responded 
that the traditional structure neglects them as they do not have much space to express 
their views. This can be the source of conflict not only because of exclusion, but also 
because the younger generation tends to be more exposed and open towards change 
and modern structures. Traditional leaders still hold that the youth were not 
trustworthy and only participate in structures where there was money (Interview, 15 
October 2004; Interview, 25 October 2004). 
One civil society representative and community member argued that youth was not 
only excluded in traditional structures, but had been marginalised from all economic, 
political and social sectors and their participation was minimal (Interview, 25 
September 2004; Interview, 12 October 2004). This calls for a vibrant leadership that 
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will be able to understand on what issues youth need to be empowered. The 
participation of the youth would be able to allow for the promotion of democracy and 
further lead to a vibrant democracy. Failure to include the youth would consequently 
leads to the violation of some of the democratic precepts. The project of nation-
building, youth development and equality would be highly compromised. 
Traditional leaders feel that youth need to be educated about the importance of 
traditional leadership in their lives, despite the negative attitude youth had towards 
this structure. The youth had less interest in the structure of traditional leadership 
because it was not open for competition. Instead, it restricts participation to male 
elders. As one community member advocating for youth argued: ' the youth playa 
major role in local government structures through their elected representatives. 
However, their role is minimal in traditional authority structures because positions in 
traditional structures are hereditary, which means that the phrase " infusing young 
blood" in leadership does not always apply' (Interview, 25 September 2004). 
5.11 Conclusion 
There were a lot of disparities and dissatisfaction at Jozini Municipality. This 
municipality is not immune to problems affecting other municipalities regarding 
issues such as the relationship between traditional leaders and elected representatives. 
This study revealed that what matters the most for development to be implemented is 
determined by political alliances. The survival of the municipality in implementing it 
activities is informed by the reality that most traditional leaders are linked to the 
ruling patty (IFP) in the municipality. Although there are ANC councillors but they 
have less influence as they are not the majority in the council, especially in important 
structures such as EXCO of the municipality. 
This study claimed that communities suffered because they were consequently not 
provided with low-cost houses due to conflict of interest between the municipality and 
the traditional authority. The issue of the limited role of youth and women is also a 
subject for considerable debate in the municipality. Most respondents argued for a 
clear working relationship between the two power structures. Interestingly, both the 
municipality and traditional structures were dominated by men. 
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The study revealed that there was very little understanding of detailed analysis of 
local government policies, such that even IDP of 10zini municipality was not 
compiled by municipal officials. Instead, it was compiled by the consultant. This 
was against the governments view that ' integrated development planning is a normal 
and required municipal function - IDPs are not "add-ons" and should not be "fanned 
out" to consultants' (White Paper on Local Government, 1998 :28). Ignorance about 
policy issues within the study area created a lot of space for political manipulation. 
The fact that in the 10zini Municipality there was no strong opposition party would 
make the consolidation and the deepening of democracy difficult. It was revealed that 
the IFP aligned councillors were respecting their political leadership in working with 
traditional leaders not that all of them want to work with traditional leaders. Most 
office bearers were appealing to the government to take the issue of traditional leaders 
and democratic structures very seriously because they witness the slow service 





It is the argument of this thesis that the institution of traditional leadership be retained 
in the new South African political dispensation and be given a space for working 
together with democratically elected representatives for the effective implementation 
of developmental local government in the context of rural local government. These 
two structures should complement each other instead of competing with each other. 
The findings of the study confirm the research and theoretical assumptions. There is a 
vast literature which attests to the view that traditional councils operate like modern 
cabinets as its members are in charge of specific duties due to their experience in the 
field of development, negotiations and exposure to the affairs of the chiefdom 
(Jordan, 1969). It was revealed in the fieldwork that most traditional councils were 
dominated by elders because of their sophisticated and specialized experience in the 
affairs of their traditional authorities. 
Chazan et al (1999: 32) noted that heterogeneity and complexity define traditional 
leadership institutions because each traditional authority has got it own ways of 
dealing with development issues; this is a similar case in the area of study. This study 
revealed that out of seven traditional authorities under Jozini Municipality, each has 
its own peculiar way of spearheading development activities. This challenges the 
municipality to designing programmes that would promote a close working 
relationship with each of these traditional authorities. It may be inevitable that the 
municipality may apply different approaches in these different traditional authorities 
for it to succeed in implementing development policies. This may be due to 
intricacies within these traditional authorities. In essence, it may be dangerous for the 
Jozini Municipality to lump traditional authorities together without w1derstanding 
differences. 
History confirms that supporting one structure at the expense of the other would lead 
to conflict. These two structures claim legitimacy from different sources. It should 
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be understood from the outset that these different sources of legitimacy between 
government and traditional leaders may lead individuals to viewing each other as 
competitors. The legitimacy of tribal leaders is not rooted in constitutions, but in a 
long history of tradition and culture. Traditional leaders are not subjected to the 
electoral process, but to a certain kind of accountability mechanism (see Chapter 2). 
It cannot be disputed that there were no electoral processes for traditional leadership. 
Instead, the appointment of traditional leaders took another form and shape. As noted 
in chapter 2, rulers were chosen in a consortium of lineage and contestation took place 
between children of the same family. It might be the case that such contestation or 
competition had certain similarities with that which takes place in modem institutions 
and structures. Furthermore, it was argued that the electoral process took place 
among the adult men who had demonstrated certain skills (Zungu, 1996). This is 
similar to what was observed in most traditional authorities in the 10zini Municipality. 
One of the main reasons for advocating for the inclusion of traditional leaders at the 
local level in the new political dispensation is the fact that there are some policies 
which cannot be implemented without consulting traditional structures. This leads to 
the suffocation of developmental projects which can have a positive impact in the 
reduction of poverty. Their incorporation could lead to the improvement of local 
governance. 
Comparative literature has shown that it would be disingenuous to argue that the 
traditional system is undemocratic. The democratic nature of the traditional system 
versus the undemocratic nature of the system may be a debate for sometime among 
revisionists as they are informed by different forms of democracy. Also to those who 
are engaged in this debate, this study poses a question: can the traditional and the 
modem institutions claim legitimacy from different sources? Gyekye (1997) 
conducted a study within Akan Kingdom in Ghana which revealed that no one was 
excluded from participating in the deliberations and the affairs of the general 
assemblies, even though the traditional system still reserves and respects the elders. 
Gyekye in his study did not show channels available for those excluded in general 
assemblies. This study revealed that channels available for communities are through 
local councils which are formed by a headman and respected elders. In such councils 
people participate, democratically provided protocols are observed and it is within 
these councils that those who participate are allocated positions. 
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In modern institutions legitimacy is based on democratic principles which are 
exercised through democratic elections. These democratic principles provide elected 
representatives power to make legislations which are executed by bureaucrats. 
Studies confirm that ' legitimacy of leadership in modern societies is based on 
elections and embedded in constitutional and legal procedures and rules ' (Lutz and 
Linder, 2004: 13). However, it was demonstrated in chapter 2 of this study how 
different legitimacy sources could supplement each other. It is not true that traditional 
leaders do not want to buy into the new political system in South Africa but they have 
problems with the way the system was introduced to them. Some studies done in 
other parts of the African continent confirmed that the way in which the colonial 
system was introduced to traditional leaders and to Africans resulted in two major 
groups - collaborators and resisters (Kiwanuka, 1975). This is similar to what has 
been revealed by this study that there were still groups of traditional leaders who were 
still opposing the newly established system of local government - such groups may be 
called resisters. The groups which may be taken as collaborators although they 
embrace and are interested with the newly established system but they demand a lot 
from the government - such that in all their different categories traditional leaders 
need to be paid. Traditional leaders are crucial because they enjoy certain legitimacy 
in rural areas and they are currently more organized to apply pressure on the post-
apartheid government, this could be effectively utilized for improving the quality of 
life of rural communities. 
In most African countries it seems to be clear that the abolition of traditional 
structures was an invitation for conflict. The traditional system has been in existence 
for a long time. Modern institutions may play their role to a certain extent but the 
issue in the countryside is on people who are exposed to different structures and in 
different legitimacy. For example, people might accept local government for the 
provision of basic services but not for things that affect their lives such as social 
matters and conflict related to land. Such issues are reported to traditional leaders. 
What is crucial for effective complementary roles between these two structures is the 
acceptance of each others legitimacy. Cunently, it is evident in most countries that 
they are searching for an appropriate place for traditional leaders in governance in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Goodenough, 2002). Municipalities are also searching for an 
appropriate space for traditional leaders. Most municipalities have started to share 
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ideas on how they may develop a model that would ensure that traditional leaders are 
involved in municipal affairs so that they would be able to implement developmental 
local government in the rural context. This study argues that traditional leaders 
operated like local government before the first local govenunent democratic elections 
in South Africa. The comparative literature shows that traditional leadership in Africa 
is the broadest political unit which needs to be integrated in governance as people in 
the countryside are more concerned about it (Mohanty, 1992: 8). Excluding the 
traditional leadership institution in local authorities ' affairs would not benefit 
development projects in the countryside that is supposed to be spearheaded by local 
government structures (Amonoo, 1981). 
South Africa before the local government elections in 199511996 experienced a 
situation where traditional leaders played a service delivery role in local government 
affairs. This study concurs with other former studies that throughout history 
traditional leadership in Africa formed the basis of local govenmlent (Rathbone, 
2000; Rugege, 2002). It is with this background that Goodneough (2002) holds that 
such history is useful in understanding the role of the institution of traditional 
leadership today (see Chapter 2). 
6.2 Dialectical modernization theory 
Dialectical modernization proponents argued that tradition need not impede 
development (Martinussen, 1997: 172). This was the main argument in the 10zini 
municipality that traditional leaders should not be seen as if they would impede 
development. Instead, their participation in local government affairs should be seen 
as complementing the elected representatives, because the modern system is weak as 
compared to traditional system in the 10zini municipality. In this regard, traditional 
institutions might playa major role in promoting political reforms so that a smooth 
transition from old practices to new ones would be realized. 
Martinussen (1997) argued that there are moments where modern institutions can 
obstruct development and not function as effectively expected because they may be 
incompatible with the traditions of the societies. A good case in the 10zini 
municipality was that of KwaSiqakatha community where the local government low 
128 
cost housing project was unsuccessful because the chief in charge rejected it because 
access to water was identified as a priority for his community. 
One of the main findings in Jozini was that the municipality' s IFP dominated political 
leadership also advocated for the existence and the participation of traditional leaders 
in municipal affairs. However, tensions loom large in the municipality. It is always 
argued that most traditional leaders belong to IFP. The IFP currently serves two 
constituencies and each strives to stamp its authority over the other. One constituency 
serves in a traditional setting while the other responds to a modem environment. 
Therefore, this raises questions as to how the IFP its serves these two constituencies. 
This political party, particularly in Jozini, needs to see tradition and modernity as 
reinforcing each other (Gusfield, 1971). 
Dialectical modernization emphasises experience. The Jozini municipality is weak in 
mobilizing communities to participate in municipal affairs. Some of the weaknesses 
could be attributed to the fact that this municipality is newly established, therefore it 
does not have enough resources to support participation which is expensive. The new 
developmental local government approach assumes a certain level of community 
participation. Unfortunately, the level of participation in government issues in Jozini 
was very low. The Indian experience showed that existing traditions were used to 
achieve new changes (Krishrna, 2001). Similar experience could be used in the Jozini 
municipality where traditional leaders could be invited to improve community 
participation and representation. Communities in the Jozini municipality have a 
desire to be modem and to see development taking place, but are not necessarily 
interested in losing their traditional outlook. 
6.3 Traditional leadership and governance 
The issue of traditional leaders and their role in governance of most African countries 
in general and South Africa in particular became part of the public debate since the 
inception of transition to democracy. Ntsebenza (2003: 55) argued that 'the role of 
traditional authorities was debated in the post colonial era long before it became an 
issue in South Africa' . Unfortunately, the focus of the debate was on what traditional 
leaders were doing in the past but was not strongly based on what should be their role 
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in future. The debate created pro-and-anti camps within ruling parties in Africa in 
'-
general, and in South Africa in particular (Ntsebenza, 2005: 77). The camp which 
advocates for the exclusion of traditional leaders in governance argued that 
democracy would be compromised if they were accorded an active role in politics. 
Mamdani (1996) shared the same view with those who advocated for the exclusion of 
traditional leaders, as he noted that bifurcated states need to be dismantled for 
transformation to take place. 
However, an important issue is whether those who advocate for the exclusion of the 
institution in governance are not falling into a trap with contemporary studies about 
the institution of traditional leadership. It is argued that contemporary studies lack 
both proper historical and ethnographic focus ; therefore, they treat the institution of 
traditional leadership in a singular manner. Most of these studies focused on what 
took place during the colonial period. These studies failed to consider that 
generalizing about the transformations of kingships under colonial rule is a risky 
business (Lemarchard, 1977: 14). 
Others who advocated for the exclusion of traditional leaders in governance argued 
that the institution is male-dominated, which goes against the principles of non-
seXIsm. These were concerned about the patriarchy of the institution and issues of 
gender equality (Mokgoro, 1994). The present study shows that although there is lack 
of practical implementation of gender equality in 10zini this does not mean that 
traditional leaders are opposed to addressing gender equality. Traditional leaders in 
10zini are encouraging women to participate in local structures. Keulder (1998: 7) 
argued: 'one cannot assume that greater representation would automatically lead to 
more gender-sensitive policies'. Chazan et al (1999: 93) contended: 'development 
policies have frequently excluded women, and when specific projects were designed 
for their benefit, these projects often resulted in women' s further marginalization' . 
Interestingly, these writers admitted that more new problems on gender disparities 
cropped out since independence. Gender disparities since independence coincided 
with a controversial subject of traditional leadership and democracy in African 
countries. 
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The debate about traditional leaders and democracy can be viewed in two broad 
categories. Some scholars argued that traditional leaders should be completely 
eradicated in favour of democratic rule. This was because traditional leadership was 
primitive and corrupted by the process of colonial state formation and apartheid 
(Mamdani, 1996). Other scholars concluded that chiefs and democracy are not 
incompatible. Hart (2002: 275) observed that the amalgamation of urban and rural 
areas led to the redefinition and reduction of powers and functions of traditional 
leaders and replaced them with elected representatives. 
Political developments in Africa have always been questioning the democratic nature 
of the institution of traditional leadership, as it is hereditary. The question that arises 
is the following: do we have to judge the democratic nature of the institution by 
elections? It is worth asking this question in an African context, especially because 
we have moved away from African thinking to Western thinking about democracy. 
One may ask: in light of these fundamental changes in thinking about democracy in 
the institution of traditional leadership, is the form of democracy and practice of 
traditional leadership institution still relevant in the current system of governance? 
This is a question one has to ruminate about in an African context where the debate 
about traditional leadership in governance and in development looms large. Arguably 
in some country case studies (Ghana, Uganda and South Africa) most development 
agencies recognised traditional leaders as partners in development processes. 
Basically, those who advocated for the inclusion of traditional leaders in governance 
supported their argument with reference to their role in the pre-colonial period. They 
further referred to African democratic experiences such as assemblies where 
important issues were discussed. The view was that traditional leaders were not far 
away from communities as compared to the modern institutions. In 10zini most 
traditional leaders argued that they need to be included in the local government 
system because most of the work done by local government today was done by them 
in the past.
34 
While this thesis is in favour of complementary role for traditional 
leaders in local government, there are certain issues that they may be unable to 
34 The ' past' in this case refers to the apartheid regime in South Africa but it cannot be underestimated 
that even during the colonial period there were other duties which were done by traditional leaders. 
The apartheid system consolidated some of the colonial activities. 
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handle. Such cases may call for the understanding of internal governance system of 
traditional authorities, and be benchmarked with that of local government so that 
these structures would be able to work with something which is more practical in the 
rural local environment, rather than working with something based on theory. There 
may be ineffective models of co-operation and integration that would be developed if 
there is no understanding of different norms and values in these different structures. 
Those who advocate for exclusion fail to account for the shortfalls of the electoral 
systems that are being followed by political parties, and those who advocate for 
inclusion fail to convincingly account for why general assemblies are constituted by 
elders and what kind of approach they are intending to use that would lead to popular 
participation in decision-making. In terms of gender existing data still shows that 
there are a lot of disparities in both structures. 
Both camps glorify and praise their positions, but the fact that positions are derived 
from different precepts may not stop clashes which at times are healthy for the 
consolidation of democracy. What needs to be noted, which is hardly mentioned in 
the literature, is that both the modern and the traditional institutions - if viewed very 
closely - are closest to the people according to their definition. These two structures 
are linked to each other because the modern structure is a product of a traditional 
structure. History confirms that democracy and modern institutions did not emanate 
from a vacuum, particularly in Europe and Asia. Krishma (2001) conducted a study 
in a north Indian village where it was revealed that effective institutions are those that 
combine elements of tradition with aspects of modernity. This could be a lesson for 
South Africa. 
It seems to be true that most of the African politicians were critical of the system of 
traditional leadership. Even in South Africa there are some disagreements in the 
alliance (African National Congress, South African Communist Party (SACP) and 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)) about the issue of traditional 
leaders in a democracy. Ntsebenza (2005: 77) argued that 'the alliance is not 
unanimous on the issue of traditional leaders in a democracy. Some of the ANC 
members have taken vanguard positions of excluding traditional leaders in certain 
important issues as it was assumed that they would undermine democracy. In 10zini 
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municipality, it was observed that excluding traditional leaders created numerous 
challenges for the newly structured municipalities because they are very weak as 
compared to traditional authorities because they have a strong support from the 
constituency on the ground in rural areas. A good example was the case of 
KwaSiqakatha Traditional Authority where low cost housing project was not provided 
because of the weakness of the municipality (see Chapter 5). It was due to these 
weaknesses that some politicians and officials are calling for the working together of 
these two structures. Friedman (2003) warned that excluding traditional leadership 
from political participation would be risky and could threaten the new democratic 
system. 
According to lessons drawn from Ghana's expenence the traditional leadership 
institution became dependant upon the government for its legitimacy, maintenance 
and survival (Rathbone, 2000). Experience drawn from Ghana, which is similar to 
that of South Africa in general and the area of study in pmiicular, is that of political 
parties working with traditional leaders. 10zini Municipality is IFP led, hence, there is 
a growing consensus that most traditional leaders support the IFP. However, close 
observation shows that not all traditional leaders are IFP supporters, but are also 
aligned to different major political parties, such as ANC and DA. In Ghana, UGCC 
relied on chiefs to campaign for support in rural areas. This is similar to South Africa, 
particularly in KZN, where the IFP seems to rely on chiefs for a vote. This led to the 
situation where traditional leaders were assumed to support the IFP. 
Traditional leadership suffered in Ghana and in Uganda after independence. 
Chieftainship was abolished in Uganda under Obote's regime but restored under 
Museveni. It was transformed in Ghana and chiefs realized that their future depended 
on loyal co-operation with the government. In South Africa apartheid consolidated 
colonial activities where chiefs were used as public servants and paid. This still 
prevails in the post-apartheid era. 
It seems to be clear that the institution of traditional leadership derived its legitimacy 
outside the state structures. The involvement of traditional leaders in state structures 
may at times undermine their independence. Once the state fails to provide basic 
services, traditional leaders may be blamed for the state failure. It is a challenge to 
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traditional leaders and they need to ruminate about whether they need their 
independence to be compromised. In addition, their involvement in policy 
implementation and their mobilization capacity are important in implementing 
policies. 
This thesis revealed that most people are still attached to traditional structures, 
particularly in the 10zini municipality. Similarly, Lutz and Linder (2004: 12) revealed 
that ' in other parts of the world, where the majority of the citizens are still attached to 
traditional structures, the issue is more about interaction between traditional and 
modern structures'. Traditional structures have historically been linked to spiritual, 
religious, political, judicial and economic functions and traditions. In South Africa 
before 1994 there were chiefs who were against the apartheid government, whilst 
others supported it. Interestingly, in the post-apartheid period after realizing that 
certain legislations were silent about their role in local government they then worked 
together to challenge the democratic government. Collaboration among traditional 
leaders contributed to a lot of political changes and anlendments in certain laws. For 
example, the Municipal Structures Act was amended so that traditional leaders' 
representation in local government affairs was increased from 10 to 20 percent. It 
was revealed in the 10zini municipality that the 20% representation of traditional 
leaders in the municipal affairs is not utilized.35 It is worth noting that this 20% 
participation of traditional leaders was provided after a long debate and intimidation 
where traditional leaders took a vanguard position that they would disrupt the second 
democratic local government elections of December 2000. 
6.4 Traditional leadership and the land question 
Any discussion about the effective implementation of developmental local 
government would be incomplete if it did not mention the land question. Land has -
been for sometime served as an economic base for most chiefs in Africa. Turner 
(1972: 110) observed that most of the faction fights originated from land shortage and 
35 This refers to the case of 10zini Municipality where they argued that they could not do anything with 
that 20% because it is not clear what these traditional leaders could do in council matters and that they 
had a minimal budget. Most municipal officials are reluctant to encourage them to utilise this 
percentage because they do not have a budget to give allowances to traditional leaders for attendino 
council meetings. I:> 
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further led to intense competition among clans in particular communities. He further 
argued that ' the land is the cement that binds the tribal society together in one social, 
economic and religious group' (Turner, 1972: 116). This shows that the issue for land 
contestation is not a new debate. Writing the foreword to the White Paper on South 
African Land Policy, Derek Hanekom (then Minister of Land Affairs) held that 'land 
ownership in South Africa has long been a source of conflict. Our history of conquest 
and dispossession, of forced removals and racially-skewed distribution of land 
resources, has left us with a complex and difficulty legacy' (White Paper on South 
African Land Policy, 1997: 3). Barrow (1977: 26) argued that 'not long after the first 
Dutch settlers arrived at the Cape in 1652 they were confronted with the problem 
which remains fundamental in South Africa; land'. This confirms that land-based 
confrontations have a long history in Africa in general , and in South Africa in 
particular. This study revealed that at Jozini Municipality, this land conflict was 
nuetralised by the IFP political leadership. The view was that IFP councillors should 
not disturb traditional structures on land systems because traditional leaders are the 
custodians of the land. 
Traditional leaders were at times selling communal land as an income-generating 
activity, but in certain cases this is done to benefit of local communities, whilst at 
times, it was used for their own benefit and needs. The study revealed that there is a 
certain tax that people are paying for land in rural areas, but it has not been the task of 
this study to audit as to how this tax is used. There is a need for further research 
about whether it is fair to pay such a tax or not. In the case of Jozini Municipality, the 
council does not have land (Jozini Municipality IDP Review, 2004: 19). This leaves 
the council with no choice except working in juxtaposition with traditional authorities. 
This thesis found that there was a concession directed to traditional leadership which 
has been a product of limited co-operation between government departments 
(Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG)) at national level. Land is important for the provision of 
development projects in rural areas. Ironically, the Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLRA) gave powers to traditional councils to allocate and administer land issues in 
rural areas. In KwaZulu-Natal such powers were already in place through Ingonyama 
Trust Land Act. It is against this background that these two structures should work 
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together. Traditional authorities should not be service delivery agents. Researchers 
such as Keulder (1998: 315) argued that 'traditional authorities do not have sufficient 
capacity to become service providers themselves. Any attempt to tum them into 
service providers will probably fail and undermine the support of the institution'. 
Through the inclusion of traditional leaders the new conception of developmental 
local government would be able to contribute to the quality of service delivery to 
previously disadvantaged communities. 
Most country case studies reviewed in this study vividly show that traditional leaders 
were used by colonial governments to maintain control over the African population 
and to implement unpopular policies. With the advent of democracy and the 
introduction of local government in rural areas, traditional leaders were stripped of 
their remaining powers and were transferred to rural local government. Ironically, 
although their powers were reduced implementing some of the development policies 
required the support of traditional leaders or chiefs. This is similar to the indirect 
colonial rule system which relied on the traditional system to implement its unpopular 
policies. The difference in the new political landscape in South Africa is that 
traditional leaders are viewed as one of the important stakeholders in implementing 
rural development in South Africa (Pycroft, 2002). The question that arises about the 
participation of traditional leaders in municipal affairs is whether it is a supportive or 
a directive one. 
It has been clear in this research that the colonial and apartheid government used 
traditional leaders as civil servants and paid them for doing certain administrative 
work. What is emerging even in the post-apartheid government is that although some 
are advocating for the exclusion of traditional leaders from governance, but traditional 
leaders are still paid just like civil servants. It could be argued that by paying chiefs 
the state can instruct traditional leaders to implement some policies of government 
institutions. This has also created a potential for latent conflict among traditional 
leaders themselves. This thesis revealed that only the chiefs are paid. Headmen are 
concerned that such concessions were only directed to chiefs whilst they were also 
performing a lot of administrative work in rural areas. There has been a concern in 
this thesis as to how accountability is exercised by chiefs as paid civil servants 
because both structures are informed by different types of legitimacy. 
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Accountability is an important requirement in public management. F or centuries 
accountability was a central issue in the theory and practice of public administration. 
Accountability is a traditional cornerstone of democracy to which each political 
representative and public official has to adhere. It is vital to note that at the heart of 
any discussion about accountability lie questions about who is accountable to whom, 
for what, in what manner and in what circumstances? 
6.5 Service delivery mechanism in the new macro-economic context 
Despite gradual developments from apartheid to democracy and the establishment of 
wall-to-wall municipalities in rural areas, such restructuring has played a limited role 
in bringing about liberation of the mass of ordinary people in rural areas in South 
Africa in general, and in KZN in particular, from the scourges of poverty and 
widespread unemployment. Basically, rural poverty has its own basis in the structural 
inequalities of wealth and power. Indeed, the main purpose of developmental local 
government is the improvement of service delivery and poverty reduction, but all 
these are dependent on the active participation of communities in the identification 
and implementation of developmental activities. The high level of incompetent 
personnel and the lack of capacity of municipal structures to deliver is a subject for 
considerable debate in the reduction of rural poverty. Many rural local municipalities 
including Jozini municipality lack the organizational, technical and administrative 
capabilities to undertake meaningful development processes. Instead, they rely on 
consultants and thereafter they shift the blame as if traditional leaders are preventing 
the progress of development. Ironically, most rural local municipalities fail to 
acknowledge that they are not economically viable to ensure that poor households 
have access to basic services. 
There was a formal adoption of the macro-economic policy GEAR in 1996 when the 
RDP collapsed. Most advocates state that GEAR was a neo-liberal agenda which 
calls for the privatization, public-private partnerships and cutbacks in social spending 
lead to serious consequences for the rural local government environment. Most of 
these approaches to service delivery are laid down in the White Paper on Local 
Government, but what needs to be accounted for is how such approaches work with 
unskilled officials and scarce resources in rural local government. 
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There has been a shift in municipalities from being providers of services to becoming 
facilitators and leaders that work with multiple partners. This shift introduced great 
challenges for municipalities in addressing administrative and spatial inequalities 
generated by apartheid, the large scale of service backlogs, and the internally divided 
and non-developmental nature of much of local government. 
The two-tier system which exists in rural local government poses serious problems for 
rural municipalities as this contributes to slow service delivery. Communities are not 
well educated in understanding how the current system of local government is 
operating. Instead, most of them still understand how traditional leaders operate. For 
these rural municipalities to be able to improve their communities within their areas 
of jurisdiction they could not operate in isolation. Instead, they need traditional 
authorities to assist them. 
What has been observed in this two-tier model which operates in rural local 
government is that there is suddenly a conflict (between District Municipalities and 
Local Municipalities) which adversely impacts on the vision for developmental local 
government. The Constitution gives all the categories same functions, but the role for 
the rural local government is further clarified in the Municipal Structures Act (1998), 
especially in terms of Category Band C. Interestingly, there is a key challenge in 
distributing these powers and functions between district municipalities and local 
municipalities. Presently district municipalities have all the powers over local 
municipalities in the district, and are taken as the engine for implementing rural 
development in South Africa. What was observed in the area of study was that the 
issue of powers and functions between the district municipality and 10zini local 
municipality has become a contentious issue. Communities argued that even in the 
new system of government there is still no improvement and no body seems to care 
about them. People are looking for basic services such as water, electricity and all 
this according to powers and functions as laid down on the Municipal Structures Act 
of 1998, are supposed to be provided by the district municipality. People in the 10zini 
municipality continue to identify such services during IDP processes. The 
identification of services during IDP processes show that communities are still not 
aware of who provides what between local municipalities and district municipalities. 
This thesis argues for the revision of the current local government system that exists 
138 
In rural areas in South Africa, because in one way or the other either local 
municipalities or district municipalities serve as a bottleneck for rural service 
delivery. 
6.6 Traditional leadership and party political affiliation 
It has been revealed in the area of study that most traditional leaders are pro IFP, and 
the municipality is also IFP-Ied. It has also been argued that some traditional leaders 
are leaving the indigenous structure particularly those who are at the lower level such 
as headmen. It may be concluded that they leave their positions because they are not 
being paid. They vote with their feet, but community members do not understand that 
they are no longer traditional leaders. In certain instances these traditional leaders 
serve as elected and traditional representatives at the same time. In his research in 
four country case studies (Nigeria, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe), Keulder 
(1998: 316) revealed that there are those who serve in two positions at the same time. 
He argued that ' traditional leaders should not be allowed to serve as elected and 
traditional representatives at the same time' (1998: 316). This calls for the resignation 
of one position at the time the other position is assumed. In addition, it may be noted 
that most people still fail to make a distinction between traditional and modern 
structures, and that people in the countryside may not quickly embrace democratic 
principles and rules. However, they may start to do that once they see a difference in 
their lives. 
For developmental local government to succeed it reqUires some form of 
participation. It is worth noting that participation in development issues was 
neglected over the years, especially in rural and marginalized communities. Lutz and 
Linder (2004: 24) argued that traditional leaders have their own special, historical and 
cultural sources of legitimacy in implementing developmental approaches. Studies 
confirmed that in most African countries governance is shared asymmetrically 
between governments and traditional leaders because of their divided nature of 
legitimacy and sovereignty (Ray and Brown, 2004: 2). Interestingly, with their kind of 
legitimacy traditional leaders could be able to convince their subjects to participate in 
developmental programmes. In essence, community participation needs to be secured 
through traditional leaders as they retain extensive influence over their sUbjects. 
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Traditional leaders have a special political legitimacy that IS recognized by their 
subjects. 
It is possible that people may enjoy the benefits of developmental local government in 
different ways if one compares urban and rural areas. Basically, there may be a 
gradual shift in power relations such that those who were marginalized would take 
DLG principles as a stepping stone towards the realization of their own ends/needs. 
Greenberg (2004: 20), for example, observing the local government restructuring 
argued: 
Despite the discursive framework of developmental local government, rooted 
as it is in the rhetoric of popular participation, accountability and transparency, 
this is not the way post-apartheid local government is experienced by the 
residents of informal settlements or farm dwellers on the commercial farms. 
Local elites have been able to capture institutional political power to serve 
their own interests. 
This shows that people from dominant parties in certain areas may become primary 
beneficiaries of local government restructuring. This calls for certain models or forms 
of participation that may ensure that it caters for the needs of most people without 
discrimination of any kind. 
Participation is an area mostly spoken about but rarely effectively implemented. It is 
important to recognize that within communities there is wealth of human and physical 
resources. The incorporation of these human resources development projects is the 
challenge. The understanding, knowledge and skills that communities have should be 
utilized by planners to determine strategies to solve problems. Using such knowledge 
would assist in the effective implementation of developmental local governn1ent. 
Conversely, what is often taking place and observed in 10zini is the sidelining of 
active members of communities in participating in their own development activities, 
despite the fact that participation in governance is a defining feature of the new 
system of local government. Mogale (2003) argued for a synergic partnership for the 
delivery of services in a decentralised governance system for it to address poverty. 
The invisibility of elected representatives has become a contentious issue in South 
Africa. Local government structures in rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal are very weak 
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and underdeveloped. Keulder (1998: 317) observed that if the elected local 
government structures are weak that leaves a space for traditional leaders to develop 
strong support base in future because of their active involvement which could create 
problems for elected structures to retain their powers. Greenberg (2004: 22) also 
noted that the tendency of lack of accountability by elected representative to the 
constituency is visible in both rural and urban municipalities. This is linked to the 
electoral system that is currently in practice in South Africa. The electoral system has 
opened a grave problem at local government level because councillors are not 
accountable to constituencies, but rather to political parties. Although the rural 
population could have little difficulty in supporting both structures but traditional 
structures would receive greater endorsement. This was because chiefs remained the 
only authority in rural areas. For that reason this thesis is advocating for a 
complementary role between traditional leaders and elected structures. 
Keulder (1998: 316) argued that where the elected local government representatives 
are weak and the traditional leadership was not formally incorporated to serve in the 
local govenm1ent structure, the local government representatives may face a 
challenge. It was viewed that traditional leaders may supply alternative strategies that 
may lead people to deny the local government in favour of traditional leadership 
institution. This attests the need to incorporate traditional leaders in local 
government. In 10zini different development agencies used traditional leaders in 
implementing projects. Some of these development agencies do not follow new 
strategies such IDP which gives mandate to municipalities to coordinate development 
at the local level. It is argued that the denial of using new development strategies may 
lead to the duplication of services. Once there is a continuation of providing services 
using traditional authorities, elected representatives would find themselves in a 
difficult situation of contesting with a structure that is rooted in a long history of 
tradition and culture. It can be argued in this thesis that it seems to be clear that in 
most African countries the state finds difficult to penetrate the rural areas. The fact 
that traditional structures survived the colonial as well as the post-colonial period 
suggests that traditional structures were strong in rural areas. Therefore, it is there to 
stay in most African countries. 
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Oldfield (2002) argued that the division between the ruling party and opposition 
parties created complex politicisation that looms large at the local level in different 
ways. More specifically in the Jozini, it was revealed that most of the time there were 
instances where those who form part of the municipality do not comply with certain 
legislations. Instead, orders were taken from the party that dominates the 
municipality. The party that runs the municipality is an opposition party at the 
national level. In essence, the party that runs the municipality ensures that it pushes 
its own agenda. 
The new local government system has to attend to the backlog of service delivery 
which is very visible in rural areas. But the communication channels are too long for 
rural local government. Greenberg (2004: 21) argued as follows: 
The DCs have been given statutory control over many of the functions that 
were to be performed by the municipal council, but which the latter lacked the 
capacity to view, it nevertheless serves to extend the distance between farm 
dwellers and political institutions. From voter to ward committee to ward 
councillor to local council to municipal EXCO to DC to district EXCO is a 
long distance indeed. 
This is too long and it can be made worse if there is no close relationship between the 
municipality and the traditional authority in the area where the project is located. The 
traditional structure has its own chain to be followed. Such a chain can be eliminated 
and costs saved through what this study is advocating for, the complementary role. 
There are interesting debates in the field which this thesis was able to capture. Some 
argued that traditional leaders should not be part of pat1y politics because this would 
undermine their legitimacy. It emerged from others that chiefs should remain 
' neutral ' in party politics. There was also a view that chiefs are citizens who have the 
constitutional rights to support and be actively involved in any party of their choice. 
The debate in South Africa about traditional leaders is centred around the issue of 
party politics. In Ghana it became clear that traditional leaders were not encouraged 
to playa major role in party politics. In South Africa most debates revolve around the 
fact that traditional leaders should not be used by political parties to further their 
political agendas. 
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In the South African context, various apartheid policies and homeland laws brought 
traditional leaders at the centre of politics, in such a way that others (traditional 
leaders) formed their own political parties. The apartheid state supported these 
initiatives because the parties formed by traditional leaders were going to fight with 
underground structures of ANC especially in areas where such parties were not 
subscribing to ANC ideology. It was clear that some traditional leaders participated 
fully in homeland legislatures (in the case of KwaZulu under the banner of Inkatha), 
for other traditional leaders such participation was a bitter pill to swallow. 
This thesis argues that this debate of neutrality is informed by political history. 
Observation shows that the establishment of a democratic order in South Africa in 
1994 witnessed traditional leaders assuming different positions with regard to political 
affiliation. The argument that traditional leaders should not be part of party politics 
seemed to be informed by history of manipulation they faced during colonialism and 
apartheid. Presently the South African Constitution entrenches and guarantees that 
everyone has a right to belong to any political party of his/her own choice. This 
confirms that even traditional leaders could align themselves with political parties of 
their choice Evidence seems to suggest that neutrality is far from traditional leaders 
(Mamdani , 1996). 
With the potential these structures have a lot can be done to implement developmental 
local government and to revive rural economies. The majority of rural people are 
poor and unemployed. It is therefore imperative that these two structures co-operate 
with each other so that poor people can benefit. The quality of local leadership could 
playa crucial role in the achievement of rural development opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The current study has explored numerous factors that shaped the nature of the 
relationship between governments and traditional leadership institutions in Africa in 
general, and in South Africa in particular. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. 
First, it provides a synthesis of the issues addressed in the preceding chapters 
regarding governance and traditional leadership institutions first in the African 
context and more specifically in the South African context. Second, it demonstrates 
the significance of the study in implementing developmental local government in 
South Africa where there is a dominance of traditional leaders. Last, it suggests a 
way forward for the proper implementation of developmental strategies that would 
contribute to the realisation of rural development. 
7.2 Synthesis 
The history of the operation of the traditional leadership institution as local 
government in Africa pre-dates the colonial period. During the pre-colonial era this 
institution used certain strategies to address social problems among the communities -
some of these strategies are still relevant and used even today. What was not visible 
was competition among political parties to form local governments similar to the one 
which is taking place in contemporary Africa. Mngomezul u (200 1: 18) once 
reasoned: 'political parties have never been part of the political set-up in pre-colonial 
Africa in general. This is partly due to the fact that African states were ruled by kings 
and chiefs. These rulers were appointed and did not need any election, nor did they 
require a political campaign structured along party politics' . Although there were no 
political parties forming local government, the view that traditional leadership was 
autocratic is rejected by some scholars. Mngomezulu (200 1: 18) further reasoned that 
patiicipatory democracy practised in Africa in the pre-colonial era 'did not require 
political parties because people debated issues as a community and were answerable 
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to the king or their local chiefs, just as people are answerable to presidents and local 
government councillors in the modern politics' . 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that some scholars argued that there was no democracy in 
traditional African political systems. Their arguments are built on the fact that the 
African systems of governance were hierarchical, nonegalitarian, gerentocratic and 
sexist (Simunyu, 1987). The current study demonstrated that democracy is interpreted 
in different ways by intellectuals in different disciplines, especially politics, history 
and philosophy. These scholars are informed by their background. 
The arrival of the colonists marked a watershed between chiefs and their subjects, 
particularly in places where chiefs collaborated with the British. Chapter 2 
demonstrated how the issue of citizens/subjects dichotomy emanated. It was tlu-ough 
this dichotomy that scholars like Mamdani were critical about the wave of 
democratisation which took place in African states and was instituted into a bifurcated 
power relation. It can be concluded that in most African countries traditional 
leadership or traditional authorities cannot be ignored in development activities. 
Failure to include them puts such development activities and initiatives at risk. It was 
clear from this study that the debate between these two structures was far from being 
exhausted and that they are not new debates. These debates have a long history in 
most African countries - they date back to the independence period while in other 
countries they started from the formation of political parties to fight against colonial 
imperialism. 
This study demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3 how colonialists worked with the 
institution of traditional leadership and how this co-option led to division among 
traditional leaders themselves. This was due in part to the fact that there were those 
who collaborated with British imperial policies whilst others resisted working with 
British administration. Those traditional leaders who did not want to implement 
British imperial policies were dealt with accordingly. British imperialists insisted that 
implementing the colonial order depended on traditional leaders. In the contemporary 
order evidence in this study seems to suggest that the successful implementation of 
some of the developmental policies are dependent on the politicians, whether they 
embrace the idea of working with traditional leaders or not. It was demonstrated in 
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the current study that the alliance which was forged by the colonists and the chiefs 
was more beneficial to the former than to the latter. Colonists were able to secure 
labour through such an alliance. 
During the post-colonial era the attempts of African politicians to exclude traditional 
leaders in mainstream politics or governance prompted other developments and 
certain benefits to the institution of traditional leadership. The wave . towards 
independence was also characterised by tensions, which exacerbated divisions m 
African societies. Chapter 2 demonstrated that chiefs who were sympathetic to 
nationalists lost their positions. Ironically, after independence some nationalists did 
not support traditional institutions. Instead, they abolished them. These nationalists 
were driven by the zeal that democracy was incompatible with traditional leadership 
structures. 
Similar tensions emerged in South Africa in the post-apartheid era. The study has 
demonstrated in chapter 3 that the relationship between governments and traditional 
leadership in different periods in South Africa was characterised with many changes 
and conflicts. Holomisa (2004: 3) argued that 'the initial exclusion of traditional 
leaders from the constitutional talks by the De Klerk government and the ANC 
deprived the people of a contribution which could have produced better dispensation 
on the question of the land' .36 This study demonstrated that such exclusion led to a 
strained relationship between government and traditional leaders. 
First, the crisis and the transition led to the restructuring of local government which 
remained on top of the political agenda. Out of the political agenda the LGNF was 
born which excluded those who lacked local government profile. Traditional leaders 
were among the groups excluded. The exclusion allowed an opportunity to 
Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, CONTRALESA and Inkatha to speak in one voice 
calling for the inclusion of traditional structures in the Interim Constitution. Such 
exclusion further led to the collaboration among traditional leaders to force the post-
apartheid government to provide them with a space in the new political set-up. This is 
36 Nkosi Phathekile Holomisa is strongly aligned with an organization of traditional leaders which is 
Contralesa, which became more vocal and advocated for the inclusion of traditional leaders in the 
Interim Constitition of 1993 in South Africa. He made this statement in a Conference Reviewin o the 
first decade of Development and Democracy in South Africa '=' 
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still a contested issue at local government level since there is no clear policy that 
encourages traditional leaders and councillors to work together. 
The constitutional exclusion of traditional leaders contributed to challenges in the 
implementation of RDP and to the failure to run first democratic local government 
elections in KZN on the stipulated date. The White Paper on Local Government was 
silent about the roles and functions of traditional leadership in local government. 
Ismail et al (1997: 116) argued about the lack of political will in traditional local 
governance as follows: 
The question of integrating indigenous and contemporary structures and 
process of governance has thus proved to be a difficult one for African 
countries generally, and South Africa in particular. The Interim Constitution, 
1993 (Act 200 of 1993) and the New Constitution acknowledge the existence 
of indigenous local governance, but remain ambiguous about its roles, powers 
and functions. Similarly, many constitutions of other African make reference 
to indigenous systems. But the general trend has been to marginalise these 
institutions. In fact, many of them were mere retained for symbolic rather 
functional purposes. Admittedly, there are features of the indigenous local 
government system which are not consistence with democratic principles. 
However, the reality is that chiefs ruled people for many years before colonial 
rule was imposed upon them. Thus, for many rural communities in South 
Africa, the indigenous local government system is the only one known to 
them. 
The above quotation conceptualised the premIses on which the debates between 
traditional leaders and elected representatives is centred around in South Africa and in 
the 10zini municipality in particular. 
The current study, in chapter 3 demonstrated how academics, practitioners, activists 
and observers from different disciplines articulated their views about developmental 
local government. What loomed large was that DLG was premised on addressing 
poverty, deepening social justice and fostering sustainable development. Some 
scholars remained critical about DLG due to numerous contradictions in rural local 
government and the neo-liberal orientation. These scholars were critical in the sense 
that, it would be difficult for service provision to be directed to poor citizens. 
Chapter 5 of the current study revealed that the clash between traditional leaders and 
elected representatives in the 10zini municipality is related to a power struggle over 
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who controls the area about servIce delivery. This chapter further showed that 
disputes start because traditional leaders were under pressure from communities. 
They then pressurised councillors about development activities. This chapter revealed 
that the involvement of traditional leaders into party politics loomed large in such a 
way that their involvement is questionable whether it promotes or impedes 
development. Most participants argued that traditional leaders' involvement supports 
developmental progress and that the more they excluded themselves from party 
politics the more development is skewed in their areas. In addition, it was revealed 
that when the IDP concept was conceived that local government should work through 
it in search for developmental projects and budget, traditional leaders were excluded, 
after realising the difficult of implementing developmental projects they were invited 
in training workshops. Conversely, some chiefs did not attend such workshops, 
instead, they sent Izinduna (headmen). A cause for concern is whether they give 
proper feedback or not. 
Furthermore, chapter 5 showed that the land question occupied a large space in the 
current developmental issues of South Africa in general, in the 10zini Municipality in 
particular. Land ownership rests with traditional leaders in the 10zini Municipality. 
This clearly indicated that the accomplishment of rural development projects in the 
10zini Municipality is linked to suppOlis from traditional leaders. From a 
development perspective, it was concluded in 10zini that councillors should lead 
development projects because they are a legitimate structure established through 
government policies but should work in consultation with traditional leaders and 
communities. 
7.3 Recommendations 
7.3.1 General issues to be addressed 
The implementation of developmental local government in 10zini has shown that it 
should not be only about the application of formal procedures and recognising official 
structures, but that it should be about involving traditional leaders through a process 
of inclusionary debates. The research revealed that the inclusion of traditional leaders 
lacks a commitment of political will due to the fact that political leaders have a 
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different vision of democracy. This study recommends that a political will is needed 
for the proper implementation of developmental local government, and this will 
require the inclusion of traditional leaders. Most studies revealed that traditional 
leaders have become important stakeholders for the realisation of rural development. 
The realisation and failure of rural development lies in the rural local government. It 
was revealed in this study that most local municipalities are undergoing institutional 
changes and the politicisation of positions looms large. Such politicisation of 
positions destroyed the proper implementation of developmental programmes. This 
study recommends for the discontinuation of the politicisation of positions. Once 
municipalities and other government departments take vanguard positions in 
discouraging these politicisation activities, issues of addressing skills shortages and 
attracting relevant people for programme implementation would be witnessed. This 
further requires that clear boundaries be drawn between political functionaries and 
administrative office bearers when it comes to recruitment processes. 
In the democratic era participation has become a cornerstone in any public policy. 
But incorporating these participation principles are challenging because it has divided 
communities as there are those who support the idea of participation whilst others 
reject it completely. However, this study suggests that marrying democratic 
principles in a low capacity environment is challenging. Failure to attend and assist 
with capacity-building programmes will eventually threaten the vision for 
developmental local government, for example, addressing the high levels of poverty. 
The issue of consultation, feedback and people's participation needs to be carefully 
reviewed. In the current system of governance most activities need to be people 
driven. Observation showed that councillors are only reporting to selected individuals 
in their wards. Other community members were excluded because of the fear that 
they would challenge issues. In addition, as noticed (in the 10zini municipality) most 
councillors were part-time. Therefore, they were not always available to address 
community concerns. Consequently, community members would get disillusioned on 
community matters and further do not allocate time to attend community meetings. 
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The study revealed that there were conflicts and tensions between traditional leaders 
and elected representatives, but there were instances where the district municipality 
and local municipality created unnecessary structures which are uncoordinated and 
powers duplicated. These structures were created on top of tensions and conflicts 
between traditional leaders and elected representatives- resources used in running 
these structures seemed to be wasted. This study recommends that such activities 
should be avoided and resources be utilised and directed at assisting poor 
communities. This study further argued that the two-tier system that exists in rural 
local government needs to be observed and evaluated very closely in terms of whether 
it contributes to the proper implementation of developmental local government or it 
hinders the speedy delivery of services. This study also argued that most people 
working for rural municipalities have insufficient skills to implement local 
government services in rural areas. 
7.3.2 Specific issues to be addressed by the municipality 
This study has shown that people in rural areas are exposed to both the modern and 
indigenous local governance systems. It was revealed that the colonial penetration 
created a dual system of governance and at the same time chiefs too had to exercise 
dualistic roles as they had to be accountable to their subjects and to government but in 
an asymmetric way. Therefore, the 10zini municipality is facing a challenge that it 
has to educate community members on the importance of both structures in 
government for smooth developmental activities. 
This study has shown that one of the major issues that added to the tensions between 
traditional leaders and elected representatives is the reality that these two structures 
claim legitimacy from different sources. It is important for traditional leaders and 
elected councillors to accept their differences and implement developmental local 
government projects for the benefit of the masses in the countryside without 
competition and conflicts. 
It is an inevitable debate that most rural constituencies are still not yet exposed to IDP 
processes. Less exposure was exacerbated by the fact that these IDP processes are 
politicised and most of these processes are driven by consultants. In rural local 
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government it was conceived in the context of tensions between traditional leaders 
and elected representatives. This study argues that such politicisation augmented gaps 
in information among rural constituencies. Therefore, the municipality is facing a 
challenge in that it has to develop mechanisms that would empower rural stakeholders 
to use the IDP as a powerful tool to select programmes that would address their 
priority needs. 
It is true that there is bias in developmental local government. This can be attributed 
partly due to the fact that urban constituencies are more organised as compared to 
rural communities. This resulted in the marginalisation of rural communities. It can 
be argued that this political marginalisation of rural areas gave little space for the rural 
poor to influence government policies. This calls for strategies that would be able to 
provide rural people with basic skills to interpret local government policies, and this 
should take into consideration the high rate of illiterate that prevails in these areas. 
It is revealed within this study that one of the major predicament of the traditional 
leadership structure in adapting in democratic governance is fear of unknown and 
some of it members are illiterate. Therefore, the structure needs to be empowered in 
different categories. Empowerment should not only be directed to chiefs, headmen 
should also be trained. Traditional leadership structure need to be capacitated on the 
following issues: understand the Constitution; to understand developmental processes 
and their roles in such projects. Introduction of basic training modules in these areas 
would be useful. 
151 
References 
Books and Journals 
Ake, C. 1976. "The congruence of political economies and ideologies in Africa, in 
Gutkind, P.C.W. and Wallestein, I (eds.) The Political Economy of Contemporary 
Africa. London: SAGE Publications 
Amonoo, B. 1981. Ghana 1957-1966 Politics of Institutional Dualism. London: 
George Allen and Unwin Publishers Ltd 
Anthony, J.O. Ethnicity, State power and the democratisation process in Uganda. 
Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper No 33. South Africa: Institute for 
Global Dialogue 
Atkinson, D. 2003. The state of local government: Third-generation issues, in Daniel, 
J, Southall, R and Habib, A (eds.) State of the Nation South Africa 2003-2004. South 
Africa: Human Sciences Research Council Press 
Barrow, B. 1977. South African People, South Africa: Macdonald 
Bennett, T.W. 1998. The constitutional base of traditional rulers in South Africa, in 
d'Engelbronner-Kolff, F.M, Hinz, M.O and Sindano, J.L(eds.) Traditional Authority 
and Democracy in Southern Africa. Namibia: New Namibia Books (Pty) Ltd 
Blaikie, N. 2000. Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation. Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
Bless, e. and Higson-Smith, e. 1995. Fundamentals of Social Research Methods-An 
African Perspective. 2nd Edition. Kenwyn: Juta & Co 
Boafo-Arthur, K. 2001. Chieftaincy and Politics in Ghana since 1982. West Africa 
Review: 3, 1. Africa Resource Center 
Boaten. N.A. 1996. 'Colonialism and Forms of Traditional Local Rule in Ghana', in 
Hofmeister, Wand Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and Contemporary Forms of Local 
Participation and Self-Government in Africa. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer-
Stiftung 
Bonstein, L. 2000. Institutional Context, in May (ed.) Poverty and Inequality in South 
Africa: Meeting the Challenge. Cape Town: London and New York 
Buxton, J.e. 1963. Chiefs and Strangers: A Study of Political Assimilation among the 
Mandari. Oxford at the Clarendon Press 
Cashdan, B. 2002. 'Local Government and Poverty in South Africa', in Parnell, S, 
Pieterse, E, Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique (eds.) Democratising Local 
Government the South African Experiment. Landsdowne: University of Cape Town 
152 
Chazan, N., Lewi, P., Robert, A.M., Rothchild, D and Stedman, SJ. 1999. Politics 
and Society in Contemporary Africa 3rd Edition. United States of America: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 
Chipkin, I. 2002. 'A Developmental Role for Local Government', in Parnell, S, 
Pieterse, E, Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique (eds.) Democratising Local 
Government the South African Experiment. Landsdowne: University of Cape Town 
Clarke, A. and Dawson, R. 1999 Evaluation Research: An Introduction to Principles, 
Methods and Practice. London, Thousands Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications 
Cloete, F. 1995. Local Government Transformation in South Ajdca. Pretoria: J.L. van 
Schaik Publishers 
Cross, C., Luckin, L., Mzimela, T and Clark, C. 1996. 'On the Edge: Poverty, 
Livelihoods and Natural Resources in Rural KwaZulu-Natal', in Lipton, M. , and Ellis, 
F. Land, Labour and Livelihoods in Rural South Afi'ica. Vol (2): KwaZulu-Natal and 
Northern Province. Durban: Indicator Press 
Faure, M. and Lane, J. 1996. South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions. 
London: SAGE Publications 
Fernandes, L. undated. Susane Hoeber Rudolph: Transforming the Boundaries of 
Political Science. Rutgers University-New Brunswick www.apsanet.org. Date 
accessed 12 July 2004 
Forde, D and Kaberry, P.M. West Afi'ican Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century. 
London: Oxford University Press 
Friedman, S. 2003. The state, civil society and social policy: setting a research 
agenda. Politikon 30 (1):3-25 
Gertzel, C. 1975. Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda in Ojuka, A and 
Ochieng, W (eds.) Politics and Leadership in Africa. East African Literature Bureau: 
Kampala, Nairobi Dares Salaam 
Gildenhuys, J.S.H. and Knipe, A, 2000. The Organisation of Government: An 
Introduction. South Africa: van Schaik Publishers 
Gillham, B. 2000. Case Study Research Methods. London& New York: Paston Pre 
Press Ltd 
Glaser, D. 2001. Politics and Society in South Afi'ica. London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd 
Glense, C and Peshkin, A. 1992. Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction. 
Melbourne: Longman (Cheshire) 
Goodenough, C. 2002. Traditional Leaders: A KwaZulu-Natal Study 1999 to 2001. 
South Africa: Independent Projects Trust 
153 
Gukiipa, P.M. 1972. Uganda. A Case Study of African Political Development. 
London: University of Notre Dame Press 
Gusfield, J.K. 1971. "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the study of 
social change" in Finkle, J and Gamble. R. Political Development and Social Change. 
John Wiley: New York 
Gyekye, K. 1997. Tradition and Modernity Philosophical reflections on the Aji'ican 
Experience. New York: Oxford University Press 
Harries, P. 1989. "Exclusion, Classification and Internal colonisation. The Emergence 
of Ethnicity the Tsonga-Speakers of South Africa", in Vail, L (ed.) The Creation of 
Tribalism in Southern Africa. London: University of California Press and James 
Currey Ltd 
Harrison, K. 2002. ' Social Capital and Local Government' , in Parnell, S, Pieterse, E, 
Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique (eds.) Democratising Local Government the 
South African Experiment. Landsdowne: University of Cape Town 
Hart, G. 2002. Disabling Globalisation Places of Power in Post Apartheid South 
Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press 
Hazelton, D. 2001. 'The Rural Poverty Trap a Challenge to the new Municipalities' in 
New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy. Issue 4. Fourth 
Quarter 2001 
Hilliard, V.G. and Wissink, H.F. 2000. Local Government and Development in South 
Africa, in De Beer, F and Swanepoel, H (eds.) Introduction to Development Studies 
2nd Ed· . ItlOn 
Huysamen, G.K. 1994. Methodology for the social and behavioural sciences. South 
Africa: International Thomson Publishing (Southern Africa) Pty Ltd 
Iroko. A.F. 1996. 'Pre-Colonial and Colonial Policy and Government in West Africa: 
The Example of Benin', in Hofmeister, W and Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and 
Contemporary Forms of Local Participation and Self-Government in Africa. South 
Africa: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung 
Ismail, N, Bayat, S and Meyer, I. 1997. Local Government Management. South 
Africa: International Thomson Publishing Southern Africa. 
Johnson, A.M. 1996. KwaZulu-Natal ' s Constitution: Turning Point or Footnote? 
Indicator South Africa. Vol 13 (3) 
Jordan, R.S. 1969. Government and Power in West Africa. London: Latiner Trend C 
Ltd Plymouth 
Kaarsholm, P. 1991. Cultural Struggles and Development in Southern Africa (ed.) 
London: James Currey Ltd 
154 
Keulder, C. 1998. Traditional leaders and local government in Africa: Lessons for 
South Africa. Human Sciences Research Council: Pretoria 
Keulder, C. 1998. Traditional Leaders and Rural Development, in d'Engelbronner-
Kolff, F.M, Hinz, M.O and Sindano, J.L(eds.) Traditional Authority and Democracy 
in Southern Africa. Namibia: New Namibia Books (Pty) Ltd 
Kiwanuka, S. 1975. The Three Traditional Foundations of African Nationalism: A 
Study of the Western Impact on African Politics (1900-1960) in Ojuka, A and 
Ochieng, W (eds.) Politics and Leadership in Africa. East African Literature Bureau: 
Kampala, Nairobi Dares Salaam 
Krishma, A. 2001. Global Truths and Local Realities: Traditional Institutions in a 
modern World. Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy Duke. Working paper Series 
Ladouceur, P.A. 1979. Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalisation in 
Northern Ghana. London and New York: Longman Group Limited 
Lahiff, E. 1997. Land, Water and Local Governance in South Africa: A case study of 
the Mutale River Valley: Rural Resources, Rural Livelihoods Working Paper Series 
Lemarchand, R. 1977. African Kingships in Perspective Political Change and 
Modernisation in Monarchial Settings (ed.) England: Frank Cass and Company 
Lemon, A. 2002. 'The Role of Local Government', in Parnell, S, Pieterse, E, Swilling, 
M and Wooldridge Dominique (eds.) Democratising Local Government the South 
African Experiment. Landsdowne: University of Cape Town 
Lock, R and Quantrill, P. 2002. Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the cover-
up. London: Stackpole Books 
Lodge, T. 2002. Bus Stop for Everyone: Politics in South Africa [From Mandela to 
Mbeki] Cape Town: David Philip 
Lutz, G and Linder, W. 2004. Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local 
Development. University of Berne Switzerland 
Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and The Legacy of 
Late Colonialism. United States of America: Princeton University Press 
Mamdani, M. 1998. When does Reconciliation turn into denial of justice? South 
Africa: Human Sciences Research Council Press 
Mare, G. and Hamilton, G. 1987. An Appetite for Power Buthelezi 's Inkatha and the 
Politics of 'Loyal Resistance '. South Africa: Raven Press (Pty) Ltd 
Marlow, C. 1998. Research Methods for Generalist Social Work 2nd Edition. Pacific 
Grove, California: Brooks/Cole 
155 
Martinussen,l. 1997. Development as a Subject Area, in Martinussen, 1. (ed.) State 
and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development. United States of 
America: Zed Books Ltd 
Martinussen, 1. 1997. Political Development and State Building, in Martinussen, 1. 
(ed.) State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development. United 
States of America: Zed Books Ltd 
May, T. 2001. Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process. Buckingham, 
Philadelphia: Open University. 
Maykut, P. and Morehouse, R. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: Using the Constant 
Comparative Method. London: Routledge 
Mbatha, L. 2003. "Democratising Local Government": Problems and Opportunities in 
the Advancement of Gender Equality in South Africa, in Goetz, AM. and Hassin, S 
(eds.) No Shortcuts to Power African Women in Politics and Policy Making. London: 
Zed Books Ltd 
McIntosh, AC. 1996. 'Rural Local Government in South African Context: The 
Theory and Process', in Reddy, P.S. (ed.) Readings in Local Government and 
Development: A South African Perspective. Cape Town: luta & LTD 
Mhome, G and Edigheji, O. 2003. Towards Developmentalism and Democratic 
Governance in South Africa, in Mhome, G and Odigheji, 0 (eds.) Governance in the 
new South Africa: The Challenges of Globalisation. Landdowne: University of Cape 
Town Press 
Minnaar, AV. 1991. Conflict and Violence in NatallKwaZulu Historical Perspective. 
Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council 
Mogale, T. 2003. Developmental Local Government and Decentralised Services 
Delivery in the Democratic South Africa in Mhome, G and Odigheji, 0 (eds.) 
Governance in the new South Africa: The Challenges of Globalisation. Landdowne: 
University of Cape Town Press 
Mohanty, S. 1992. Political Development and Ethnic Identity in Africa: A Study of 
Angola since 1960. London: Sangam Books Limited 
Moore, N. 2000. How to do research: The complete guide to designing and managing 
research projects. 3rd Edition. London: Library Association Publishing 
Morrell, R., Wright, 1 and Meintjes, S. 1996. Colonialism and the Establishment of 
White Domination 1840-1890, in Morrel, R (ed.) Political Economy and Identities in 
KZN: Historical and Social Perspectives. Durban /South Africa: Indicator Press 
Mouton, 1. 1990. Basic Concept in Methodology of Social Science. Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council 
156 
Mugyenyi, M. 1987. Development First, Democracy Second, in Oyugi, W.O. and 
Gitonga, A. (eds.) Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa Nairobi: Heinemann 
Kenya Ltd 
Mutibwa, P. 1992. Uganda since Independence. A study of Unfulfilled Hopes. United 
Kingdom: Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd 
Mzala, 1988. Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda. London: Zed Books 
Ntsebenza, L. 2001. 'Traditional Authorities and Rural Development', in Coetzee, 
lK, Graff, Hendricks, F and Wood, G (eds.). Development, Theory, Policy and 
Practice. South Africa: Oxford University Press 
Ntsebenza, L. 2003. Democracy in South Africa's countryside: Is there a role for 
traditional authorities? Development Update, 4(1) 
Ntsebenza, L. 2005. Rural governance and citizenship in post-1994 South Africa: 
democracy compromised?, in Daniel, J, Southall, Rand Lutchrnan, J (eds.) State of 
the Nation South Africa 2004-2005. South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council 
Press 
Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2003. Chieftaincy and the Negotiation of Might and Right in 
Botswana's Democracy, in Melber, H. (ed.) Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: 
The unfinished business of democratic consolidation. South Africa: Human Sciences 
Research Council Press 
Oldfield, S. 2002. 'Embedded Autonomy' and The Challenges of Developmental 
Local Government, in Parnell, S, Pieterse, E, Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique 
(eds.) Democratising Local Government the South Ajhcan Experiment. Landsdowne: 
University of Cape Town 
Oyugi. W. 1996. 'Governance in Kenya during Pre-Colonial and Colonial Periods' , in 
Hofmeister, Wand Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and Contemporary Forms of Local 
Participation and Self-Government in Africa. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer-
Stiftung 
Pape, J and McDonald, D.A. 2002. Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery 
in South Africa. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Publishers 
Parnell, S and Pieterse, E. 2002. 'Developmental Local Government', in Parnell, S, 
Pieterse, E, Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique (eds.) Democratising Local 
Government the South African Experiment. Landsdowne: University of Cape Town 
Phillips, A. 1989. The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa. London: 
Third World Publications (C-op) Ltd 
Pieterse, E. 1997. 'Metropolitan Policy Making in a Globalising Context', in Naidu, 
R.A. and Reddy, P.S. (eds.). Metropolitan Government and Development: Present 
and Future Challenges. Durban: Logos Printers 
157 
Potholm, C. 1977. The Ngwenyama of Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political 
Adaptation, in Lemarchand, R (ed.) African Kingships in Perspective Political 
Change and Modernisation in Monarchial Settings. England: Frank Cass and 
Company 
Pycroft, C. 2002. 'Addressing Rural Poverty: Restructuring Rural Local 
Government', in Parnell, S, Pieterse, E, Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique 
(eds.) Democratising Local Government the South African Experiment. Landsdowne: 
University of Cape Town 
Rathbone, R. 2000. Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics Chieftaincy in Ghana, 
1957-1960 (West African Studies). Ohio: Ohio University Press 
Reddy, P.S. 1999. Local Government Democratisation and Decentralisation. A 
Review of the Southern African Region (ed.) Cape Town: Juta & Co Ltd 
Rudolph, S.H. 1967. The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Rugege, S. 2002. The Institution of Traditional Leadership and Its Relation With 
Elected Representatives, in Seminar Report 2002, No 14. Constitution and Law IV: 
Colloquium on Local Government Law. RSA: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung 
Simunyu, V.G. 1987. The Democratic Myth in the African Traditional Societies, in 
Oyugi, W.O. and Gitonga, A. (eds.) Democratic Theory and Practice in Aji-ica 
Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya Ltd 
Spitz, R. and Chaskalson, M. 2000. The Politics of Transition: A Hidden History of 
South Africa 's Negotiated Settlement. South Africa: Witwatersrand University Press 
Tapscott. C. 1996. ' Institutionalisation of Rural Local Government in Post Apartheid 
South Africa' , in Hofmeister, Wand Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and Contemporary 
Forms of Local Participation and Self-Government in Africa. South Africa: Konrad 
Adenauer-Stiftung 
Turner, R. 1972. The Eye of the needle: Towards Participatory Democracy in South 
Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press 
Van Donk, M. 2002. 'Local Government's Role in Realising Gender Equality: From 
Policy to Practice', in Parnell, S, Pieterse, E, Swilling, M and Wooldridge Dominique 
(eds.) Democratising Local Government the South African Experiment. Landsdowne: 
University of Cape Town 
Van Vonk, M. 2000. 'Local Government: A Strategic site of struggle for gender 
equality', in Agenda 45 Empowering women for Gender Equity. South Africa-
Durban-Artworks 
Venson, P. 1996. Civil Society and Forms of Political Participation in South Africa, in 
Hofmeister, Wand Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and Contemporary Forms of Local 
158 
Participation and Self-Government in Africa. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer-
Stiftung 
Wanyande, P. 1987. Democracy and the One-Party State: The African Experience, in 
Oyugi, w.O. and Gitonga, A. (eds.) Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa 
Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya Ltd 
Welsh, D. 1971. The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Natal 1845-1910. 
London: Oxford University Press 
Zungu, S. 1996. 'Traditional Leaders' Capability and Disposition for Democracy: The 
Example of South Africa', in Hofmeister, Wand Scholz, I (eds.) Traditional and 
Contemporary Forms of Local Participation and Self-Government in Africa. South 
Africa: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung 
Unpublished Theses 
Amtaika, A.L. 1996. The Role of Traditional Leaders in Democratic KwaZulu-Natal. 
Unpublished Masters Dissertation: University of Natal 
Appiah, G.A. 1994. Chiefship in the Transkei under Tribal Authority System: A case 
study. Unpublished Masters Dissertation: University of Natal. Durban 
Ngcobo, R.M.B. 1997. The role of Civil Society in the Reconciliation and 
Development Pragramme: A case Study of Community Based Organisation in KZN. 
Masters Thesis: University of Natal 
Government Sources 
Jozini Local Municipality, Integrated Development Plan Review 2004, 30 June 2004 
LED Projects 2003/04 Status Report as at 05 November 2004 
Mayoral Fund Projects 2003/04 Status Report as at 05 November 2004 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Republic of South Africa, 1997. White Paper on South African Land Policy 
Republic of South Africa, 1998. Municipal Structures Act 
Republic of South Africa, 1998. White Paper on Local Government 
Republic of South Africa, 2000. Municipal Systems Act 
159 
Uphongolo Sub-Regional Development Plan Development Perspective, April 2000 
Conference Papers and Reports 
Achmat, F. 2002. LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. 
Approaches for Local Governance. Public Participation in the Western Cape, South 
Africa. Bandung, Indonesia, 20th - 2ih January, 2002 
Greenberg, S. 2004. Post-apartheid Development, Landlessness and the Reproduction 
of Exclusion in South Africa, Centre for Civil Society Research Report No. 17, 
Durban, South Africa, May 2004 
Holomisa, N.P. 2004. The role of traditional authorities in rural development: The 
cultural, socio-economic and governance role of traditional authorities in the new 
South Africa. Paper presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference Reviewing the First 
Decade of Development and Democracy in South Africa, International Convention 
Centre, Durban, South Africa, 21 5t - 22nd October, 2004 
Mngomezulu, B.R. 1999. "Forgotten Heroes: Resuscitating Zulu Struggles Against 
Colonial Encroachment" . Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the South 
African Historical Society, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, 11th - 14th 
July, 1999 
Mngomezulu, B.R. 2001. "One country, two political systems: a critical appraisal of 
Tinkhundla in Swaziland since independence". Paper presented at the African Studies 
Association 44th Annual Meeting, Houston, Texas, USA, 15th - 18th November, 2001 
Ntsebenza, L. 2002. Decentralisation and Natural Resource Management in Rural 
South Africa: Problems and Prospects. Paper presented at the ISACP Bi-Annual 
Conference, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe from 1 i h - 21 5t June, 2002 
Ntsebenza, L. 2004. Rural Development, Traditional Authorities and Democracy in 
South Africa. Paper presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference Reviewing the First 
Decade of Development and Democracy in South Africa, International Convention 
Centre, Durban, South Africa, 21 5t - 22nd October, 2004 
Ray, D.l. and Brown, S.A. Building HIV/AIDS Competence in Ghana-Traditional 
Leadership and Shared Legitimacy: A grassroots Community Intervention Best 
Practices Model-With Some Preliminary Comparisons to South Africa and Botswana. 
Paper Prepared for presentation to the Canadian Political Science Association Annual 
Meeting, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3rd June, 2004 
160 






Dear Sir or Madam 
APPENDIX 1 
23Minelso Gardens 
30 Prains Avenue 
DURBAN 
4001 
01 September 2004 
REQUEST TO CONDUCT RESEARCH - MASTER'S DEGREE 
I am registered student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in the School of 
Development Studies. I am currently pursuing the Masters Degree in Development 
Studies and the primary component deals with research-based investigation which 
necessitates, inter alia, field work and data collection. I intend commencing with data 
collection process from the 04th of October 2004 to the 15th of November 2004. 
My topic is entitled: 'Developmental local government in a rural context: A case 
study of Jozini Municipality'. In order to successfully complete my Masters 
Degree, the latter part of the empirical framework involves conducting interviews 
with some of the municipal councillors and some traditional leaders within the Jozini 
Municipality. Your municipality has been identified as the municipality where the 
exploration of developmental local government in a rural context can be done. There 
is an assumption that the traditional and modern structures are operating in 
juxtaposition to each other. Indeed, this study intends to develop practical and salient 
recommendations on how these two structures work together in enhancing service 
delivery, and on the whole promoting rural development which appears to be taking 
strain due to the discord that exist between modern and traditional structures of 
governance. 
Your co-operation in assisting me with this important component of my study is 
highly appreciated and I look forward to a positive feedback. If there are any queries, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at the above address and cell number. I take this 
opportunity of again thanking you in advance in order to enable me to complete this 
research project. 
Sincerely 
Sithembiso Lindelihle Myeni (Mr) 
Student Number: 202519238 University of KwaZulu Natal (Howard Campus, School 
of Development Studies) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Traditional Authority: Where the community member should give receipt given by 
a local induna to the traditional authority secretary so that another receipt could be 
given to that person. This serves as a proof that that person who was looking for a 
site followed all proper channels 
i 
At the time the local induna invites community member and neighbors to officially 
give a site to a needy person and these neighbors and other community members ' 
witness. It is at this time when a local induna should receive a certain payments for 
administration which is differ from traditional authority to the other. 
r 
Local Induna approach with his council of his specific ward and discusses the 
request for that person who is in need of a site. 
r 
Community member who is looking for a site approach a local induna (headman), 
and this community member must be clear as to where the site is and has already 




Interview Number .. ... ... ...... ............... ...... ..... ...... ....... ... .... .... 
Developmental local government in a rural context: A case study of Jozini 
Municipality . 
Name of Interviewee (Optional) 





18 and below 
19 - 25 
26-30 
31- 35 
36 and above 
Position Full Time Part Time 
Senior Municipal Official 




Represent Civil Society Member 
Represent Traditional Leadership 
Place 
Date of Interview 
Time of Interview 
Ward Number 
Name of Traditional Centre 
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B. QUESTIONS 
1. Politics and Traditional Leadership 
1.1 How do traditional leaders relate with political parties? 
.............. .... .... ..... . ........... .. ........ . .... . . ... ..... ... ....... .. ....... .. ...... .. 
..... .. ....... .. ....... .. ....... ... ......................... ... ................... . .......... 
. . .................. .. ....... .... ................. .. ....... .. ....... .. ................... ... . 
............................................................................... .... .... . . .... 
......... . . . . . . ..... .. . .. ..... . ... . ......... .. . . ............................ . .......... ... ... 
1.2 Are traditional leaders forced into party politics? Elaborate . 
......................................................................... . . ........... .. . .. .. 
.............. .. ............................................. . ............... .. .............. 
1.3 Is there any need for traditional leaders to involve themselves in party politics? 
Yes or No? Elaborate. 
1.4 Are traditional leaders' involvement in party politics supporting or impeding 
developmental progress? With reference to Jozini. 
1.5 Do you think the government is aware of the tensions and conflict associated 
with the relationship between traditional leaders and elected representatives? 
..... ..... . ... .. ........ . ............ . ........... . . . . .. ............ ... ....................... 
.............. .. ............................................... . ............. . ............... 
............ . ......................... . ............ . ............................. . ........ . .. 
.. .. ....... ... .. .. ..................................................................... . . .. . . 
.................................. ...... .......... ........ ......................... ...... .. .. 
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1.6 Are the tensions between elected representatives and traditional leaders 
impacting on the IDP? Elaborate . 
..... .. ...... . ..... . ........ ... ... . ........ .. ..... .... ........................................ 
.. ... ...... .. ........ .. ............ .. ....... .. .................... .. ............. . ...... ... .. 
... . . ... ........... ... ..... ..... ........... . ...... . ................. ..... .... .. ............ . . 
.... . . .... .. . . .. ..... ... . .... .... . ..... . .. . ...... . ............... .. ...... . ...... .. ...... . . . .. 
.... . ........ . ..... . .................... . ....... ...... ..... . .... ..... ...... . ....... .. ......... . 
1.7 What is the nature of relationship between traditional leaders, government and 
civil society in this municipality? 
.......... . .. . ....... . ...................... .. .......... .. ........ . ........................ . . 
............................................................................................. 
..... ... ........ . .. ... ...... . .. . .......... ..... ....... .... .. .. ....... . ......... . . . ......... . . 
............................................................................................. 
............................................................................................. 
1.8 What role do traditional leaders have in respect of all issues relating to land in 
10zini? 
1.9 How democratic are the traditional authority areas e.g. are there any no-go 
areas? Elaborate. 
2. Traditional Political System and Development 
2.1 What are preferred ways of dialogue between elected representatives and 
traditional leaders that could sustain long-term development projects in 10zini? 
............................................................................................. 
............................................................................................. 
. ..... ........ . . ...... .................... . ....................... . . .......... ......... .. .... 
.............................................................................................. 
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2.2 What are preferred ways to implement developmental local government at 
10zini? 
. . ..... . .... . .................. . ....... . ..................... . ........... . ........ . .. . ...... . 
. . ........ . .. . ..... . . .... . .. . .. . .. ......... . ........ ... ....... ... ......... ..... ...... . .. . .. . . 
... ...... ....... . .. ...... . ..... . . .. ......... .. . . ........ .. ....... .. .... . ................. .. .. 
................... . ......... .. ............ .. .......... . .. . .................................. 
. . ........ . .. . ....... . . .. . . ... . . ..... . . ....... . ....... . .. . . .. ............. ... ........... .... . 
2.3 How do the tensions between elected representatives and traditional leaders 
impact on development projects in 10zini? 
2.4 Who do you think should lead development projects in this municipality? 
Why? 
2.5 What has changed on the ways in which development was taking place within 
the jurisdiction of this municipality since 2000? 
. .. ...... . . . ................ . .. . .. . .... . ....... .. ........................... . ................ 
3. Legal Frameworks 
3.1 How is the statutory relationship between traditional leaders and elected 
representatives promoting or hindering development? 




............... . ......... . ........................... .. ...... . . . .............................. 
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3.2 Is the content of the legislation about the role of traditional leadership 
institution and government institutions reconcilable with the system of 
democracy in the country? Elaborate 
. . ........ . ........ . .. . . . .... . .. . ... . ... . .. . ........ . .... . . . . . ........ . .. . ......... . .... . .. . . 
. . ...... . .. .. ..... . .... .. . . ....... . ...... .. .. . .. . .. . . .. ......... . ... .. ....... . ....... . . . .. . .. 
. .. ....... .. .......... . ....... . . .. . .. ...... . .. . ........ . .. . ..... . ......... .. . . .......... .. ... 
. ...... . .. . ......... .. ......... . ............ . ...... . . . ......... . . . . . ........ . .. . ........ . .. . . 
. . . . ..... . . ... . . . .. ...... . .. . ......... .. ....... . . . ..... . ........ . ... . ........ .. ....... .. . . ... 
4. Structures and Mechanisms 
4.1 Does central government take any responsibility for capacity building of 
traditional leaders and other stakeholders involved in development? 
5. Relation between traditional leadership and governments 
5.1 How are government officials at all levels interacting with the institution of 
chieftaincy? 
5.2 How do traditional leaders relate with local government, especially the elected 
councillors? 
.......... . . . . . ........ . ... .. .................... . .......................... . .. . ............. 
. ... . ........... . ................. . ........ . . .. .. . ............ .. . . ............. ... . .. ........ 
.......... . . . ........ .. ........ . ........................ . .......... . ....... . .... .. ....... . . . . 
.... . . .. .. . ........ . .. . ................. . ... . ........... ... . . . . ....... . .. ... ................. 
5.3 How do traditional leaders relate to provincial and national government? 
. . . . ....... . . . . . ..... . ................... . . . ........... . .. . ..... . .................. . .... . .... 
..... . ....... . ... . ...... . ................. .. ........... . .. . ......... . .. . . . ......... .. ........ 
. . ..... . ........ . .......... . .................................. .. .......... . .................. 
..... .. . . ..... . . . .. . ....... . ......... . . . ..... . . . . ..... ..... . .. . ....... . ...................... 
.... . ........ ... ...... . .. . .... . ......... . .... .. .... . . .. ..................... .. ......... . ....... 
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6. Gender and Traditional Political Institutions 
6.1 What is the status of women in traditional authorities? 
............................................................................................. 
............................................................................................. 
. .................................................................................. .. ........ 
............................................................................................. 
........... .. ............. .. ........................................... . ...................... 
6.2 Are women allowed to be traditional leaders? If yes, what are the criteria used 
to appoint them? 
7. Traditional Authority and Local Government in Service Delivery 
7.1 What is the relationship between traditional authority and local government in 
lozini? 
8. Traditional Political System and Youth 





. . .. ...................................... . ............. .. ............ ... .................... 
9. Policies 
9.1 Are you aware of national policies that are designed to promote the 
relationship between traditional leaders and elected representatives? 
............... . .................. . .......................................................... 
........... . .... . ...... .. .................................................................... 
............................................................................................. 
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9.2 What are problems facing the institution of traditional leadership in adapting 
to democratic governance in South Africa? 
THANK YOU, FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
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